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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  In recent years, the relationship between traditional and social media has resulted in debates 
that examine how audiences perceive information coming from Internet sources – in particular, 
how audiences perceive trust, credibility and authenticity. At the same time, both American 
audiences and American journalism have grown more culturally diverse – not necessarily in direct 
proportion to each other, but in ways that suggest that audiences interpret news from traditional 
and social media sources differently. This dissertation examines perceptions of news information 
from multiple channels, presenters of different ethnicities and modality due to the drastically 
changed ways in which the American public, politicians and the media talk about “security.” 
 This dissertation brings together all these elements in a controlled experiment that 
addresses important theoretical approaches from communication and international relations in the 
news media environment. This introduction sets out the general approach to those theories by 
defining them through prior research and tying them into audience perceptions of race and news 
information. However to accomplish this, it has to start with a 19th century concept that still flavors 
much of the political discussion about the U.S. and its place in a diverse and chaotic world. This 
chapter will briefly turn to discussing exceptionalism and its role in the way Americans view race. 
 In that context, this project examines how groups that are deemed to be culturally different 
or foreign are placed under a symbolic quarantine by American exceptionalism. This notion stems 
from the perception that American ideals and values are superior to those of foreign nations. The 
concept of exceptionalism “emphasizes the United States—and earlier the colonies—separation 
from the rest of the world and development of unprecedented forms of society and politics,” 
(Chaplin, 2003, p. 1432). Newer forms of exceptionalism can also come into play when dealing 
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with individuals from “othered” geographic regions such as the Middle East, South Asia and Latin 
America.  
 One definition of “othering” is the way the West views the East through the lens of moral 
and technological superiority, thereby creating a sense of ongoing tension between the two (Said, 
1978). Said used the term “other” to specifically refer to Arabs, the Middle East and Islam, naming 
this particular form of “othering” Orientalism. Said used the term Orient to refer to the East, while 
defining the Occident as the West. Orientalism from European nations like Germany and France 
share the perception with American Orientalism that they possess “a kind of intellectual authority 
over the Orient within Western culture,” (Said, 1978, p. 19). Therefore, “othering” people in 
geographic and cultural spaces allowed Europe or Western nations’ culture to gain strength and a 
specific identity by setting themselves against the perceived inferiority of the East (1978). 
 Nayak and Malone (2009) argue that the myth of Orientalism arises out of this belief that 
America and Europe are the “monolithic, hermetically sealed ‘West’ that posits itself against the 
rest of the world” (2009, p. 255). This Orientalism focuses on the physical and cultural space 
between the Occident and Orient, but scholars have noted that Orientalism also exists within the 
context of the United States (2009). 9/11 has changed the way the public thinks and talks about 
people from the Middle East and South Asia (Hagopian, 2004). Immigration from countries like 
Mexico have led to claims that the Anglo-Saxon way of life is being threatened (Nayak & Malone, 
2009). This fear of losing a “way of life” echoes the rhetoric of the Reagan administration during 
the Cold War and continues to be used by politicians and the mass media (2009). This furthers the 
divide between America and the “others.” 
 In the context of the current research, “othering” is not just relegated to the East/West 
divide, but rather looks at the more nuanced institutional biases that exist within the news media. 
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Traditional news media routinely use racial stereotyping, which becomes more evident in the 
context of disaster and crisis coverage (Gitlin, 2003). As Gitlin writes, “simply by doing their jobs, 
journalists tend to serve the political and economic elite definitions of reality” (2003, p. 12). 
Journalists, editors, managers and media owners develop their ideas of social reality through 
routines that have been developed as early as childhood and further reinforced by their careers 
through training, assignments, rewards and promotions (Gitlin, 2003). These routines, when used 
regularly create a framework that is passed onto audiences and continues to depict “the other” in 
a stereotypical fashion. This framework, referred to as media framing, is a “process of culling a 
few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among 
them to promote a particular interpretation,” (Entman, 2007). 
 Framing is the repetitive use of words, metaphors, symbols, phrases and the types of stories 
used that create a specific social reality (Entman, 1991, 1993; Gitlin, 2003). Developed frames can 
highlight how and what audiences perceive as problems and moral dilemmas (Entman, 1993; 
2004). Frames have been used as mechanism to define cultural differences on a range of issues 
pertaining to Muslims and Islam (Kumar, 2010). However, “othering” is not just relegated to Islam 
and Muslims, but also to other ethnicities. 
 The growing multiculturalism in U.S. society has led to heated debate regarding racial 
identity (Gandy, 1998). Equality, by definition, means there is no underlying difference between 
races and cultures; however, adherents to multiculturalism argue that “Whites, Blacks, Asians, and 
Native Americans are different at a deeper, cultural level, and that the preservation of these cultural 
differences is a legitimate choice” (Gandy, 1998, pg. 73). But the framing of race and ethnicity has 
been controlled actively in the political sphere, which has led to the use of identifying markers 
(such as race, language and religion) as the focus of attack by adversaries of multiculturalism 
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(Gandy, 1998). Hall (1998) argues that for cultural framing of an issue to be successful, it requires 
dominance over all other frames such that it silences all other competing frames. This allows the 
specific frame “to win a kind of credibility, legitimacy or taken-for-grantedness for itself” (1998, 
p. 1050). The addition of an actor, like a politician or the media, has an amplifying effect that can 
turn racial/cultural stereotypes into threats to a country’s dominant culture. This combination of 
frames and the amplifying effects of a perceived threat can influence audiences’ perception of an 
“othered” group’s identity. This threat can be physical or cultural and has raised questions about 
how politicians and, in turn, the mass media, define “security threats” and is referred to as 
securitization. 
 Securitization was introduced by the Copenhagen School (Buzan, 1983) and is housed 
within international relations. The Copenhagen School is an academic school of thought that 
suggests that “the enunciation of security itself creates a new social order wherein ‘normal politics’ 
is bracketed” (Balzacq, 2005, p. 171). Originally, securitization was defined through the prism of 
military and state security (Williams, 2003); however, the concept has expanded to include issues, 
such as immigration, language and culture as an imminent threat to the dominant culture of the 
state. The media play a crucial role in the perception and management of information regarding a 
distant and poorly defined enemy, especially during times of conflict (Hess and Kalb, 2003). This 
research examines security through the lens of juxtaposition of the dominant culture to 
immigrating cultures (such as Middle Eastern, South Asian and Latin). The current research finds 
the media is an important intermediary for politicians to convey their messages of imminent threats 
at the global and state levels.  
 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s (1998) definition of securitization consists of three 
elements: 1) the securitizing actor or agency that makes the securitizing move (for this research 
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the media plays the crucial role as a platform for the actor), 2) the referent object, (in the context 
of this dissertation is the dominant culture) and 3) a target audience that accepts the issue as a 
security threat (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). In order for a threat to be successfully 
securitized, it must be accepted as an existential threat by the audience. In this regard, race and 
culture can be securitized by repetitive use of frame; in particular, issues surrounding racial and 
cultural identity have been highlighted during times of conflict and strife, such as war or economic 
downturn. Thus, in the context of the current research, securitized situations would require a 
perceived threat of an outside cultural influence with the media (traditional or social) as an 
intermediary. The perceived threat could be based on language, religion and ethnicity and an actual 
physical threat.  
 Rather than the prevailing black-white paradigm that has dominated U.S. racial discourse, 
this research looks at the phenomenon of “browning.” Discussions regarding “browning” and 
“browned” bodies took place prior to the attacks of 9/11 and focus on two areas: 1) the growing 
number of immigrants and minorities and 2) the wider acceptance of multiculturalism within U.S. 
society (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo 2009). This “browning of America” has been viewed 
with contempt because it disrupts the longstanding black-white binary that has pervaded U.S. 
rhetoric on race (Sundstrom, 2008). Post-9/11 growing “brownness” has created a sense of 
insecurity within the mainstream such as anti-immigration sentiment (Lugo-Lugo and 
Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2009).  
 This dissertation follows previous research in race and identity which defines “Brown” as 
a body that is perceived as a threat to the American government and the social values of the 
country, deemed as being un-American. And finally Brown individuals are placed under strict 
containment; that is, they are socially quarantined and allowed to be scrutinized by the government 
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and the public (2009). Conversations post-9/11 have divided “browned” groups as threats or as 
“model minorities.” Puar and Rai (2004) find that South Asians, in contrast to Middle Easterners, 
often had the label of “model minority” attached to their identities. 
 Much of this identity came in the form of “economic exceptionalism, upward class 
mobility, and educational excellence” (Puar and Rair, 2004, p. 11). However, 9/11 tarnished the 
image of the South Asian “model minority” due to physical and geographic association with 
Osama bin Laden and other terrorists (2004). Muslims, along with Sikhs, are identified as “others” 
due to wearing turbans and hijabs. Hindus, on the other hand, although “brown” do not face the 
same level of surveillance (2004). This research looks to define “Brown” and “browned bodies” 
as those from the Orient, while “White” is viewed as the Occident.  
 Previous research defines White as it contrasts with Black Americans, who have been 
historically defined as the “other” (Warren and Twine, 1997). Whiteness comes with privileges 
such as being seen as neutral and normal (McIntosh, 1989). Many of these perceptions are 
considered to be unearned privileges to being viewed as White. Perhaps most importantly, the 
perception of Whiteness is deemed as American (1989). Brown and White are not defined based 
on physical skin color, but rather the focus is on other elements that define an individual along 
these racial lines. 
 The attacks of September 11, 2001, turned to this new “browned” racial discourse that 
focused on Muslim nations and their citizens being viewed as a threat. Since the attacks on 9/11, 
terrorism has been associated with Brown “others” and it became so salient that the “war on 
terrorism” became a global fight against “otherness.” In 2008 when the U.S. was under the most 
severe recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
February 2012), interest surrounding terrorism and government policies fell in importance in the 
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public forum in favor of the economy and jobs. According to Pew Research (Pew Research, 2012), 
terrorism had fallen to third place; behind the economy and unemployment, in 2012 due to the 
recession. Since President Barack Obama’s election in 2008, the American public’s concerns have 
been closer to home, with 81 percent saying Obama should be more focused on domestic issues 
than foreign policy (Pew Research, 2012). The president, other politicians and the mass media can 
set the agenda for the most important issues facing the country. The salience of certain topics 
presented by the mass media is referred to as Agenda-Setting Theory. 
 According to McCombs and Shaw (1972), by simply emphasizing stories on a particular 
issue, the mass media plays an integral role in agenda setting. Their study on audiences and 
political information found that people’s perception of important news stories came directly from 
the mass media. Major campaign issues in 2012 were focused on unemployment and the economy 
and as a result audiences of traditional media found those issues to be the most important (Neuman, 
Guggenheim, Jang and Bae, 2013).  
 Yet despite the shift in public priorities, securitizing factors continue to remain a prevalent 
part in the way political actors widen their agendas by throwing a security net over specific referent 
objects like national security, immigration, the economy, and other societal sectors. For example, 
honoring Muslim holidays in schools like Eid-ul-Fitr or Eid-ul-Adha could be conflated with the 
larger idea of political violence from the Middle East and South Asia. American exceptionalism 
can only exist if American values and ideals remain the standard. As a result, Muslim holidays, 
foreign languages and political ideologies cannot share the same stage with American holidays, 
American English and American political ideals.   
 Issues like immigration and economic downturn can place “othered” groups in a 
contemptuous space that has those groups being perceived as burdens on already strained economy 
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with American taxpayers taking on the brunt of the financial responsibility (Ana, 1999). But even 
when they are being “good” immigrants, like getting H-1B visas to legally work in the United 
States and not straining the economy, they are still perceived as taking opportunities away from 
Americans (1999).  The H-1B visa allows American companies to hire foreign workers on a 
temporary basis in certain technical fields related to technology and medicine (U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services, n.d.). Despite the process being legal, issues of allowing “others” into 
America for employment has further lengthened the divide between “us” versus “them.”  
 Media coverage surrounding the “war on terror” and immigration continues to distinguish 
“good guys” from “bad guys.” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States projected 
the image of the lone world superpower that was the cultural and technological top of the pyramid. 
The attacks of September 2001 changed that. America’s sense of invincibility was shattered and 
as a result, in an effort to recreate the muscular propaganda war of the 1940s, George W. Bush 
initially used language that evoked images of the old West (Jansen, 2002, p.178). This post 9/11 
world was a black and white land where there were clearly defined good and bad guys, over-
simplifying the complexities of war (p. 178). Prior to 9/11 countries like Iran and Iraq had been 
perceived as enemy nations along with their citizens. 
 Part of creating this good versus bad field involved putting the war in terms of language 
that attempted to make America the heroic figure. Frames, in part, rely on the repetitive use of key 
words and phrases (Gitlin, 2003), thus language framed in specific ways, such as de-emphasizing 
victims and government actions, can create social hierarchies that extend out to the rest of the 
world (Entman, 2007). After the end of the Cold War, Washington faced a “threat deficit” and 
despite potential replacements as foreign enemies to focus U.S. foreign and military policy, like 
Japan and China (as economic competitors), none came as close as the Soviet Union (Buzan, 
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2006). The U.S. struggled against Communism for over 40 years and had created a global shared 
framing that positioned it as the leader of the Western world (Buzan, 2006). 
 The terror attacks provided a new global threat that could be a unifying force to maintain 
U.S. leadership over the Western world (Buzan, 2006). Organizations like the Taliban and al-Qaida 
had become a new branch of “manly men” (Jansen, 2002, p. 55) that were a formidable enemy, 
not only through the attacks, but also by defying the hierarchical social order that had dominated 
Western ideologies since the fall of the Soviet Union (2002).  
 The Cold War discourse helped to condition the American public to seek enemies (Mehan, 
1997). This is reflected below the level of interstate conflict in the framing of such issues as 
immigration, especially in more conservative states. As an example, Arizona passed the Arizona 
State Senate Bill 1070 in 2010, requiring police to check the citizen status of anyone who was 
suspected of being an illegal immigrant (Valentino, Brader and Jardina, 2013). In the same year 
Arizona House Bill 2281 passed and as a result all ethnic studies curricula had to be eliminated 
from public schools (2013). The growth in the number of non-English-speaking immigrants in the 
United States has made language a central issue in current political debates over immigration and 
even multiculturalism (Newman, Hartman and Taber 2012). Framing issues surrounding 
immigration, and subsequently race and identity, can shape the way the public perceived groups 
and individuals. In the context of conflict, certain groups can be framed as the “enemy” while other 
groups can be viewed as “allies.” 
 Entman defines framing as “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and make[ing] 
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation,” (1993, p. 
52). Media framing scholars argue that culture is a stock “of commonly invoked frames” (p. 53). 
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The news media make framing judgments, which are manifested through emphasizing certain 
elements and de-emphasizing others (Entman, 1991, 1993; Fahmy, 2004). A combination of these 
can create specific themes within the text that then reinforce those judgments. The viewing public 
makes its judgments based on a collection of thematically driven clusters of information and this 
creates their version of a social reality. The mass media set the frames the public use to interpret 
new events (Tuchman, 1978).  
 Scheufele (1999) also places framing within the context of political communication and 
says that frames can be presented as two concepts: media and individual. Media frames take 
complex issues and make them in discernable news bites for audiences to consume (Gitlin, 2003). 
Further, media frames allow journalists to classify and identify news and quickly package it 
(1999). Entman (1993) suggests that individual frames are organized by the viewing audience 
based on previous stored mental judgments about the concepts within the news text. In terms of 
international news coverage of non-Western nations, the viewing public is flooded with a constant 
barrage of images, keywords/phrases, which in turn create social realities about distant places, 
making them appear exotic, backwards and threatening (Moeller, 1999; Fahmy, 2004).   
             This over-simplification of complex issues creates a specific social reality for American 
audiences when it comes to international coverage of crisis and disaster (e.g., Ali, James and 
Vultee, 2013). Journalism makes its subjects into archetypes (Batteau, 1990). Thus, audiences are 
shown images of starving children as representations of African nations (Ali et al, 2013), cowering 
women in blue burkas as the image of the Middle East (Fahmy, 2004), conflict and bombings as 
the image of Asian countries (Norris, 1995), while being fed a constant diet of American troops’ 
achievements and heroism (Kellner, 2004; Lee, Maslog and Kim, 2006).  
             Journalistic routines are heightened by the inherent characteristics of broadcast news 
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(media frames) and the characteristics of audience (individual frames). According to the Pew 
Research Center (2012) news consumption from television remains the number one source for 
young people, despite the rapid increase of information gathering from digital sources.  Scholars 
have also noted that the audiences for print and broadcast news have different characteristics. Print 
readers are generally more educated and members of a specific party (Neuman, Just and Crigler, 
1992), because they tend to be more involved in the political process and are more media literate 
(Valentino, Beckman and Buhr, 2001).  
 Heavy television news consumers might be more vulnerable to media frames because this 
group of news consumers may solely rely on this medium for their news (Valentino, Beckman and 
Buhr, 2001). Thus the visuals of television news may have a stronger effect because of the 
characteristics of the audience, not the medium itself (2001). Both print and broadcast may use the 
same frames, but television news coverage has a different impact on heavy users based on the 
characteristics of that group (2001). 
  Research on portrayals of race in broadcast find that “othered” groups are blamed for 
problem behavior and how that behavior negatively effects the dominant group (Romer, Jamieson 
and De Coteau, 1998). Examining prime-time news coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
Iyengar & Simon (1993) found that viewers who reported higher rates of television exposure were 
more inclined to support a military response to crisis and disaster than a diplomatic one. That type 
of television exposure helps to perpetuate the ethnic blame discourse, which frames “behavior by 
ethnic others as intergroup conflict and accentuates the harmful effects of the behavior for the in 
group” (Romer, Jamieson and De Coteau, 1998, p. 286). Romer, Jamieson and De Coteau’s (1998) 
study on Philadelphia television stations found that White actors were predominantly presented as 
victims of crime, while non-White actors were visualized as perpetrators. Despite country 
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citizenship, individuals deemed other by the media can be viewed as a threat within their own 
nations. 
 This distorted image of the “Other” also comes into play during times of disaster and crisis 
(Fahmy, Kelly and Kim, 2007). Thus, rather than speaking about the benefits of immigration, such 
as new taxpayers and the infusion of new workers, the focus shifts to the dangers from immigrants 
(Ana, 1999; Maira, 2004). This debate has also opened up new sources of information in the online 
world, which has become significantly more important for contemporary media consumers. 
Although the prevailing idea is that the Internet opens spaces for dialogue and understanding, the 
interactive nature of the medium complicates race in ways that are still tied to hegemonic norms 
from American exceptionalism (Daniels, 2013).  
 The television culture from the 1960s through the ‘80s laid the groundwork for the 
beginnings of the Internet in the ‘90s (Batteau, 2010). Unlike its media predecessors (print and 
radio), the power of television images arguably has replaced previous oral and literate cultures 
(2010). This is important to politics because favorable coverage from traditional media can raise 
the status of political candidates in the same way unfavorable coverage can lower the level of 
political power and status (Wolfsfeld, 1997). The introduction of the Internet, especially interactive 
sites like YouTube (a video sharing site), provided media consumers alternative sources for 
information, while combining the visuality of television with choice and control over content 
(Gaskin and Jerit, 2012). Perhaps the most important feature of the Internet is that it allows users 
the ability to create their own content, as well as disseminate information that they deem important 
(2012). Interactivity with traditional media and within online spaces has allowed once passive 
consumers to now be an active part of the news gathering and dissemination system. 
 The fast pace, connectivity and ability for users to create their own content have added new 
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elements to politics in the public sphere. Social media sites like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter 
allow users to produce and capture news stories that have meaning to them with mobile technology, 
creating an incessant new flow of information in which political figures’ reputations can be 
enhanced or destroyed (Gurevitch, Coleman and Blumler, 2009). From Senator Trent Lott’s 
disparaging remarks about the civil rights movement at what he thought was a private meeting, to 
Senator George Allen’s mockery of an Indian staffer working for his opponent at a campaign rally, 
political figures have found themselves in a very different sort of spotlight (2009). Barack Obama’s 
2008 grassroots Facebook campaign further cemented the Internet’s, in particular social media’s, 
political power (Gurevitch et al, 2009; Batteau, 2010).  
 The ubiquitous nature of social media in modern society has opened the doors to 
connectivity and information; however, these concepts themselves have little meaning without 
context (Batteau, 2010). This context and connectivity can be engaging by uniting individuals with 
groups with common goals and agendas or it can be alienating in that users become disconnected 
with the offline world. (2010). Anderson (1991) refers to this concept as an imaginary community. 
These “communities” can consist of millions of people who have never met, but share common 
characteristics such as ethnicity, language, or political agendas. In many cases they are also united 
by a specific medium such as Facebook or a blog (1983). Batteau (2010) suggests that the 
distinguishing characteristic of modern technology is its ability to be repurposed for new uses.  
 The online world has been viewed as a public space that allows for open and egalitarian 
discussions (Ali and Fahmy, 2013). Perhaps the most recent and widely known example is Egypt 
and its “Facebook Revolution,” which was part of a much larger phenomenon with activists from 
Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia also using social media as a forum to express their frustrations and 
outrage regarding their governments (Ali and Fahmy, 2013). This new space has emerged as an 
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alternative to the commercial area that traditional media occupies. However, in recent years, the 
line between alternative and traditional media has begun to blur. The Middle East protests have 
exemplified how information from social media has been used to enhance traditional media 
coverage (Ali and Fahmy, 2013). 
 Technological advances in information dissemination such as social media sites have given 
citizen journalists new opportunities to become active participants in the newsgathering and 
information dissemination to engage audiences. Much of this user-generated content (UGC, such 
as podcasts, videos on YouTube, Facebook pages) is produced during times of crisis, including 
wartime and political strife. One major question that remains unanswered, and that this study hopes 
to demystify, is how audiences respond to information about conflict and other crises from 
traditional media sources as compared to UGC coming from social media. In recent years 
demonstrations across the Middle East have shown the world that countries with authoritarian 
regimes, where media is restricted if not owned by the government. In these countries, UGC plays 
a larger role in dissemination of what many citizens consider to be more authentic news, or 
information coming from sources that are first-person accounts (Domingo and Heinonen, 2008; 
Wardle and Williams, 2010). 
 This study examines audience perception of news from traditional and social media 
sources, while examining at the same time how the ethnicity/race of the presenter changes that 
perception, especially in regards to the type of story being presented (securitized or not 
securitized). Broadly, does the audience trust a source like traditional media more or less than 
social media? According to the Pew Research Center (State of the News Media, 2012), news from 
television remains the top source for a majority of Americans; however, that is changing as digital 
technologies become more available. Are those sources considered credible and authentic? Do the 
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perceptions of credibility and authenticity change depending upon who is presenting the 
information? In addition, when information and images are framed in specific ways, how does that 
change the way a viewer responds to the material? Specifically, if the information presented is 
securitized, how does the audience respond to that type of framing amplification? Thus the 
following research examines audience attitude and perceptions towards news from traditional 
media as compared to social media sources when dealing with the hot button issue of terrorism 
and U.S. policy using race and story type as moderating variables. The study hopes to clarify and 
perhaps unlock issues that surround media framing, as well as audience attitudes towards the 
“anchor” that is delivering news who then may be perceived as being a threat. 
 Although many studies have used the theory of framing (visual and textual), little research 
has extended into the realm of social media and audience perception during perceived crisis. This 
study is an attempt to fill the gaps in the media literature regarding framing and securitization using 
modality (news from television or social media), story type (securitized or not securitized), and 
race (White or Brown) as independent variables. Entman (1993) defines framing as “select[ing] 
some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text” (p. 
52). Using that definition, securitization works as another element of framing because it highlights 
an existential threat of an issue and makes the normal routines of politics less salient (Buzan, 
Waever, & de Wilde, 1998; p. 5). Buzan et al (1998) conceptualize securitization thus: 
“Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and nonmilitary, but 
to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them 
from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential  threats 
to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of 
emergency measures beyond rules that would thereby bind.” (p. 5).   
Buzan et al’s (1998) definition focused on existential threats and does not include the media as a 
securitizing actor; however, this study hopes to expand on the theory of securitization by 
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comparing traditional and social media sources. Previous research has examined issues of security 
from traditional media sources (O’ Reilly, 2008; Vultee, 2009). The contribution the current 
research makes is an examination into how frames and securitization work within the context of 
social media. As previously discussed, online spaces such as YouTube and Facebook also provide 
news information to a newer generation of media consumers. In addition to looking at news 
information sources (traditional and social), this study also includes the broader terms of race: 
White and Brown. Thus this study derives its conceptual framework from several major 
disciplines, including communication and journalism studies, new media and social media, 
anthropology, and risk and crisis research.  
 This study will look at the way race/ethnicity is framed in the context of the current 
American political landscape. First looking at how the audience perceives news coming from an 
“anchor,” traditional and social, when the “anchor” looks like “the other.” Arguably, since 9/11, 
fault lines have shifted from White Americans versus “Others” or even from the black/white 
paradigm in the media to a grayer area. Especially given the racial tensions in response to the 
Obama presidency. America has now divided along the lines between Muslim versus non-Muslim, 
American/foreigner, and even citizen/non-citizen (Maira, 2004).  
 Certain elements like food, language and clothing are considered ways for people of 
different ethnic backgrounds to preserve their cultures while assimilating into Western societies 
(Poole, 2002). But these aspects of culture can also be perceived as a threat to the dominant culture, 
thereby indefinitely excluding othered groups (2002). The media (print and broadcast) have been 
scrutinized for their portrayal of Islam and Muslims with the religion becoming synonymous with 
terrorism and fanaticism (Said, 1997). Media outlets, in particular Fox News Channel, use a 
distinct set of frames that create an atmosphere where the audience and the American public are 
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constantly under threat (Vultee, 2009). Examples of “othering” occur within traditional media, 
especially post-9/11.   
 During an interview with author Deepak Chopra, Bill O’Reilly, host of the O’Reilly Factor 
on Fox News, said: “I believe there is a Muslim problem in the world. I think we should 
acknowledge it and try to solve it” (Edwards, 2010). Since the attacks on 9/11, Islam and its 
followers are vilified in the news media, particularly in American media outlets like Fox News. 
The menacing specter of Islam, as created by Fox News (Vultee, 2009) uses the most common 
theme of “us” versus “them” which continues to pit a modern and virtuous West against a 
menacing and backwards East (Said, 1978; p. 7). 
 All this “othering” takes place against a background in which groups, especially Muslims, 
are marginalized. Like many demographic minorities, Muslims move and can reside in any number 
of Western nations and be any race or ethnicity. According to a study conducted by the Pew Forum 
on Religion & Public Life (2011), by 2030, the world’s Muslim population is expected to increase 
by 35 percent to nearly 2.2 billion. Within the United States, it is expected to grow to 1.7 percent 
(of the total U.S. population) up from 0.8 percent in 2010 (The Future of the Global Muslim 
Population, 2011). A majority of these immigrants and their children will be from South Asia, the 
Middle East, and Africa (Grossman, 2011).  
 Those trends (both demographic and technological) underscore the importance of framing 
research that looks beyond the black/white racial binary that has pervaded American political and 
legal discourse. According to Perea (1997) the black/white racial paradigm was so widely accepted 
that other racial groups, such as Latinos, Asians and Native Americans were often marginalized or 
ignored. This binary was also strengthened by popular culture, textbooks, and other forms of media 
such that those researching race were often forced to write about ‘others’ within this paradigm 
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(1997). However, in recent years the conversation on race has shifted this black/white binary to 
include other racialized groups. Although racially, politically and anthropologically simplistic 
(1997), the category of Brown has also been added to the conversation. 
 This study focuses on race, security, American exceptionalism and social media, by 
combining all of these elements. It examines audience perceptions of video news reports as a way 
of integrating that array of contemporary concerns. This study is focused on how media sources 
(traditional and social) are perceived as trustworthy, credible and even authentic to audiences and 
how that changes when the presenter is Brown or White. Broadly, the study will ask:  Do audience 
members have more trust in information coming from traditional media versus social media? Will 
news from social media be perceived as more authentic? In the context of America’s current 
political atmosphere, does that trust change when an audience member is viewing information that 
is securitized or not securitized? And finally, does the trust in the information change when the 
‘anchor’ looks ‘American’ (White) or more like “the Other” (Brown)? 
 The study hopes to make scholarly contributions to framing and securitization theories in 
the context of crisis, as well as how individuals perceived as Brown are viewed by audiences in 
the current socio-political climate of America. In addition, adding the element of information 
disseminated through social media will expand the growing research on new media and journalism. 
Expected findings hope to clarify the differences in audience perceptions of trust, credibility and 
authenticity in information from traditional and social media sources. Thus, the research will 
examine how people approach securitized information from two modalities (traditional and social 
media) and whether what type of information combined with the race/ethnicity of the presenter 
will elicit stronger reactions for trust, credibility, and authenticity.  
 This dissertation is divided into six chapters. After the introduction, chapter 2 will discuss 
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the major literature within framing while also acknowledging the effect social media has had on 
traditional media sources. All of this is in the context of how audiences interpret trust, credibility 
and authenticity. Chapter 3 delves in securitization and how its amplifying effects on frames 
regarding race, immigration and terrorism have created an existential threat on culture and the 
American way of life. This chapter also further discusses American exceptionalism and the role it 
plays in discussions about American politics. The methodology chapter will discuss in detail how 
the experiment was designed and how it will test the hypotheses and research questions. In 
addition, the methodology will define the terms trust, credibility and authenticity in the context of 
traditional and social media. The results chapter will show the tests used to answer hypotheses and 
research questions, which will be discussed in the final chapter in detail. The discussion chapter 
will also place this research in the wider context of framing, securitization and race in a new media 
environment. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
FRAMING 
 
Framing race, culture and audience perceptions 
This chapter begins with defining framing by placing it in the context of race and ethnicity, 
particularly focusing on the way people from foreign nations are depicted in U.S. media. Here the 
discussion will use Said’s (1978) concept of “othering” and how that notion has evolved post-9/11. 
Literature will also be examined on race in the newsroom and how journalists as media consumers 
are subject to their own biases. Further, immigration post-9/11 has changed the way race and 
ethnicity is discussed in the media and the public. This chapter elaborates on the “browning” of 
America through immigration, but also the demonization of Islam, which in turn has resulted in 
younger generations embracing their religious and cultural heritages. And finally, chapter 2 
examines the relationship between traditional and social media and the effects it has on audiences’ 
perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity in the traditional and new media environment. 
 Frames are one of the ways the media contribute to the creation of social realities. By 
choosing certain images, phrases, or words, media accounts help shape individual perceptions 
(Entman, 1993). The media frame issues through “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, 
and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely 
organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (Gitlin, 2003, p. 7). Entman (1993) defines framing 
as “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or recommendation” (p. 52).  
 Visuals such as graphics, photographs and broadcast images can also be used to emphasize 
and de-emphasize victims and certain agencies (Entman, 1991, 1993). In addition, news frames 
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can be constructed using graphics, keywords, concepts, and visual images that are emphasized in 
the news narrative (Entman, 1991, 1993; Gitlin, 2003; Scheufele, 1999). Messaris and Abraham 
(2001) suggest that visuals are uncontested by audiences because they appear to be more closely 
related to reality. Visuals that accompany text can lead audiences to perceive complex issues 
simplistically resulting in a loss of context (Domke, Perlmutter and Spratt, 2002). Coupled with 
pre-existing attitudes and stereotypes, specific news construction can lead to a country and its 
citizens being perceived as an “enemy,” while other countries and their citizens are depicted as 
American allies. Research in framing also looks at the portrayal of victims, finds that frames can 
emphasize the one nation’s citizens as victims, while another can be virtually non-existent in news 
coverage (Iyengar, 1991, 1993). “Television news has a significant impact on public opinion,” 
(Iyengar, 1993, p. 381). A majority of television news is focused on “episodic” themes or issues 
within the context of specific instances and events, such as a murder or a car accident (1993). As 
a result audiences “induce attributions of responsibility to individual victims or perpetrators rather 
than to broad societal forces,” (Iyengar, 119, p. 16).  
 In addition, emphasis or de-emphasis on human life in the midst of a crisis, whether through 
man-made or natural causes, also have been framed in ways that continue to maintain the 
hegemonic norms of U.S. news narratives and routines in regards to race and people in foreign 
nations. Entman’s (1991) comparison of imagery and language used to describe the downing of a 
Korean airliner by a Soviet fighter plane versus the U.S. downing of an Iranian airliner, showed a 
marked difference in the news coverage surrounding two similar events. Although both events 
were analogous, the Soviet downing was depicted as a moral outrage through the use of graphics 
and language (i.e. a bull’s eye placed over the image of a Korean airliner on the cover of Newsweek 
and “Shoot to Kill” on the cover of Time Magazine, p. 12), while the U.S. downing of an Iran 
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airliner was depicted as a technical error (Entman, 1991). 
 Narratives only consist of words, graphics and images and the repetitive use of them are 
where news frames are constructed (Entman, 1991, 1993). Frames are a system of “selection, 
emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and 
what matters,” (Gitlin, 2003; pg. 6). In this regard, audiences, over time, see the world as depicted, 
rather than the reality (2003).  
 Media frames also organize the world for traditional journalists and other news producers 
(i.e., citizen journalists). Frames allow journalists (traditional and citizen) to process large amounts 
of complex information, quickly and routinely (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999; Gitlin, 2003). 
Thus, frames “exist at two levels: as mentally stored principals for information processing and as 
characteristics of the news text” (Entman, 1991, pg. 7). In order for the framing devices to be 
successful, a majority of the public needs to accept it as a “common sense interpretation of events” 
(Entman, 1991, p. 6). Framing also happens in the context of race and “othering.” 
 Research in race and media suggests that citizens of nations who look like the “other” will 
be framed differently than those of nations that look like “us” (Said, 1978, 1997; Fahmy, 2004). 
The media is a window into the international arena and coupled with news organizations’ news 
philosophies and routines can provide a specific construction of reality regarding foreign countries, 
cultures, and religions. This also includes the way citizens of “enemy” and ally nations are 
portrayed (Entman, 2004). Visuals provide a simple entry point into turning a complex issue into 
digestible bites for audiences to consume. The current research focuses on the broadcast images 
of traditional and social media news presenters (specifically the race of the presenter) as a framing 
device. Visual framing “involves the selective prioritization of some images to promote a specific 
interpretation of events conducted either consciously or subconsciously. It is therefore instructive 
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to reflect on how media apply visual framing to contribute to our understanding of the world we 
see in the news” (Ying & Fahmy, 2013, p.195). 
 Audiences are more inclined to accept images of people and places because they are 
perceived to be closely related to reality (Messaris and Abraham, 2001). Viewers are willing to 
overlook the oversimplification of a complex issue or human being (Sharkey, 1993; Taylor, 2000). 
International news tends to focus on episodic coverage, stories that are onetime events, rather than 
part of an ongoing situation (Moeller, 2002; Fahmy, 2004). Visuals that accompany this type of 
news also tend to lean towards this episodic orientation, but also add information and 
understanding by providing details that words cannot (Friend, Challenger and McAdams, 2004; 
Ali et al, 2013). Thus stories about Africa focus on intense poverty and famine, while stories on 
the Middle East focus on conflict and terrorism (Moeller, 2002; Fahmy, 2004).  
 By emphasizing isolated events, media frames can also “other” citizens of foreign nations. 
American audiences are inundated with “othered” images of the Middle East, South/East Asia and 
Mexico with the West being visualized a place of moral, cultural and technological superiority 
(Said, 1978). The current research also examines the ways in which “othered” nations and their 
people are perceived by audiences in the United States. Orientalism, as discussed in the next 
section, is a concept that defines the perceived differences between America and “Others” and how 
that translates to visual media depictions of race in foreign nations.  
Framing of race and ethnicity: An examination of Orientalism 
 Edward Said (1978) defined Orientalism as the way the “Occident” views the “Orient” by 
dehumanizing, ignoring, and denuding the culture of entire groups of people. As a result, the West 
is able to maintain its perceived superiority over the East. Previous studies have found that the 
Western media often over-simplify complex issues by not placing stories and images (print and 
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broadcast) in the broader spectrum of international coverage (Moeller, 1999, 2002; Taylor, 2000; 
Gitlin, 2002; Fahmy, 2004).As a result, Western audiences have a skewed perception of what 
people look like on the other side of the world.  The news media, in particular television news, use 
video clips to represent complex issues in a form that simplifies the story to make it 
understandable, but does not demand that viewers go beyond stereotypical images (Taylor, 2000). 
For example, using images of Muslim people and the Middle East “along with repeated pictures 
of Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and other religious of nationalist leaders, to provide some 
tangible image of a largely invisible (and inexplicable) enemy (Griffin, 2004, p. 393) stereotypes 
Islam and its followers as a “threat” (Said, 1978, 1997). 
 Despite previous beliefs, the press does not use horrific images for the sake of shocking 
the public (Taylor, 2000).  Western media tend to stay on the side of restraint when it comes to 
highlighting dead bodies and suffering (2000).  American press agencies tend to focus more on the 
“human interest” stories because there is a perception by the mainstream news media that this is 
how you show audiences the rest of the world (2000). Images of mass death bring far-away stories 
closer to home, but they also oversimplify the issue taking it out of context for audiences (Moeller, 
1999; Taylor, 2000). Frames are part of this oversimplification process and are the organizing 
principles or storylines that provide meaning to complex events and spaces (Gamson and 
Modigliani, 1987). Reporters, as well as editors, managers, and news organization owners, are 
inundated with the same media that audiences consume, thus the visuals produced are based on 
the social reality that has been part of news narratives and routines.  
 Western media continue to portray international events and conflicts through a limited 
scope of themes that continue to reinforce the stereotype that the developing world is war-torn and 
violent (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; McQuail, 2000; Riffe, Aust, Jones, Shoemaker and Sundar, 
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1994; Rosenblum, 1979; Greenwood and Smith, 2007).Developing nations get news coverage if 
they are in the midst of natural disasters or conflicts and war (2007). Thus, news stories from the 
Middle East are focused on conflict and war (Fahmy, 2004) and coverage from Africa is dominated 
by extreme poverty and famine (Fair, 1993). The audience sees a part of the larger story.  
 Framing theory and visuals can only provide information inherent to the image and do not 
provide a narrative of the context of the creation of the image for analysis. Complex cultural and 
religious nuances lose their meanings when oversimplified within the mainstream media’s news 
narratives (Moeller, 1999). For example, during the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan, broadcast 
television images in 2001 showed U.S. troops invading Afghanistan to free the women from the 
pitfalls of the burka (headscarf and long coat). “The American public has identified the “veil,” 
whether a hijab (a covering of the hair) or burqa (a covering of the head including the face), with 
Islamic militancy, extremism, jihadism, and oppression of women,” (Haddad, 2007, p. 255). Yet 
despite the burka becoming a symbol of oppression for US audiences, Muslim women continued 
to wear it even after the U.S. invasion, which suggests that the nature of religion, culture, and life 
in a traditional society is far more complex than just what simple images can provide (Fahmy, 
2004). 
 International affairs are complex, but many reporters are not trained to understand local 
culture (Gitlin, 2003). Therefore, foreign coverage privileges easy-to-understand explanations of 
foreign events (2003). Rather than showing conflicts as political confrontations, they are reduced 
to predictable and intermittent events of senseless violence deserving little international attention, 
or as acts of oppression that deserve full humanitarian intervention (Moeller, 1999).News coverage 
of disasters and crises is no different (Moeller, 1999; Fahmy, 2004). International coverage dealing 
with distinct racial groups with similar conflict histories can also be framed to create a certain 
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social reality. 
 Myers, Klak, and Koehl (1996) compared news coverage of Rwanda and Kosovo and 
found that despite being similar in military tactics, external imperialism and underdevelopment, 
both countries were cast in two different frameworks. The findings suggest that although both 
conflicts are similar, the Western press continues to distort the situation in Rwanda and “force it 
to fit a frame.”  Their research found that the press tends to “other” Africa, which contributes to 
negative impressions of Africa and Africans to the West (1996).  “Othering” citizens of foreign 
nations can oversimplify complex issues and continues to distort how audiences in the West view 
“others” (Said, 1978). 
 This oversimplification also takes complex issues out of their political and societal contexts 
(Moeller, 1999), giving the viewing audience only a fraction of the story. Situations involving war, 
death, famine, and disease have been turned into easy-to-digest clips for Western audiences. As a 
result of viewing simplified “distant suffering”, thus the emaciated African baby becomes the 
image of Africa (Moeller, 1999), while citizens of the Middle East are depicted as “threats” 
(Griffin, 2004). Research in mainstream media has also found that during conflict, television 
reports, newspaper and news magazine stories tend to reinforce similar images and depictions of 
race (2004).  
 The mainstream news media have been criticized for their representations of race and 
ethnic groups as being inaccurate and reflecting institutional, individual and cultural biases toward 
minorities (Gandy, 1998). According to Gandy (1998), “the media are charged with continuing to 
rely upon racist stereotypes, emphasizing negative aspects of behavior, and suggesting deficiencies 
in morality and intelligence that stigmatize and entire population” (p. 159). Network news 
depictions of Islam and Muslims have also been cited as setting a contradictory set of frames 
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following the 9/11 attacks, such as “disapproving representations of Islam, alongside stories that 
highlighted Islam as an integral part of American life,” (Ibrahim, 2010, p. 112).  
 Disparities in race can have a major impact in the way the public views minorities in the 
U.S. (Fahmy, Kelly, and Kim, 2007; Kahle, Yu, and Whiteside, 2007; Gans, 2004), citizens of 
developing nations, as well as countries in political turmoil as is most evident by America’s 
relationship with South Asian and Middle Eastern countries during the war on terror. The lack of 
ethnic minorities on television; whether in news or entertainment, has also been cited by critics of 
American media as furthering the reinforcement of negative stereotypes in the newsroom 
(Nishikawa, Towner, Clawson and Waltenburg, 2009). 
Framing of race and ethnicity in the newsroom 
 Media Matters for America, a media watchdog group, found that although most U.S. 
minority ethnic groups, such as African Americans and Latinos, were underrepresented in the 
major cable news networks, groups that were completely shut out were Asians and Middle 
Easterners (2008).  According to a Radio and Television Digital News Association (RTDNA) 2011 
report on women and minorities in the newsroom, “in the last 21years, the minority population in 
the U.S. has risen 9.5 percent; but the minority workforce in TV news is up 2.7 percent” (RTDNA, 
2011, p. 1). The least represented group in the news workforce was once again Asian Americans. 
The lack of representation of minorities in U.S. broadcasting had been a persistent concern. 
Research suggests that ethnic minority audiences felt their group’s portrayals on television were 
negative (Halloran, 1998). Research on audiences found that trust levels for television news were 
higher in which “real images” were shown (Mullan, 1997) and that news content recall was also 
higher for racial and ethnic groups who were represented in the coverage (Fujioka, 2005). 
 Further research on people of Asian background in the UK (Halloran, 1998) found that 
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participants said that they were influenced by television and much of this influence was considered 
negative.  Many ethnic minorities felt that a significant number of whites held these negative 
beliefs about them (1998). News judgment is heavily subjective, especially on issues surrounding 
race, cultural diversity, gender and economic class (Gist, 1990). News reporters, anchors and 
correspondents are not exempt from their own biases and cultural backgrounds, which inevitably 
make their way into what news is produced and aired (Gans, 1980, 1983, Tuchman, 1972, Whyte, 
1943).  
 The preceding is important because media frames shape and alter audiences’ interpretations 
about the world (Entman, 2007). Certain issues, images, ideas are made salient thorough the use 
of frames and as a result the audience is encouraged think, feel and decide in a certain way 
(Entman, 2007; Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Kim, Scheufele & Shanahan, 
2002; Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997). The “media may be helping to distribute political power 
to particular groups, causes, or individuals,” (Entman, 2007, p. 166). Journalists are not exempt 
from frames and as a result the media’s decision biases are created within individual journalists 
and the organizations they represent as part of their news routines and norms (2007). Some of this 
distribution of power comes from the people journalists choose to interview as “experts.” 
The news media relies on a “framework of interpretation offered by public officials, 
security experts and military commentators, with news functioning ultimately to reinforce support 
for political leaders and the security policies they implement” (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003, p. 1). 
Steele (1995) finds that journalists’ selection of experts and has a “profound effect[s] on both the 
content and quality of television news coverage” (p. 807). Interviewees chosen by journalist for 
their technical expertise, analysis and predictions may frame news on war and conflict in a specific 
light, especially because these experts are not required to place events in a broader historical 
29 
 
 
context (1995). Experts are also chosen because they represent “political perspectives that are not 
acknowledged by the news organizations that solicit their views,” (1995, p. 807). Ethnicities of 
journalists are also an important factor on the way news is framed. News practices like “expertise” 
also influence less direct forms of framing – not just how groups are represented in news coverage 
but how they are represented among those who make news decisions. 
 Studies on race and ethnicity in local television news coverage find that Latinos, Asian 
Americans, and Native Americans are virtually non-existent as reporters, anchors, coverage, and 
as sources (Poindexter, Smith, and Heider, 2003; Owens, 2007). African Americans were present 
as anchors and reporters, but when it came to subjects of news, blacks were often associated with 
committing a crime (Poindexter, Smith, and Heider, 2003). The lack of ethnic minorities from 
local news coverage frames certain groups (Asian American, Latin Americans, and Native 
Americans) as not needing a voice because there are so few of them. Not being represented in the 
mainstream media or being shown as villains or in a negative context (stories about crime, conflict, 
drugs, gangs, and poverty), journalists may imply that minorities are either not important, 
untrustworthy and/or trouble causing (Gist, 1990; Nishikwa et al, 2009). Minority audiences are 
dissatisfied with mainstream media coverage and often consider themselves marginalized by 
mainstream news (Gandy, 1997; Riffe, Sneed, & Van Ommeren, 1990). This may be the case with 
groups that identify as South Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin and African American. These groups, 
through mainstream media practices, such as the use of “experts,” feel the burden of being 
“othered.” Like their audiences, journalists, regardless of race and ethnicity, are pummeled with 
the same media messages and as a result what makes it to air and how it is constructed is just as 
important as who represents the newsrooms.  
 Journalistic norms and practices have helped to “other” members of foreign nations long 
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before September 11, 2001. That pattern has been found to hold among minority journalists as 
well. Nishikwa et al (2009) found that minority journalists accept widespread mainstream news 
norms and, in fact promote the mainstream voice. These journalists eschew advocacy positions 
within the media, believing them to be unprofessional (2009). Thus ethnic media tend to be held 
in disregard because that forum is viewed as community advocacy as opposed to objective 
journalism (2009). The research also suggests that minority reporters shy away from topics like 
pro-immigration rallies to avoid being branded advocates and opening themselves to criticism 
(2009).  
  “Othering” didn’t begin with 9/11, but it took on some of its most salient characteristics 
since then. The end of the Cold War helped to open cognitive restraints, which created the 
conditions for the media to have a greater influence (Entman, 2004). Audiences cannot escape 
frames because they come, in part, from prior beliefs with the media making certain elements more 
salient through repetition of key words, images and phrases (Entman, 1991, 1993, 2004). In the 
weeks following the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush defined terrorism as a global threat, 
urging what were deemed civilized nations to band together against the “axis of evil” or Iran, Iraq, 
and North Korea (2004).  The creation of these civilized versus uncivilized divides reinforced the 
Cold-War era concept of good guys and bad guys. Nations that did not subscribe to American 
standards of democracy or were viewed as others were seen as the bad guys (Entman, 2004).  
Framing conflict, immigration and culture 
 Ten years after 9/11 the frames used by the media continue to impact how audiences 
respond to nations deemed as U.S. allies and enemies. In the days and weeks following the attacks, 
former President George W. Bush spoke in terms of a criminal attack against those who supported 
freedom and of war crimes committed by the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. Edy and Meirick 
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(2007) suggest that when audiences are confronted with competing frames, war and crime, viewers 
simply cobble components together and create their own versions of social realities. 
 Media frames have a strong impact on the way audiences treat U.S. citizens who look like 
the “other” in the post-9/11 environment. These have been through certain policy changes, such as 
stricter immigration laws, to even profiling individuals based on race and ethnicity. Maira (2004) 
argues that imperialist power is at work post-9/11 in regards to the way South Asian Muslims have 
been framed in the Western media, as well as by U.S. policies towards immigrants. However, 
unlike imperialist power during colonial times, this neo-imperialism does not require physical land 
or even the direct ability to govern. 
 Many scholars discuss South Asian identity in the context of 9/11, but very little of the 
research goes further to say that perhaps the terrorist attacks may have shaped a new South Asian 
identity, especially among the youth. Despite certain fears regarding citizen status and 
surveillance, many Muslim youth are actively speaking out against terrorism and questioning how 
the United States responded to 9/11 (Maira, 2004). Many second-generation South Asians are 
seeking their own identities. These identities are a mix of what the first generation brought with 
them from their home countries while assimilating into American culture and the second 
generation traversing through old and new cultures creating a new identity. The current study is 
focused on ethnic populations that were born in the United States. These groups of people do not 
have the same issues when it comes to assimilation, yet may be perceived as “others.”   
  Although many second-generation South Asians were not “pushed” into their cultural 
identities, they were still curious to learn more about the traditions of their parents (Maira, 2004). 
So although these individuals are “integrated” into American society by virtue of being second 
generation, they still have a desire to maintain and reaffirm their identities as South Asia Muslims. 
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Perhaps mainstream media’s demonizing of Islam may have caused a shift for second-generation 
youth to find ways to dispel anti-Muslim-ness by gaining a stronger hold on religion and ethnic 
pride, as opposed to “browning it down.”  
 Since the attacks, the concept of being “Brown” comes with mixed feelings. “Brown” was 
associated with two components: increased immigration, especially from Latin countries and the 
United States embracing multiculturalism (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2009). But in the 
context of a post-9/11 world, the concept of “Brown” has been framed as a threat, capitalizing on 
U.S. anxieties about public and national safety (2009). Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo (2009) 
refer to this as the “browning of terror” (p. 115). When the media, such as Fox News commentator 
Mark Williams, made a comment suggesting that President Obama was a “domestic insurgent,” 
(p.115), he and others were framing the President to their viewing audiences as not only 
unpatriotic, but also un-American. “Not like us” theme developed by Vultee (2012) suggests that 
Obama is seen “as a foreigner, non-Christian, and a Muslim. Indirectly he is seen as the mirror 
opposite of traditional values of courage, honesty, modesty, and respect,” (p. 58). The Obama as 
an “other” discourse does not just belong to journalists. Fox News audiences also share that 
sentiment on the network’s website and take advantage of the interactivity available to them 
through the site to support comments made by the reporters (2012). 
As a result, it is important to consider the post-9/11 audience when conducting framing 
research about Islam. Framing, on one hand, refers to the way journalists shape news content 
whether it is because of their own personal experiences or due to news organizations’ routines and 
narratives. But it also depends on the audience who adopts the frame by seeing the world in a 
similar way as the journalist (McQuail, 2005). Why Afghan women continued to wear the burka 
even after being “liberated” by the U.S. suggests that complex issues like cultural and religious 
33 
 
 
traditions cannot be merely quantified and that just photographs are not enough to relate the 
experiences of these women (Fahmy, 2004).  
 Ibrahim (2010) argues that non-biased coverage of Islam is a myth. In the weeks following 
September 11th, visuals from television news coverage depicted anti-American and pro-bin Laden 
demonstrations throughout Pakistan. These images created a social reality for American audiences 
that suggested to them that not only was Pakistan against the U.S. foreign policy, but also military 
action in Afghanistan. Showing images of incensed Pakistanis juxtaposed with images of groups 
of Muslims kneeling for prayer clearly framed Muslims and Pakistanis as the “bad guys” in the 
media (2010). It also turned Muslims into a monolithic group and negated the actual diversity 
among its millions of followers (2010). In recent years, the idea of Muslim American identity has 
been circulating in public discourse namely focused on the homegrown terrorist; however, when 
“othering” individuals, current research finds that foreignness and immigration status plays a key 
role in highlighting cultural differences in the media. 
 Chuang (2012) highlights two shootings perpetuated by East Asians. Jiverly Wong, a 
Vietnamese immigrant, opened fire at a New York immigrant center on April 3, 2009, killing 
thirteen people and critically injuring four others. This was considered the nation’s worst mass 
shooting since the Virginia Polytechnic Institute shooting on April 16, 2007, where Seung-Hui 
Cho shot and killed 32 people in Blacksburg, Virginia, then killed himself (2012). What makes 
these incidences analogous is the way the media portrayed these individuals. Both individuals were 
Asian and born outside the U.S. with Cho registered as a permanent resident and Wong a 
naturalized U.S. citizen since 1995 (2012). Media depictions in both cases focused on the 
foreignness of these individuals, even conflating ethnic for foreign (2012). 
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The news media have maintained a foreigner identity for Asian Americans because of 
perceived cultural differences. Gandy (1998) finds that the same foreigner-constructed identities 
do not apply to European-descended immigrants like Italians, Irish or German, because these 
groups have been able to assimilate into the White mainstream. However, non-Europeans like 
Asians and Middle Easterners continue to be placed in the ethnic categories because they are 
perceived as being considerably different, physically and culturally, than whites (1998). This 
perceived difference also is a factor in the way groups like South Asians Middle Easterners are 
depicted by the media. 
 Since 9/11, media scholars have been focusing on Muslim identity. As was the case with 
Cho and Wong, Pakistani American Faisal Shahzad, who in 2010 attempted to bomb Times 
Square, represents a homegrown terrorist who was physically and culturally foreign (Chuang and 
Roemer, 2013). On May 3, 2010, Shahzad, a naturalized citizen from Pakistan, attempted to 
detonate a car bomb in New York’s Times Square (2013). Although unsuccessful, the idea that a 
potential terrorist could come so close to another American landmark generated intense media 
coverage with Shahzad’s Pakistani American and Muslim identities being the focus of news 
coverage (2013). 
Although American Muslims are not defined by race or nationality, they share a religious 
identity (Chuang and Roemer, 2013). The events of 9/11 have narrowed debates into Orientalistic 
modes of discussion (Kumar, 2010). Orientalist thinking allows them to maintain that image in 
that they are complex, dynamic and adaptive, while the Orient, particularly Islamic nations are in 
constant states of conflict, backwards, barbaric and in need of Western intervention to pull them 
into the modern world (Said, 1997; Kumar, 2010). Political leaders and popular members of the 
mainstream media connected the actions of extremists to an entire religious following (2010). 
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Many issues surrounding race and cultural differences are focused on individuals that are 
not perceived as being American enough or those who fail to achieve the American Dream 
(Chuang, 2012; Chuang and Roemer, 2013). That is, they do not learn the language or fail to 
assimilate into the mainstream. De Vreese, Boomgaarden and Semetko (2011) found that negative 
framing by the media and political elites yielded stronger effects in participants, in particular as 
cultural threats. In areas where the Turkish population was high, the European Christian culture 
was threatened by the growing population of Muslims throughout Europe (2011). In the U.S, 
increased immigration resulting in demographic changes has been unnerving to those who believe 
that Anglo-American culture should remain dominant and foremost (Ana, 1999). 
The portrayal of immigration, as the following chapter suggests, has been a frequent topic of 
securitization studies because of that sort of perceived threat. Ana (1999) suggests metaphors used 
by the media surrounding the 1994 political debate over California’s anti-immigration referendum 
Proposition 187 say that the language that the media uses can contribute to “demeaning and 
dehumanizing the immigrant worker” (pg. 217).  Further, the techniques the political elite and the 
media use to frame issues have the ability to influence whether audiences apply existing racial 
stereotypes in a politically meaningful manner (Domke, McCoy & Torres, 1999). Audiences, 
through the interpretation of certain frames, may perceive immigration as an issue that may have 
a negative consequence for their lives. Thus the framing of immigration can lead to audience’s 
perceiving an individual’s identity as foreign and culturally different regardless of their citizenship. 
 Such studies have usually been rooted in legacy media, but discussion on identity also 
comes from the online world. The glut of websites, social media, and blogs are dedicated to 
connecting people to other like-minded individuals. Online spaces also provide audiences with 
alternative sources for news information, which in turn have expanded concepts surrounding trust, 
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credibility and authenticity. Social media connected activists in the Middle East with the rest of 
the world, allowing people in the West (Muslim and non-Muslim) to take part in a dialogue about 
government corruption and other issues surrounding the unrest in the Arab world (Ali and Fahmy, 
2013). Although no strangers to the online world, journalists and media organizations from around 
the globe became transfixed with Facebook pages, Twitter feeds, and YouTube videos; relying on 
these sites for breaking news in the international arena. 
Relationship of traditional media and citizen journalism 
 Many news organizations are opening their websites to readers thorough the creation of a 
shared space that has constantly changing content generated by a large collective of individuals 
(Singer and Ashman, 2009). It is this shared space that has called into question issues regarding 
the credibility and newsworthiness of the participatory content, as well as who is responsible for 
the content itself (2009). Traditional media journalists are wary of the public’s contribution to the 
news (2009). 
 Although journalists may appreciate the public’s ability to voice their opinions, “many felt 
some of those voices were not worth listening to” (Singer and Ashman, 2009, p. 18). Some of the 
contention lies in the reporters’ skepticism regarding the public’s opinion on what is newsworthy 
and whether that information should trespass onto the journalist’s professional news judgment. 
Singer and Ashman (2009) found that despite the growing amount of user-generated content, 
traditional media members are cautious of the contributing public and tend to pick and choose 
comments that fit within the normative framework created by the institution. 
 Domingo and Heinonen’s (2008) typology examines the relationship between citizens and 
traditional journalists through an analysis of blogs. Independent bloggers, or those who are not 
affiliated with news organizations, do not pretend to be journalists; however, much of the work 
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they do approaches that arena.  Blogs may be challenging the very definition of journalism and 
may be causing a paradigm shift by changing the understanding of what journalism is with the 
proliferation of the Internet (2008).  In addition, bloggers are pushing against the norm of the 
journalist as the trained observer. Bloggers are generally involved in the stories they are reporting 
on, thus giving first-hand accounts as they happen (2008). Despite research that suggests user 
generated content (UGC) is changing traditional journalism norms, other scholars find that news 
media’s hegemonic norms remain intact (Hermida and Thurman, 2008). 
 Hermida and Thurman (2008) found that gatekeeping practices in news organizations want 
to use a lot of UGC but only select those comments that “fit their brand” (p. 350). In other words, 
information that deviated from the story or did not meet the standards of audience expectations — 
as deemed by editors — was filtered out. Similar to text, TV stations are also large consumers of 
UGC, especially in the form of videos and photographs. Television news, as part of the elite media, 
filter UGC based on gatekeeping processes that they deem valuable to their audiences.  
 Williams et al (2011) found that editors and managers at televisions stations use UGC as 
just another source for news stories. Their findings suggest that reporters have not changed the 
way they work; rather the material provided by citizen journalists continue to remain embedded 
within the institution’s framework, maintaining the status quo for traditional media. Their study 
revealed that long-established reporting practices, “such as ensuring accuracy, authenticity, and 
impartiality” (p. 93), remain paramount when using UGC. Thus, although news organizations have 
embraced materials provided by citizens, they have done so with restraint. The videos and photos 
citizen journalists provide are pushed through a filtering process of journalists, editors, and 
managers, who then select only those pieces that fit within the news organizations traditional 
structures (Williams et al, 2011). 
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 Information from social media has sparked debates on issues surrounding trust, credibility, 
and authenticity of the information (Georg and Jackob, 2010; Lee and Sundar, 2012; Marwick and 
Boyd, 2011). Traditional media is also using UGC as a way to combat viewer disengagement from 
their news stations and draw in larger and more diverse audiences (Harrison, 2010). News 
organizations use UGC that fits within the routines and narratives of their organization but also as 
a way to connect to their audiences to the happenings in other parts of the country and world as a 
part of public service (2010).  
Trust, credibility and authenticity in online spaces 
 Live broadcast television has allowed viewers from across the globe to witness major news 
events instantaneously, but unlike traditional media, social media has allowed citizens to engage 
and add to the discussion. A recent incarnation is the “Arab Spring.” Demonstrators in Egypt, 
Libya, and Tunisia credited social media like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and blogging sites as 
important components to overthrowing authoritarian regimes (Nguyen, 2009, Parvaz, 2011, Ali 
and Fahmy, 2013). These sites allowed protesters to post videos, images, and start discussions, 
thereby not just viewing the materials, but also becoming an active part of the dialogue and protests 
(2013).  
 In addition, social media allowed activists from other countries the opportunity to aid other 
revolutions. For example, online organizers in Egypt and Tunisia exchanged their experiences via 
Facebook, including information like using vinegar and onions to stave off the effects of tear gas 
(Kirkpatrick & Sanger, 2011). In other words, social media proved that it had the ability to create 
collaboration among a pan-Arab youth movement, giving “birth to a new force in the Arab world” 
(2011, p. 1). 
 Although social media have been praised for their ability to unite people as a tool for 
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activists, they still need a traditional media source to get widespread attention. As Singer (2005) 
found, citizen generated materials, such as blogs, are being used by traditional media organizations 
to enhance their own coverage. Thus the user-generated content is being forced to fit the narratives 
and traditional routines practices by traditional media. These routines are part of the gatekeeping 
process, which is the selection process used by editors, news directors, and managers (the 
gatekeepers) to choose stories and/or visuals that follow the organizations’ routines and narratives 
(White, 1950). Thus the social media information that fall in line with traditional media are the 
ones that get picked up to be presented via traditional news platforms to a wider audience.  
 Citizen journalists provide an alternative source of information outside of traditional 
media, which in turn, are electronically disseminated to a larger audience via traditional media 
sources (Berenger, 2006). One reason for this growing dissemination has been the need for many 
news organizations to tighten their budgets. Many news organizations simply cannot afford to send 
reporters to cover international events. This need suggests that the reliance on citizen journalists 
will continue to grow (2006).  
 Many traditional news organizations have an independent new media staff whose main 
focus is to write news for the web and disseminate it to wider audiences (Pavlik, 2011).  The speed 
and access of information on the web has allowed social and new media news producers to bring 
information to audiences at a rapid rate. However, new media staffs are not necessarily trained 
journalists. They do not have strong journalism credentials or follow the practices of traditional 
media producers (2011). But research suggests that due to the growing distrust in traditional media, 
social and new media have become alternative sources for news information (Johnson and Kaye, 
2004). And that underscores the importance of exploring their trustworthiness, credibility and 
authenticity. 
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Framing and audience perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity 
 Coming from authoritarian regimes, news from social media sites is considered a source of 
trusted information simply because most of the traditional sources are government owned (Wall, 
2009; Ali and Fahmy, 2013). For many activists, especially the youth, the Internet was a resource 
where like-minded people could gather to exchange ideas amongst themselves, as well as 
organizations from other public spheres. In addition, news from social media provided alternative 
information (Olsson, 2008). Because authoritarian governments continue to exercise control over 
the information being distributed that they deem “objectionable” including pornographic materials 
and political dissidents’ messages (Ghareeb, 2000), news from citizen journalists is viewed by 
many as being as credible source.  
 Choi, Watt, and Lynch (2006) examined how American news audiences perceived the 
Internet as a source of credible information during the 2003 Iraq War. They found that credibility 
was not merely a characteristic of the message itself; rather it was a perception by the viewing 
audience. Audiences respond less to news organizations and their personalities than they do to the 
specific content (Gunther, 1992). Thus when consuming news content concerning an issue as 
salient as the Iraq War, participants who were more involved with the issue tended to judge media 
credibility differently than those who were merely casual consumers. Compared to groups that 
were supporters of the war and neutral parties, those participants that were opponents of the U.S. 
attack on Iraq viewed the Internet as a credible source of news (2006). Opponents of the war used 
the Internet as an alternative source of information that accorded with their political attitudes 
towards the war that they were not able to find in traditional media sources. 
 Similarly, Abdulla, Garrison, Salwen, Driscoll, & Casey (2002) found that online news 
credibility was based on trustworthiness, timeliness, and viewer biases. Their comparison of 
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newspapers, television, and online news found that even though people perceived all three 
similarly in terms of credibility, such as dimension of currency, timeliness, and up-to-date 
information, but there were some fundamental differences.  
 News audiences perceived newspapers to be up-to-date, while television news was seen as 
current, up-to-date, as well as timely. Online news furthered that by also being current (Abdulla et 
al., 2002). In terms of credibility, viewers felt that in order for newspapers to be credible they must 
be “balanced in story-telling, complete in providing information, objective and fair, accurate, and 
unbiased.” In addition, honesty in presentation, believability, and trust in the source were also seen 
as major factors in credibility. Television news credibility is constructed around providing 
information that is fair and balanced (Flanagin and Metzger, 2000; Abdulla et al, 2002) the 
information and source must be trustworthy, accurate, objective, complete, unbiased, honest, and 
finally believable (Flanagin and Metzger, 2000; Austin and Dong, 1994). Finally, viewers believe 
that online news credibility is based on trustworthiness (Flanagin and Metzger, 2000). Thus for an 
online source to be credible it must be trustworthy, fair, honest, balanced, accurate, and believable 
(Abdulla et al, 2002). Their study also revealed that many viewers are not convinced that the 
Internet is a source for unbiased and objective information. These viewers found that the relative 
ease of putting information on the Web, as opposed to the work it takes to put together a television 
broadcast or newspaper, made this medium less credible.  
 Traditional media producers and online news observers have also noted their concerns over 
credibility, believability, ethical lapses, newsgathering techniques, and news presentation of 
Internet sources of news and information (Lasica, 2001; Arant & Anderson, 2000). Similarly, 
Flanagin and Metzger (2000) find that while traditional media goes through a process of gathering 
and verifying information, online news does not necessarily follow that convention. Internet sites 
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do not always use such measures. Thus, the central problem lies in the lack of editorial and 
gatekeeping rules that the traditional media use. Finally authenticity comes to the forefront when 
discussing UGC and online news. Like trust and credibility, authenticity can be based on the source 
of the information. But unlike trust and credibility, authenticity relies on online news producer’s 
real self (Marwick and Boyd, 2010). 
 Grazian (2003) suggests that authenticity is a social construct that requires something to be 
inauthentic. There is not a universal authenticity; rather it is a construct that varies according to 
community (Marwick and Boyd, 2011). Authenticity requires the producer use rawer tone that 
might too conversational for traditional media outlets (Matheson, 2004). When it comes to online 
news, audiences valued diverse topics, the personal character and the authenticity of the stories 
published (Deuze, Bruns, and Neuberger, 2007). Individuals producing news that comes from a 
real person is considered authentic because it is perceived as being without bias (2007). 
 In the news media, discourse concerning state and national security is often constructed 
through the use of frames. This collection of words, images, and graphics put together create a 
specific social reality for audiences. Cultural differences and foreign identities can force 
individuals into “othered” categories, despite citizenship. The introduction of information 
dissemination through social media forums has also changed the way journalists gather the news 
and audiences consume it. Thus it is important to focus research on ways to elucidate questions 
regarding news consumption and audience response to presenters of other ethnicities in online 
spaces, as well as traditional media and how audiences perceive trust, credibility and authenticity 
of news sources and the presenters.  
 The news media use framing devices like words, metaphors and images to make certain 
ideas and issues more salient (Entman, 1991, 1993), but the amplifying effects of securitization 
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can intensify the social and cultural significance of certain frames (Vultee, 2009). The next chapter 
examines the theory of securitization in the context of culture and race and how certain issues 
presented by the news media or politicians as a threat to security can alter audiences’ perception 
of the content. 
 If framing creates a media atmosphere in which certain words, images, phrases, and 
metaphors are made salient through news routines and narratives that in turn become a part of how 
audiences interpret information (Entman, 1991,1993; Gitlin, 1980), then securitization is a 
loudspeaker that amplifies the social and cultural conditions that surround particular frames 
(Vultee, 2009). Chapter 3 focuses on the theory of securitization and how exceptionalism coupled 
with framing can create an atmosphere where American culture has become securitized. The 
chapter focuses on the ways in which multiculturalism, due to increased immigration especially 
from South Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, has led to a racially charged 
space post-9/11.  
 This chapter will begin with a brief discussion on how securitization works with media 
frames to exaggerate racial and ethnic stereotypes that have the potential of being perceived as an 
existential threat. Further, as mentioned in Chapter 2, a discussion on individuals and groups 
perceived as “Brown” or “Others” have become the new cultural threat due to growing 
multiculturalism in the United States. The chapter will also discuss the ways in which war and 
conflict, in particular, the ways 9/11 has highlighted America’s vulnerabilities through the prism 
of its perceived cultural, economic and technological superiority. This will lead into a discussion 
about American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism and the creation of a new American 
culture that is attempting to create a divide between the “East” and the “West.” The chapter will 
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conclude with an examination of how securitized images work within the context of traditional 
and social media discourse. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SECURITIZATION 
What is securitization and how does it work with media frames?  
 This dissertation expands on Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s (1998) definition of 
securitization, which assembles three basic elements in a “securitizing move”: a securitizing actor, 
a referent object and a target audience. If the actor makes a claim that something valuable (referent 
object) is under an existential threat that requires extraordinary measures and the audience accepts 
this claim, then the securitizing move is successful. Further, the audience needs to continue to 
accept that the referent object is something of value that requires constant protection (1998). As 
discussed earlier, this research uses the media as a securitizing actor, the target audience as the 
American public and the referent object as the dominant culture. In addition, the element of 
“Brown” bodies, specifically using race as a signifier of cultural difference or “othering,” adds the 
visual representation of ethnicity. This study takes a more nuanced approach to securitization by 
suggesting that the fear of cultural takeover by “Others” is the threat that has been securitized by 
the media for the American public. Research in security has focused on national and physical 
safety; however, this research elaborates on Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s (1998) assumptions on 
how the ability to maintain and pass along a treasured culture can be securitized. The growing 
multiculturalism in America, which scholars refer to as “browning” of America, also expands the 
discussion on securitization of culture in that it poses a threat to the dominant culture. 
 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) define a securitized situation as one that poses an 
existential threat to a cherished referent object, calling for extraordinary measures beyond the 
normal, everyday politics. Threats can be political, cultural or physical. An issue can become 
securitized when a securitizing actor, such as a politician, the media, or a community leader 
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supports emergency measures beyond regular laws and norms to extinguish the threat and the 
audience accepts the frame (p. 5).  
 Securitization is rooted in international relations and as a result is linked to the physical 
security of the state. However, scholars have recognized that securitization is more than physical 
threats and can entail societal issues, as well as the environment, the economy and the political 
arena (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). This dissertation is focused on the societal sector and 
the securitization of a dominant culture. Culture and its preservation can also be linked to the wider 
arc of a physical threat. That is, the acceptance of another culture could lead to a perceived takeover 
physically. This literature review re-examines securitization theory regarding threats to American 
culture via US foreign policy, immigration, and the ever looming threat of “the other” to the 
American way of life. The research brings to light how contemporary media frames continue to 
highlight the social and cultural conditions in which securitization factors are amplified. Because 
of the growth of online news consumption, the review will also expand the literature regarding 
news information that is disseminated through alternative sources.  
Securitization and “the Other” 
 During the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, President George W. Bush 
used language that fueled an “us” versus “them” atmosphere, which in turn created a nation of 
hyper-patriots (Gershkoff and Kushner, 2003). Thus, when the United States went to war on Iraq 
on March 19, 2003, nearly 70 percent of Americans supported the action, although there was no 
direct correlation between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein (2003). This support was high 
among Democrats and Republicans, men and women (2003). Fear of the “Other” is not limited to 
post 9/11, but can find its history in US political discourse.  
 The “global war on terrorism” can trace its roots back to the Cold War. The “war on terror” 
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and the Cold War were similar in that both were staged as defense of the West against “Others” 
who sought to destroy western ideologies (Buzan, 2006). However, a significant difference is that 
the Cold War was a highly formalized affair based on nation rivalries, while the “war on terror” 
was far smaller in comparison (Tirman, 2006). Al Qaeda is not a country, but rather a terror 
organization whose ideology is a “cry against alleged Western mistreatment” (2006, p. 2). Despite 
the fact that very little terrorism poses a threat to the US, it continues to be successfully cast as an 
“extraordinary threat” by political actors and the media. This suggests that the “threat” is more 
ideological and that there is not a clear definition of what a security threat actually is (Sjostedt, 
2007). Even with the vague conceptualization of securitization, the use of constant televisuals of 
foreign-looking people, have become a powerful tool for securitizing which has been tied 
increasingly with political communication (Williams, 2003). 
 Images of women in burkas and of bearded men began to symbolize something that was 
“un-American” and different. Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo (2009) argue that the process of 
“browning” specific groups places those members of society in a social quarantine. In the context 
of securitization, the “browned” body becomes one that is: “1) perceived as a threat to both the US 
government and the social fabric of the country, 2) rendered as being in opposition to the post-
September 11, 2001 notion of Americanness, and 3) placed under strict rhetorical, legal, or 
physical containment” (2009; p. 112). 
 Discussion regarding the “browning” of America started well before the September 11, 
2001 attacks. This was in part due to an increase of immigration, in particular from Latin America. 
The growing number of immigrants and minorities led to an embracing of multicultural ideals by 
American society (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo 2009). The United States is eventually 
expected to become a country of majority-minorities by 2043 (2009). By 2060 the Hispanic 
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population is expected to nearly double with nearly one in three US residents of Hispanic origin. 
By 2050, the Asian populations (East and South) are expected to increase by 79 percent (Ortman 
and Guarneri, 2009). 
 Certainly physical appearance is a major factor in the “browning” of a group; however, it 
is just one issue. Names like Ali, Abdullah, Hussein, and Mohammed have also been “browned.” 
For many people, these types of names may evoke images of terrorism, but they most often create 
a sense that there is a lack of patriotism (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2009). Individuals 
with these or similar “brown” sounding names (i.e. Hispanic) can be construed as being “un-
American” and potential enemies of the state. 
 During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama’s middle name, Hussein, was 
injected into discourse by conservative commentators eager to invoke images of the Muslim 
“Other,” in general, and of Saddam Hussein in particular (Lugo-Lugo et al, 2009). In the context 
of a campaign in which the absence of an American flag pin in Obama’s lapel became a 
controversy for political rivals and some press accounts (2009), his name was another way of 
questioning his patriotism (2009). Additionally, the added issues of his name being mistaken for 
Osama by members of the media, such as Glenn Beck’s 2007 misstep on “Good Morning 
America,” where he switched Obama with Osama (Stelter, 2007) and The Detroit News running 
the headline “Clinton, Osama meet to Discuss Unity” (Associated Press, 2008) added to the 
“browning” of Obama. Even politicians were not above making these errors with the President’s 
name, such as in 2008 when former Attorney General John Ashcroft referred to Obama as Osama 
to a group of students at Skidmore College (ABCNews.com, 2008). The “othering” of Obama’s 
name is an example of one of many factors used to “Brown” individuals and groups, making them 
into foreign entities (Lugo-Lugo et al, 2009). In the process of being ‘browned’ through his name 
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and his perceived lack of patriotism, Obama’s identity was also tied to Islam, a religion that has 
been demonized by politicians and the media as the ideology of the “enemy.” 
 Buzan (2006) suggests that securitizing ethnic groups and turning them into the “enemy” 
is not a new phenomenon. It is merely an evolved version “from the pre-9/11 European pattern, 
where the main effort went into securitizing a threat package linking immigration, organized crime 
and drugs—thereby depicting immigrants as the root problem” (p. 1105). Actors, such as 
politicians and policymakers, can target “Others” through issues, such as Muslims via terrorism 
and Mexicans via illegal immigration, and thus prevent themselves from being labeled racists; 
rather they are perceived as patriots focused on the security of the country. This is not particularly 
unusual. “Others” have been and continue to be the scapegoats for domestic problems (lack of jobs 
blamed on immigrants) and in some more extreme cases blamed for global calamities (Muslims 
and a perceived rise in global terrorist attacks). National leaders have used the process of 
securitizing “Others” as a tool to foster nationalism and identity, as well as gain public support for 
elections or waging a costly war (Bigo, 2002; Massey, 1995).  
 Months following the Pearl Harbor attacks, President Roosevelt signed an executive order 
in 1942 that essentially sent nearly 120,000 Japanese Americans to internment camps as a way to 
“protect” American citizens (Nagata, 1990). However, the attacks did not signal the beginning of 
the negative racial stereotypes of Japanese as “subhuman, untrustworthy, and inferior to Caucasian 
Americans” (p. 134); rather, these preexisting ways of thinking became exaggerated after Pearl 
Harbor (1990). In addition, the “Other” has also been used as a distraction from internal societal 
failings such as classism, high inflation, and poor economic performance, to name a few. Thus, 
the “Other” is not just a person or a group, but rather a political construction (Said, 1978). 
Conservatives in America and other Western nations, like Canada, also claim that immigration 
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policies in the US are detrimental to American identity as a nation founded by White Europeans 
(Russo, 2008). This stems from increased immigration from South Asia and Africa, with 
conservatives suggesting that these groups may not be able to “assimilate” as well as their 
European counterparts (Russo, 2008). Individuals and groups who physically look like their 
European predecessors have been perceived as being better equipped to assimilate into the 
dominant American culture, while people who physically look like “Others” have been expected 
to have a more difficult time assimilating. As a result, government policies, (heightened visa 
controls, new border security measures and the storage of personal information about legal 
immigrants to the US) have been enacted to tie immigration to terrorism, specifically from South 
Asia and the Middle East or geographic areas where Islam is the dominant religion practiced.  
 The combination of a perception that Islam is synonymous with terrorism (despite the 
West’s long history of encounters with non-Muslim terrorism) and fears of uncontrolled 
immigration may be creating a sense of cultural imbalance. National identity and stability is 
created by the development of traditions, such as systems of justice and rights (Ibrahim, 2005). 
However, immigrants bring different cultures and traditions and are perceived to imbalance the 
nation through the addition of their cultural practices (2005). An imbalance is perceived when the 
dominant cultural group believes their way of life is being eroded or supplanted with the addition 
of new cultures and ways of life that immigration tends to bring with it.  
 Immigration has been framed in relation to terrorism, unemployment and crime (Bigo, 
2002), but in the mid-19th century it was also focused on the expansion and economic growth of 
the US (Hipsman and Meissner, 2013). Because of industrialization and the Irish potato famine, 
immigration began around 1880 with nearly “28 million immigrants entering the United States” 
(Massey, 1995, p. 633). A majority of these immigrants were from Northern and Western Europe, 
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eventually leading to immigrants coming from Eastern and Western Europe as industrialization 
worked its way across the United States (1995). Immigration shifted to Asian populations, namely 
from China, when gold was discovered in California in 1848 (Wright, 1940).  
 “At first, the Chinese were welcomed in California. Their labor was needed, and they were 
willing to do work to which the Anglo-Saxon would not stoop—women’s work, and menial labor 
of all kinds” (Wright, 1940, p. 329). Early characterizations of Chinese immigrants suggested they 
were “hardworking exotics” (Freedman, 2005; p. 83), while their European counterparts, 
particularly the Irish, were viewed as “potential convicts” (2005; p. 83). However, Europeans were 
still the majority and as a result, “the United States became less black, more white, and more firmly 
European in culture and outlook” (Wright, 1940, p. 633). But like any other non-European 
immigrants, these groups brought their own set of customs and cultures, which were perceived by 
Europeans as a disruption of their culture and a potential imbalance to the nation (Ibrahim, 2005). 
 As the mining boom began to near its end, hostility towards Chinese immigrants rose. Thus 
Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, halting immigration from China for ten years 
(Hipsman and Meissner, 2013). This was part of a larger immigration policy that would limit 
immigration in general, with specified portion focused on Chinese immigrants. In 1917, Congress 
passed another immigration act that barred immigrants from Asian countries and the Middle East 
(2013). Further, in 1924 the US enacted policies favoring immigrants from northern and western 
Europe, placing stricter quotas on those from Asian countries (2013). Although immigration has 
always been regulated, the events of 9/11 had lasting implications that led to more robust 
immigration policies, as well as the dissolution of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(2013). In its place was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and its three 
branches: Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. 
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Citizenship and Immigration Services (2013). Yet, despite these measures, immigration in the US 
has had a steady growth since 2007 (Pew Research, 2013). 
 According to the Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project (2013), the US is home to over 40 
million immigrants, including 11 million unauthorized individuals. This group represents 13 
percent of the population, just under the 15 percent during the immigration wave from 1890 to 
1920 (2013). One major difference is that the earlier group was dominated by immigration from 
European countries, while the immigrant populations from the latter group were mainly from Latin 
and Asian countries (2013). The growth of “Brown” groups and their cultural differences have 
been perceived as threats to a nation’s existing way of life. As Ibrahim (2005) suggests that 
“cultural differences threaten the existing way of life” (p. 166) and as such, “the defining feature 
of new racism is that cultural pluralism will lead to inter-ethnic conflict which will dissolve the 
unity of the state” (p. 166). Muslim populations are growing steadily globally and in the United 
States. 
 According to projections by the Pew Research Center, the global Muslim population is 
expected to increase by 35% in the next 20 years, rising from 1.6 billion in 2010 to nearly 2.2 
billion by 2030 (DeSilver, 2013). Islam is the second fastest growing religion in the world behind 
Christianity (2013). In the United States, due to immigration and conversion, followers of Islam 
have risen to 2.6 million in 2010 from one million in 2000 (Al Arabiya News, May 2, 2012). In 
2009, a majority of Muslim immigrants were from Pakistan and Bangladesh and those countries 
are expected to remain the top countries of origin for Muslim immigrants to the United States in 
2030 (Pewforum.org, 2011). 
 Much of the issues surrounding this “invasion,” especially from predominantly Muslim 
countries, is the potential of an attack on a nation’s/person’s/group’s majority identity. The 
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securitization of cultural differences; however, can be traced back to the 16th century with the rise 
of European power (Buzan, 2010). Said (1978) suggests this fear of cultural differences, in many 
ways, is about perceiving the East as an uncontrollable danger. While the “Occident” places itself 
in a position of superiority, the “Orient” or “Other” is “devalued, feared, reviled,” (Nayak and 
Malone, 2009, p. 256). In the case of a nation-state, identity is based on what makes a country 
unique and special. In other words, what makes America and Americans, America and Americans? 
This identity is tied into pre-independence ideas of cultural superiority and an exaggerated global 
dominance the US has held since World War II. 
Culture threatened by the “Others” 
 As mentioned earlier, securitization scholars such as Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) 
suggest the securitization process requires three elements: an actor, a referent object and a target 
audience. The actor makes the claim that the referent object is under an existential threat requiring 
emergency measures and the target’s accepting this claim makes it successful (1998). The threat 
can be physical, political or cultural and be amplified and created by securitizing actors like the 
media or a politician. This dissertation; however, focuses on the securitization of culture. Markers 
like race and religion help to define those groups that are different, thus certain immigrants can be 
perceived as threatening because they represent a group that is culturally different than the 
European-based “American” culture and identity, while other groups of immigrants are perceived 
as “model minorities.” 
 Societies are organized by identity (Buzan et al, 1998). Specific members belong to 
communities and as a result identify with those politically constructed groups. Societal insecurity 
exists when the development of a potential situation threatens the group’s survival as a community 
(1998). A nation’s identity and its culture can be threatened by issues such as immigration, war, 
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even the environment when the referent object is culture or “the American way of life” (Ibrahim, 
2005; Vultee, 2009; Buzan, 2010). While war and conflict certainly constitute an existential threat, 
“the roots of conflicts are increasingly related to culture and identity,” (Laustsen and Waever, 
2000, p. 705). When there is a shared understanding by the public and its policymakers that 
extraordinary measures need to be taken to protect what makes America intrinsically American, 
the elements giving a nation its uniqueness, are in peril. Thus, immigration becomes more about 
English-only laws in states that border Mexico, rather than improving laws and policies; political 
actors can turn Sharia law into a constitutional issue suggesting that creeping Sharia law might 
mean that “we” can no longer enforce the constitution “we” want (and want to pass along to our 
offspring).  
 In recent years, the debate about foreign laws taking root in the American legal system 
have been focused on Sharia law or the moral code that followers of Islam may abide by. It is 
defined as “the body of Islamic religious law applicable to police, banking, contracts, and social 
issues” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2011). Because Sharia covers such a “wide array of societal and 
economic interactions, it fails to capture the distinctions made among various Islamic countries 
and sects” (Rosato, 2014; pg. 660). As a result, there is not a single definition of Sharia and it is 
open to interpretation that may allow it to be used in conjunction with state law (2014). Further, 
“Sharia does not represent a rigid, inflexible, and monolithic legal system,” (Rehman, 2007, p. 
838), thus Sharia law is adaptable to “changing social and political norms and values” (p 838). Yet 
several states in recent years have moved to ban Sharia usage in state courts. Although most have 
been unsuccessful, Oklahoma succeeded in 2010 by passing the “Save Our State” amendment by 
a 70 percent voter approval (Rosato, 2014).  
 Despite the lack of evidence to support the Sharia “threat,” proponents across the state and 
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nation were able to successfully securitize Sharia. Politicians argued that Sharia Law was related 
to radical Islam and as a result posed a threat to the United States (Rosato, 2014). The threat 
perceived was not because “Islamophobes in Western countries claim that they will eventually be 
forced to adhere to Sharia,” (2014, p. 661); rather, the emphasis was placed on whether Sharia 
would be injected into the American legal system and how that would change U.S. law (2014). 
Thus, proponents in Oklahoma argued that U.S. courts would only uphold American law and not 
allow any foreign legal system to enter into the courts. However, Sharia law was never a threat, 
physical or cultural. Sharia law falls in many ways within the societal sector of securitization. 
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) introduce multiple sectors of securitization including military, 
which can affect how people perceive “threats.” 
 The military sector focuses on states and would-be states as referent objects for military 
security. The protection of the physical territory of the state becomes a matter of military security. 
Within the realm of environmental security are two agendas: scientific and political. What is 
imperative for environmental securitization to be successful is for the states, major political actors 
and local communities to accept the presented scientific agenda (1998). Economic securitization 
deals the quality of economic units and the insecurity of market relations. The political security 
agenda is about non-military threats to state sovereignty. Political security issues can be divided 
into two categories: nonmilitary threats to political units that are not states and defense of system 
level referents like international law and society. However, this research is concerned with the 
societal security agenda because it has traditionally been tied to national security. National identity 
is the crux of the societal sector, which is why it is the focus of the current research. Cultural 
differences can threaten national identity and thus can be securitized. Part of national identity is 
tied to the concept of American exceptionalism, which suggests that American culture and its way 
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of life is unique and something to be protected. While the state represents physical and geographic 
borders, the nation represents something more metaphorical. It is based within the realm of culture 
and identity. Within the metaphorical space of national culture is where the concept of American 
exceptionalism takes root. 
 American exceptionalism refers to the concept that America is somehow unique due to its 
political, cultural and even religious heritage (Lipset, 1996). In one of his first trips overseas in 
2009, during a news conference, President Barack Obama was asked about his belief in American 
exceptionalism and he responded, “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the 
Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism” (Tumulty, 
2013). This suggests that the US is no more unique or superior than any other dominant nation and 
that exceptionalism is not exclusively an American concept. Yet, growing multiculturalism has 
also led to discussions about race and identity (Gandy, 1998) and the fear that what makes America 
uniquely American might not exist.  
 Obama’s comment enraged the right wing in the same way that the “Ground Zero Mosque” 
did because it redefined American exceptionalism by emphasizing every nation’s form of 
exceptionalism. Similarly, the “Ground Zero Mosque” emphasized that American was not a 
country of White Christians and despite right wing opposition mosques would exist in the same 
spaces as churches. America is a multicultural nation that is not particularly unique compared to 
other nations. Thus, immigration can be securitized because the shared need to take extraordinary 
measures to protect America is more than just about the physical borders. A broader more 
ambiguous sense of identity, culture, and language, which produces the fear of losing the very 
uniqueness of what it is to be American, might be put at risk (Vultee, 2010).  
 When certain topics like immigration or Sharia Law are brought into the public forum, 
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those conversations lead to issues surrounding the fear of losing American identity and culture and 
an inherent change in the perceived dominant society. Historically, America has attempted to be a 
monocentric culture, in that society has a core which absorbs all other cultures “into its particular 
rules, norms and institutions” (Buzan, 2010; pg. 3). As a result, cultures, races, and even religions 
that do not “fit” within the core are deemed “others.” The global growth of Islam has also resulted 
in more misunderstandings about the religion and cultures associated with it, leading to “confusion, 
misinformation, contempt, and sometimes fear and even hatred,” (Adnan, 1989). However, Islam 
and Muslims are not the only “othered” groups. Increased immigration has opened doors to citizens 
from Latin America (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2009), Middle Eastern and South Asian 
countries (Maira, 2004) and has created this divide between White (Caucasian, ethnically 
European) and Brown (others). 
 Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo’s (2009) concept of the “browned body” suggest that 
groups deemed “brown” are perceived as threats to America and its government. This threatens 
not only the state as it presents a threat to the perceived American culture and identity. Further, 
post-9/11, “browned” groups have been viewed as not only being un-American, but in direct 
resistance to American ideals and values (2009). Much of this articulation is happening in the 
public space with political actors and elites feeding the media with the information eventually 
making its way to the audience (Entman, 2003). President George W. Bush’s “war on terror” frame 
dominated the news (2003) and as a result created a distinct differences between the “East” and 
“West” (Nayak and Malone, 2009). 
 Nayak and Malone (2009) suggest that American exceptionalism is “rooted in American 
political thought about the development and articulation of the American nation in 
contradistinction to Europe,” (p. 254). An example would be the use of international law. While 
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Europe views “international law as the primary tool of diplomacy, the United States has defended 
its sovereign right to put forth a national security strategy without consulting with others” (p. 261). 
In the national context, the United States has a tendency to rely on its European roots as the 
“dominant position in American life” (Massey, 1995, p. 632), However, due to the large influx of 
immigrants to major urban areas like Los Angeles and Miami, people of European decent are 
expected to become the minority in the future (1995). It is this fear of cultural displacement that 
has resulted in rules about English being spoken in classrooms instead of Spanish and the 
continued nationalization of American and Christian holidays. 
 Buzan et al (1998) outline the three most common issues surrounding threats to societal 
security: migration, horizontal competition, and vertical competition. Migration suggests that the 
dominant group in society believes it is being overrun or diluted due to an influx of migration from 
another group. As a result of this dilution the community will be changed (1998). Horizontal 
competition occurs when the original group is still living in the region while their ways are 
changing as the newer group moves in their cultural and linguistic influence (1998).  
 In this regard, a newer identity is created that merges the original identity with the newer 
cultural influences. It is during this transition period that divides are seen within societies. Thus 
society does not refer to state population, but as Buzan et al (1998) suggest, it is based on 
communities with which individuals identify. The original group in the area may hold onto their 
culture by deeming the newer cultures as a threat. 
 Vertical competition says that the original group will stop seeing themselves as unique due 
to integration projects or secessionist/regionalist projects which pull different groups together, 
either widening or narrowing their identities (1998). For example, certain cities such as San 
Antonio, Texas (53% Latin or Hispanic), have majority-minority populations resulting in 
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integration where both groups (White or Hispanic) can identify as either (CNBC.com, 2011).  
 The securitizing society can react to the perceived threat through laws in their community 
and state through the political or military systems (Buzan et al, 1998). In many cases, the space 
between societal and political merges because situations originally deemed simple cultural nuances 
(Arabic restaurants in Dearborn, Michigan) can become politically charged (immigration from the 
U.S/Mexican border and the fear of homegrown terrorism).  
Securitizing the U.S. economy 
 Since colonial times, America has been perceived by the international community as an 
exceptional place where anything was possible (Goldberg, 2010) and unlike Britain, France, 
Germany, and Japan, the American industrialization machine did not have to seek colonies as 
markets or for raw materials (2010). “The relative US decline was an inevitable result of the 
exaggerated position of global dominance it held in 1944,” (Buzan et al, 1998; p. 97). Globalization 
has changed the United States in the last 30 years resulting in an identity crisis and a feeling of 
national insecurity (Goldberg, 2010). Certain immigration policies also ensured a large, cheap 
labor force.   
 The massive global economy that once had allowed the United States to become an 
economic leader was beginning to disintegrate due in part to the lure of cheap overseas labor. “The 
United States’ continental market has been taken over, in a semi-nonfriendly way, by the 
international marketplace” (Goldberg, 2010). The US dominant position was challenged by Europe 
and Japan as these regions began to recover after World War II and also by newly decolonized 
countries that were moving towards modernization (Buzan et al, 1998). However, like the previous 
three decades, American economic polices favored countries from Europe, which were perceived 
as “potential equals” (Beeson and Higgott, 2005, p. 1179) while Asian countries were viewed as 
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“alien” and “inferior” (p. 1179). For the first time, America was feeling the challenge of having to 
compete in a new market that had sizable opponents many of whom were perceived as “Others.”   
 Some of the largest issues that led America to this perceived sense of insecurity are trade 
deficits, the county’s dependence on foreign oil, and the pressure on the US currency (Buzan et al, 
1998). This process made the conditions ripe for securitization mainly because the United States 
was entering an unfamiliar territory of economic interdependence that made the country 
economically weaker (1998). Economic success in Europe and Asia also prompted this national 
insecurity. There was evidence that the Bush administration (2001-2009) had been in the process 
of securitizing the global economy in U.S. policy (Higgott, 2004); however, 9/11 cemented this 
ideology. Globalization was not only seen in neo-liberal economic terms, but also through the lens 
of national security (2004). As John Ikenberry notes:- 
“The pre-eminence of American power today is unprecedented in modern history. No 
 other great power has enjoyed such formidable advantages in military, economic, 
 technological, cultural or political capabilities. We live in a one superpower world and 
 there is no serious competitor in sight” (Ikenberry, 2002, p. 1).  
Prior to 9/11, the Bush Administration began adopting policies and procedures that were 
extraordinary to the norms for foreign economic policy (Higgott, 2004). Recent changes in these 
policies included the unilateralist attitudes towards economic reform instruments like the World 
Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank following the Asian 
financial crisis (Higgott, 2004). Other aspects of this dissent included walking away from the 
Kyoto Protocol (2004). Post 9/11 resulted in a renewed sense of American exceptionalism.  
 Unilateral economic moves were not unique to the post-9/11 period. After World War II, 
the US used its dominance to create and set in place global economic management systems that 
were mainly beneficial to its national interests (Higgott, 2004). These interests were threatened 
following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the rhetorical claims made by the Bush 
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administration and the media made globalization into a securitized issue, namely because of the 
country’s dependence on foreign oil from countries perceived as the “other.” 
 After the Cold War, the country was facing a deficit in national security threats (Buzan, 
2006). Washington sought a replacement that could match the Soviet Union as an enemy for 
military and foreign policy; however, countries like Japan, China and various “rogue states” 
(Buzan, 2006; p. 1101) did not provide an adequate “common cause and a shared framing that 
underpinned US leadership of the West.” (2006, p. 1101). Claims made by the Bush 
Administration following the 9/11 attacks gave the US a long term global war on terror that 
allowed it to reassert itself as the dominant leader in global security (Buzan, 2006). In a series of 
claims, the attacks also helped to frame US interests in foreign policy as universal ideals. (2006).  
Securitizing war and conflict 
 The media has always had an amplifying effect on politics, but the 9/11 attacks brought 
into light the vulnerabilities of America in terms of its perceived cultural, economic, and 
technological superiority. As a result, securitization becomes a particularly relevant form of 
framing, in that it highlights certain elements that make an issue a threat that requires extraordinary 
measures beyond normal routines and politics. Thus if the function of framing is “to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (Entman, 
1993, p. 52), then securitization is a frame that emphasizes those aspects of reality (Vultee, 2007). 
 Much of framing’s impact comes from the shortcuts it offers to people who, facing a flood 
of mediated information, act as “cognitive misers” (Pachur & Hartwig, 2006), by using systematic 
shortcuts to cut through the information quagmire. Unlike agenda setting, which says the media 
doesn’t tell audiences “what to think” but “what to think about” (McCombs and Shaw 1972); 
framing tells audiences how hard to think about what they are being told to think about (Vultee, 
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2011). Pan and Kosicki (1993) suggest that news texts should be “viewed as a system of organized 
signifying elements that both indicate the advocacy of certain ideas and provide devices to 
encourage certain kinds of audience processing of the texts” (p. 56).  
  Cognitive cues like securitization work with frames to provide pinpoint cues to audiences 
that allow them to quickly make judgments based on easy-to-digest bits of information. In the 
context of the war on terror, securitized cues play a specific role in US political and journalistic 
discourse (Vultee, 2011) by giving audiences and journalists immediate “good” and “bad guys.” 
The war on terror, like Pearl Harbor, created the classic conditions in which securitization can 
operate as a frame. Not only can securitizing actors argue, and gain assent for, using extraordinary 
measures to protect the country from future attacks, but there is comparatively little resistance 
when securitizing actors propose to hunt down, separate and vilify those who have been deemed 
the villains – or, for these purposes, those who look or talk or worship like the villains. Gandy 
(1998) refers to this new breed of politics as the “culture wars” and suggests that opponents 
(politicians and the media) use negative stereotypes to frame race and ethnicity to make identifying 
markers for attacks. Audiences see these stereotypes and accept them as reality. As a result, media 
portrayals of terrorists tend to rely on broadcast footage of “Brown” men in faraway places like 
the Middle East or South Asia.  
 Images of “Brown” people combined with language identifying this group as “inferior” 
allowed the US to maintain its cultural superiority globally. However, the 9/11 attacks forced the 
US to redefine itself in the global world order. On September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush 
announced: "Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward, and freedom will be 
defended” (CNN, 2001). Freedom was a part of America’s identity and it had been attacked and 
as a result it was imperative to protect freedom, as well as punish the “faceless cowards” that had 
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attacked it. According to Buzan and Wæver (1998), national identity has a stronger pull than 
national sovereignty because it is at the core of U.S. identity and defines whether “we” are still 
“us” (Buzan et al, 1998; Vultee, 2011). 
 Within the realm of international relations, the state is considered the only legitimate 
referent object for military security (Buzan et al, 1998). The state is comprised of a ruling elite, 
but it is an imperfect model in that it does not incorporate all the elements of civil society found at 
the national level (1998). Therefore, the door opens to other referent objects, such as language, the 
“American way of life” and religion.  
 Prior to 9/11, the growth of Islam was seen as a potential threat to the Western world; 
however, since post-attacks, the perception of Islam has become synonymous with terrorism 
(Adnan, 1989; Ibrahim, 2010).Islam itself did not attack the state physically or its identity; 
however, its followers represented something that was foreign and culturally different (what makes 
America, America) and as a result there continues to be a fear that the country cannot survive if its 
identity becomes altered (Vultee, 2011). As with immigration and campaigns to prevent Spanish 
from being used in the American public sphere, this fear of the loss of identity results in actors 
claiming Sharia law will void the U.S. Constitution and campaigning for bills that will prevent this 
takeover. In many ways Sharia law has been securitized as a specific threat because it threatens 
the dominant American way of life in that it is the “enemy’s” law and way of life and the 
“possibility of radical Muslims infiltrating the US government and establishing a Taliban-style 
theocracy” (Sullivan, 2011). Despite the lack of evidence, politicians, like former House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich and Alabama State Senator Gerald Allen, both calling for a federal law that would 
deter the use of Sharia law in U.S. courts (2010). The fear that American culture and “way of life,” 
or what makes America unique, could inherently be altered by the introduction of a “foreign” legal 
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and moral code is how Sharia Law is securitized. Buzan (2010) says that the only uniqueness that 
the U.S. may actually have is its desire to “impose its values on others for their own benefit” (p. 
7), but other states have also followed a similar path, suggesting that the US is perhaps not more 
or less unique than any other dominant culture or power. 
 Outside of language and culture, certain ethnic groups may be targeted as “enemies” after 
major events, like Middle Easterners and South Asians in the years after 9/11. Further, once the 
actor made a securitizing move, claiming that a referent object was under threat, the actor needed 
a target audiences’ support (Buzan et al, 1998). Dissent of any sort, especially following the days 
after the attacks, would have warranted negative public outcries. O’Reilly (2008) refers to this as 
hyper-patriotism. This hyper-patriotism made the atmosphere ripe for the Bush administration to 
create ties to Iraq and the “war on terror.” Members of the Bush administration contended Saddam 
Hussein had active ties to al-Qaeda, which in turn led to a hunt for the infamous weapons of mass 
destruction; however, both assertions were unfounded and as a result the administration lost a 
majority of international support for war (2008). Due to high levels of patriotism after 9/11, the 
administration was able to successfully securitize the Iraq War in the United States using the media 
(2008).  
 Another way to capture target audiences is to get media and political elites discussing those 
topics. Although dissent is not stopped by discussions, it has a better chance of reaching traditional 
news outlets and target audiences if it comes from conversations already happening among the 
elites (Entman, 2004). The cascading activation model, according to Entman (2004), is how 
specific frames about war, public policy, and economy start at the top level of a government system 
(for example, the White House) and move onto other elites such as Congress and experts, then to 
the media, and finally to the public. But before these frames make it to the media and eventually 
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the public, there must be agreement among top-level political elites (Bennett, 1990). The 
relationship between government and the mass media has not always been so antagonistic.  
 The intent of the mass media is to act as a balance to counter the potential unchecked power 
of government (Bennett, 1990). “A strong, adversarial press must be ready to raise its own and 
other grass-roots voices against government officials who would exclude those voices from 
deliberations about the national interest” (1990, p. 104). However, due to budget cuts and the 
growing need to fill “news holes,” journalists rely on government officials to supply a steady 
stream of information (1990). Bennett (1990) suggest that news professionals “index” a variety of 
“voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in 
mainstream government debate about a given topic” (p. 106). In this way the government controls 
the information that mass media covers as it eventually makes its way to the audience. The 
interpretations of the topics then come back from the lowest level (public) eventually making it to 
the higher levels (Entman, 2004). Thus, once the political elite were in agreement and had the 
media on their side, the decision to invade Iraq was largely supported by the American public. 
 “Winning the moral support of the American public and the formal support of a Senate 
vote went hand-in-hand, and arguably influenced each other in supporting the war” (O’ Reilly, 
2008, g. 67). The rhetoric the Bush administration used also helped to narrow the gap between 
citizen and state, keeping the security issues of the politically elite in line with American citizens 
(2008). Speeches with metaphors suggesting a “good” versus “evil” (2008) with the U.S. as the 
“good guys” and Iraq as the “bad guys” helped to further American exceptionalism and the need 
to protect “our way of life.” Securitizing an issue allows an actor to describe an issue as a security 
threat without having to go into significant details. Thus the decision to invade Iraq was supported 
by the American public despite international dissent because of the hyper-patriotic atmosphere 
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post-9/11.  
 The language used by Bush, combined with the highly emotional state of the country and 
the “national feeling and fostering of hyper-patriotism, driven through the mainstream media 
which played upon the 9/11 attacks and created an audience far more susceptible to securitization 
rhetoric” (O’Reilly, 2008; p. 67). In addition, for securitization to be successful, the target audience 
needs to be appropriate and relevant. The audience needs to be a group that the threat would be a 
viable threat to (2008). In the case of the Iraq War, support from the international community was 
not required; rather it was sufficient to convince Congress and the public. 
 US identity also plays a major role in international relations, especially in terms of how 
U.S. foreign policy can treat one country benevolently, while the “Other” is considered a threat 
(Hayes, 2009). In order to securitize an issue successfully, actors must use the language of security 
by appealing “to certain norms and identities in order to communicate the idea of a threat and that 
the object threatened is valuable” (2009, p. 982). The Copenhagen School says the language used 
by actors can position whether a situation is deemed a threat (Wæver, 1995). Political leaders use 
language that helps create a democratic identity and as such nations that share similar democratic 
identifying markers are considered allies. Nations deemed allies versus enemies by US political 
leaders are created as a mechanism of self-preservation. Nations that are dissimilar to America can 
fall into the “othered” category and that prejudice can trickle down to the media and further to the 
public.  
Securitizing images and traditional/social media discourse  
 Both theories of framing and securitization contend that phrases, metaphors, and images 
are a required component to understanding political outcomes. On their basic levels, the theories 
posit that through the use of many types of discursive practices, the actor can construct existential 
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threats (Watson, 2011). Securitizing actors like political leaders can endorse the need for 
emergency actions beyond the normal routines (Buzan et al, 1998). Using this definition, the media 
is also a securitizing actor, in that it was used as a facilitating agency to seek public support for the 
military actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the U.S. “war on terror.” For this project, the increasing 
relevance of social media in news consumption is an important factor in how audiences interpret 
news information. 
 Because of the role the media plays, this research specifically looks at audience attitudes 
towards news information that is securitized or nonsecuritized. It suggests that when audiences are 
presented with visual cues that play on stereotypes and themes that have already been made salient 
in the news media, those ideas will not have to fight opposing ideas because stereotypes readily 
used in mainstream media have already primed audiences, thus making securitizing moves more 
likely to succeed.  When issues surrounding immigration or terrorism are presented in the news 
media, audiences, in many cases have negative attitudes towards the information. The process of 
securitization is open to the securitizing actor. The “actor” can securitize any issue so long as 
he/she can make any effective claims about the threat, which in turn needs an appropriate audience 
to accept such claims (Williams, 2003). Part of the securitizing actor’s job is to also define the 
boundaries of “friends” versus “enemies.” Schmitt (1985, as cited in Williams 2003) suggests that 
“enemies” are not necessarily defined as economic competitors or even morally evil, but rather as 
‘others’ whose very nature makes them an existential threat so that in extreme cases, conflict is 
considered a norm. When a group or community has been “othered” by securitizing actors like 
politicians and the media, it opens the door for the public to view these groups as alien and a danger 
to them. Thus, political actors in conjunction with the news media can form a very powerful 
securitizing union. 
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 One of the most powerful forms of communication media is television. Without words, 
televised images can help to define who the “enemies” versus “friends” are in relation to any 
nation. Thus, similar topics like war and conflict, where there tend to be grayer moral areas, can 
be constructed in ways that suggest those who are most similar to us are the “good guys” while 
those deemed unusual or strange are depicted as “bad guys.” Television images have become the 
privileged lens through which moral relations are mediated and filtered to the modern world 
(Ignatieff, 1998). In reality, conflicts are not composed of “good guys” and “bad guys.” Frames 
can eliminate gray areas in conflict by diverting audience attention to support those portrayed as 
our allies, while instilling hatred and fear to those deemed “villains.” Still, the degree to which 
fundamentally rhetorical arguments like securitization work with televised images remains 
unexplored. According to Buzan et al (1998), a sucessful argument is a combination of the 
language used, as well as the public value of the actor(s) that authorize that speech. However, this 
definition does not include the added power of televisual images and immediacy of broadcast 
news. Although words are powerful, images have the ability to communicate beyond just the 
verbal and have become an essential form of communication (Moeller, 1999). Images, especially 
moving images, can convey emotion and add clarity and depth that words alone may not be able 
to (1999). Images can penetrate the consciousness of the public, calling to question issues 
surrounding domestic and international conflict.  
 Securitization scholars also recognize the importance of non-linguistic forms of 
communication, such as images, to help aid in the move towards a more multi-layered 
understanding of security theory (Watson, 2011; Möller, 2007; McDonald, 2008). Broadcast 
images used in conjunction with television linguistic tools have created a social reality that allows 
the actor to make the successful securitizing move (Williams, 2003). The constant barrage of 
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televison images that depict nefarious-looking “Others” in faraway desert countries shooting 
targets with rifles or lines of immigrants from Mexico waiting for daily employment juxtiposed 
with a well placed voiceover have created an electronic media environment ripe with “threats” to 
America and Americans.  
 Images cannot function without the appropriate linguistic tools to make an issue 
securitized. Vuori (2010) suggests that images and symbols can facilitate, or impede, secutitization 
moves, They require some sort of anchorage to have the full effect. Certain words, such as 
terrorism, automatically bring to mind danger and fear (2010). These types of words have already 
been institutionalized as securitized (2010). However, some written text is open to interperation 
and may be more difficult to securitize, therefore the employment of images can help to convey 
the emotion and clarity that words alone are not able to. It is also important to recognize that 
images require a member of the media to give them meaning and provide a solid context to the 
audience (2010). Without previous securitization, it would be difficult for images to convey that 
act of securitization alone. Images, therefore, perform a facilitating act between the speech act and 
securitization.  
 The attacks of 9/11 provided a contemporary example of how broadcast images were used 
to create an atmosphere open to securitizing forces (verbal and non-verbal). The use of raw footage 
on television of the planes crashing into the towers followed by the ash-covered faces of survivors 
and emergency personnel made it easier for actors like the media and politicians to justify the use 
of extraordinary means to stop the threat. The constant images also made it easier for the American 
public to see the justification behind using those means (Shapiro, 2004; Williams, 2003). Televison 
images also created hypernationalism. “Media sources, and in particular the major television news 
networks, strived to show how patriotic they were, how proud they were to be American and most 
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importantly how just was the cause for war,” (O’Reilly, 2008; p. 71). In this hyper-patriotic world 
amid visuals and words, where does social media fit? 
 Cultural theorist Paul Virilio says cyberspace provides a newer perspective compared to 
traditional media (n.d.). Walsh and Barbara (2006) suggest that cyberspace has allowed the “war 
on terror” to take place in a number of geographic fronts. The Internet, specifically social media, 
has allowed many groups to engage with the political process in unprecedented ways, using 
imagery as a way to create and sustain fear or unite populations for a cause. 
 In the Western world, Walsh et al (2006) say that despite citizens’ enjoying unparalleled 
opportunities to engage and express their political opinions while gaining diverse information, they 
have inadvertently weakened their ability to make real political changes. Social media provides a 
political vent where citizens can express themselves, while the state continues to pursue its own 
agendas. However, these techniques are entrenched in the broader realm of more traditional mass 
media for which the state mobilizes public opinion and support (Walsh et al, 2006). 
 In recent years, social media has been used as a tool for engagement and mobilization. The 
most recent examples are the protests across the Middle East, in which youth activists utilized 
social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to engage with their governments 
and each other (Ali and Fahmy, 2013). Many bloggers focused their energies on dislocating the 
hegemonic norms of racial superiority and transforming the contemporary social order. According 
to Domingo and Heinonen (2008), bloggers are challenging the definition of journalism by 
removing the concept of the “trained observer.” Despite traditional media’s dominance in 
viewership (Olmstead, Jurkowitz, Mitchell and Enda, 2013), news from social media is gaining 
trust from younger consumers (Huang, 2009). According to Huang (2009), younger viewers 
consume news to monitor the world around them and prefer Internet sources for their shorter, more 
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concise writing styles, as well as the multimedia visual presentations. Further, younger consumers 
also “like to control what news to access and how to access it. For some, they do not just want to 
be passive news receivers; they also want to contribute content via participatory media, such as 
blogging and podcast” (Huang, 2009, p. 117).  
 Despite the growth of social media, it continues to remain on the fringes of news 
trustworthiness and credibility. However, in regards to authenticity, social media may take on a 
stronger presence. In the Middle East protests, traditional media, most of which are owned by 
governments, were not considered a trustworthy or even credible source (Ali and Fahmy, 2013). 
Those media systems were considered mouthpieces of the government, hence the reliance on social 
media platforms. However, no studies to date look at audience attitudes towards information 
coming from social media sources from the Western world. This study hopes to add to the literature 
regarding how Americans view securitized information coming from both traditional and social 
media spaces. It also looks at how the amplifying effects of securitization work in conjunction 
with media frames to make cultural and societal differences more salient. 
 The next chapter will lay out the hypotheses and research questions which ask how 
audiences percieve trust, credibility and authenticity in regards to race and modality. This section 
will lead into the methodolgy for this dissertation. The current study is an experiment that utilizes 
broadcast images of traditional and social media anchors and podcasters, respectively, presenting 
securitzed and nonsecuritzed information. The methods will lay the foundation of how race and 
security work in a traditional and new media environment. 
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HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Hypotheses and research question on trust, credibility and authenticity of PRESENTERS’ 
RACE 
Hypothesis 1a: The White (Anglo-European descent) anchor presenting the securitized story will 
be perceived as more trustworthy than the Brown (other/South Asian/Middle Eastern) anchor 
presenting the same story. 
Hypothesis 1b: The White anchor presenting the nonsecuritized story will be perceived as more 
trustworthy than the Brown anchor presenting the same story. 
Hypothesis 2a: The White anchor presenting the securitized story will be perceived as more 
credible than the Brown anchor presenting the same story. 
Hypothesis 2b: The White anchor presenting the nonsecuritized story will be perceived as more 
credible than the Brown anchor presenting the same story. 
Research Question 1: Will audiences perceive the Brown news presenter presenting either 
securitized/not securitized news as being the more authentic voice than the White news presenter 
presenting the same stories? 
Hypothesis on trust, credibility and authenticity of MODALITY (traditional and social media) 
Hypothesis 3: Stories from traditional media (broadcast TV) will be perceived as more trustworthy 
than stories from podcasts (social media). 
Hypothesis 4: Stories from traditional media (broadcast TV) will be perceived as more credible 
than stories from podcasts. 
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Research question 2: Will audiences perceive news information from podcasts as more authentic 
than traditional media? 
MEDIA USE (traditional and social) on trust, credibility and authenticity on PRESENTERS’ 
RACE and STORY TYPE  
Research question 3: What is the effect of participants media use (traditional or social) on trust 
of presenter? 
Research question 4: What is the effect of media (traditional and social) usage of participant on 
credibility of presenter? 
Research question 5: What is the effect of media (traditional and new) usage of participant on 
authenticity of presenter? 
Participants’ POLITICAL LEANINGS and PERCEIVED POLITICS OF THE MEDIA 
Research question 6a: What is the effect of participants’ political leanings on trust of the 
presenter?  
Research question 6b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media on participant 
trust of the presenter?  
Research question 7a: What is the effect of participants’ political leanings on credibility of the 
presenter? 
Research question 7b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media on participant 
credibility of the presenter?  
74 
 
 
Research question 8a: What is the effect of political leanings of the participant on the authenticity 
of presenter? 
Research question 8b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media of the participant 
on authenticity of presenter?  
Participants’ POLITICAL LEANINGS and PERCEIVED POLITICS OF THE MEDIA and 
STORY TYPE 
Research question 9a: What is the effect of participants’ political leanings on trust of story type? 
Research question 9b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media on trust of story 
type? 
Research question 10a: What is the effect of political leanings of the participants’ on credibility 
of story type? 
Research question 10b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media on credibility of 
story type? 
Research question 11a: What is the effect of political leanings of the participants’ on authenticity 
of story type? 
Research question 11b: What is the effect of the perceived politics of the media on authenticity 
of story type? 
We cannot ignore the possibility that that participant characteristics, like age, gender and 
ethnic backgrounds, can play a role in how these participants perceive trust, credibility and 
75 
 
 
authenticity of presenters and story types. Therefore I propose the following research questions 
based on age, gender and participants’ ethnic backgrounds. 
AGE of PARTICIPANT on Trust, Credibility and Authenticity on presenter and story type 
Research question 12: What is the effect of age of participant on trust of presenter and story type? 
Research question 13: What is the effect of age of participant on credibility of presenter and story 
type? 
Research question 14: What is the effect of age of participant on authenticity of presenter and 
story type? 
Research question 15: What is the effect of age of participant on perceptions of trust, credibility 
and authenticity of the modality? 
  Further, the study looks at how participant gender and ethnicity can also play a factor in 
trust, credibility, and authenticity and how these audiences perceive story type, race of anchor, and 
modality of the source. 
GENDER and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity of presenter, story type and 
modality 
Hypothesis 5: Women will perceive both presenters as more trustworthy compared to men. 
Hypothesis 6: Women will perceive both presenters as more credibility compared to men. 
Research question 16: Will male or female participants find the Brown presenter more/less 
authentic than the White presenter? 
PARTICIPANT RACE and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity 
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Hypothesis 7: Participants who self-identify as South Asian and Middle Eastern will perceive the 
Brown anchor more trustworthy than participants who self-identify as Caucasian. 
Hypothesis 8: Participants who self-identify as South Asian and Middle Eastern will perceive the 
Brown anchor more credible than participants who self-identify as Caucasian. 
Research question 17: Which ethnic group of participants will perceive the Brown anchor more 
authentic than the White anchor? 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
Participants and procedure 
Undergraduate students from Wayne State University were recruited from the 
Communication Department’s participant pool. The participant pool draws primarily on the 
introductory public speaking course, a campus wide requirement, but also uses other 
communication courses in which extra credit is offered. The experiment was presented on desktop 
computers with flat-screen monitors, using the MediaLab data collection program (Jarvis, 2010). 
171 participants were recruited, but that number was dropped to 165 due to a technical error with 
one of the computers. Course credit for participants was recorded in a separate management 
system.  
 College students can provide valuable information about psychological processes within 
the context of basic research. In addition, students are appropriate for basic research because it 
focuses on relative effects (Kardes, 1996). Relative effects can be determined using carefully 
controlled studies and well-developed measures that provide useful information about the 
moderating variables and mediating process that explain behavior (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Student 
samples are not required to be representative of the population in experimental studies for several 
reasons: experiments can randomly assign conditions, as was done in this study, and multivariate 
effects (such as the effect of a news story on attitudes) are different from univariate effects (the 
attitudes themselves), thus the theory can be tested using this sample (Basil, Brown and Bocarnea, 
2002).  
 The sample of 165 participants used for this study includes the following ethnicities as 
compared to the current ethnic populations in the United States (see chart below): 
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Student sample Percentage (out of 
165) 
U.S. ethnicity Percentage (out of 
total population, 
308.7million, 
approximately; 
United States 
Census, 2010) 
 
Hispanic or Latino 3% Hispanic or Latino 12.5% 
Native American or 
Alaskan Native 
1.2% Native American or 
Alaskan Native 
0.9% 
East Asian/American 
 
5.5% 
 
 
East Asian/American 
 
4.8%* (combined 
with South 
Asian/American) 
Native Hawaiian or 
other Pacific Islander 
.6% Native Hawaiian or 
other Pacific Islander 
0.1% 
White or Caucasian 37% White or Caucasian 75.1% 
South 
Asian/American 
11.5% South 
Asian/American 
4.8%* (combined 
with East 
Asian/American) 
Middle Eastern/ 
Middle Eastern 
American 
 
14.5% Middle Eastern/ 
Middle Eastern 
American 
 
.42% (year 2000) 
Black/African 
American 
23.6% Black/African 
American 
12.6% 
Multi or Biracial 3% Multi or Biracial 2.4% 
 
 Table 1 
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The average age of the participants was 22.5 years old. Out of the 165 participants, 70 identified 
as male, while 95 identified as female. 
Experimental design 
The current study is a 2 (ethnicity of the presenter) x 2 (medium modality) x 2 (story type) 
mixed design. The independent variables, race of presenter, story type, and medium modality. 
Race of presenter and story type were within-subjects variables, while modality was a between-
subjects variable. Ethnicity of presenter is operationalized as South Asian/Middle Eastern (Brown) 
and Caucasian (White). Medium modality is operationalized as traditional media and podcast. The 
final story type is operationalized as securitized and not securitized. Demographic factors and 
participants’ attitude toward media and government are between-subject factors. 
Stimulus material 
Scholars have stressed the necessity of creating television news stimuli that are seen as 
realistic despite being used in an artificial setting (Brosuis, Donsbach, & Birk, 1996). Thus the 
stimuli were created keeping in mind real life newsroom settings (lighting, anchor desk, camera 
footage). Thus, the researcher (a former television reporter and anchor) recruited journalism 
students specifically interested in careers in broadcast television reporting as talent. 
  In order to test the hypothesis/research questions, one Caucasian (Anglo-European 
descent) anchor and one “other” (South Asian/Middle Eastern) student were recruited to play the 
respective parts. The presenters were female. According to Coleman and Wu (2006) during the 
9/11 attacks both male and female anchors had the same rate of success or failure at concealing 
their nonverbal expressions while reporting on the attacks. Coupled with the fact that 
approximately 65% of bachelor’s degrees in journalism were awarded to women in 2003, more 
than double from the 30% awarded in 1970 (Becker, Vlad, Huh, & Mace, 2003), suggests that 
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audiences are often going to see female newscasters. The current research hopes to fill in the gap 
in the literature regarding news reported by “anchors” within the context of social media, as there 
is far less theoretical research on the subject.  
 Playing the role of the social media podcaster were two journalism students recruited by 
the researcher from Wayne State and Oakland University. The student presenters were given 
copies of their footage to be used for resume tapes/demo reels, as well as a Target gift card. All 
the presenters were women. One anchor and one podcaster were chosen from Oakland University 
and the other anchor and podcaster were chosen from Wayne State University.   
 In the effort to minimize any external factors that may influence participants, the presenters 
were of similar body types. In addition, all anchors/podcasters wore the same clothing and had 
similar hair and makeup styles during the news story tapings. The presenters were asked to keep 
their makeup neutral and hair pulled back. All presenters chosen for this study were native English 
speakers with Midwest accents. 
Stories were based on current news stories in traditional media in 2011. Story topics 
included: NATO attacks on Pakistan, drone attacks, CIA agent shooting, Iraqi refugees, Lowes 
pulling its advertisements from a Muslim reality show, gunman in Los Angeles, Sharia law and 
the Ground Zero mosque. Each story was written in securitized and nonsecuritized versions, and 
each of those was prepared for presentation in traditional broadcast style and in the less formal 
style of podcasts, creating a total of 32 versions. All stories were reviewed by another professional 
multimedia journalist. 
 To address validity and reliability issues, this project used the de Vreese (2004) study on 
the enlargement of the European Union as a guide. Thus the decision to produce news stories, 
rather than select stories as a representation of the framing issue was made. Creating news story 
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stimuli ensures that the researcher has full control over the material, such as the variation of the 
manipulation, and can exclude any unintended variations (2004). Also, this avoids the potential of 
participants’ having seen the stories before (2004). 
 Before beginning the experiment, participants were asked a series of demographic 
questions. Participants were asked to indicate all ethnicities to which they might belong, their age, 
gender and media consumption. Those questions specifically dealing with the participants’ 
political affiliation, and trust in media (traditional and social), used Vultee’s (2007) media distance 
scales. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions. Each of the eight 
conditions had eight stories, about 35 to 60 seconds in length. Thus, participants watched about 
four to six minutes of video. The participants were divided into two smaller groups. One group 
viewed all traditional media stories, while the other group viewed all of the podcasts. After each 
video, participants answered a series of questions based on scales for the dependent variables 
(trust, credibility, and authenticity—see Appendix B for questions). Including demographic 
questions, video viewing, and experiment questions; the experiment time was about 25 to 30 
minutes. 
  The conditions with stories are as follows: 
Condition 1 Brown Television Securitized/Nonsecuritized 
NATO Attacks 
Drone 
Raymond Davis 
Iraqi refugees 
Lowes’ ads 
Gunman 
Sharia Law 
Ground Zero Mosque 
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Condition 2 White Television Securitized/Nonsecuritized 
NATO Attacks 
Drone 
Raymond Davis 
Iraqi refugees 
Lowes’ ads 
Gunman 
Sharia Law 
Ground Zero Mosque 
 
Condition 3 Brown Television Securitized/Nonsecuritized 
NATO Attacks 
Drone 
Raymond Davis 
Iraqi refugees 
Lowes’ ads 
Gunman 
Sharia Law 
Ground Zero Mosque 
 
Condition 4 White Television Securitized/Nonsecuritized 
NATO Attacks 
Drone 
Raymond Davis 
Iraqi refugees 
Lowes’ ads 
Gunman 
Sharia Law 
Ground Zero Mosque 
Condition 5 Brown Podcast Securitized/Nonsecuritized 
NATO Attacks 
Drone 
Raymond Davis 
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Iraqi refugees 
Lowes’ ads 
Gunman 
Sharia Law 
Ground Zero Mosque 
Condition 6 White Podcast Securitized/Nonsecuritized 
NATO Attacks 
Drone 
Raymond Davis 
Iraqi refugees 
Lowes’ ads 
Gunman 
Sharia Law 
Ground Zero Mosque 
Condition 7 Brown Podcast Securitized/Nonsecuritized 
NATO Attacks 
Drone 
Raymond Davis 
Iraqi refugees 
Lowes’ ads 
Gunman 
Sharia Law 
Ground Zero Mosque 
Condition 8 White Podcast Securitized/Nonsecuritized 
NATO Attacks 
Drone 
Raymond Davis 
Iraqi refugees 
Lowes’ ads 
Gunman 
Sharia Law 
Ground Zero Mosque 
Table 2 
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[See Appendix A for scripts assigned to each condition]. 
 Current research suggests that social media users are divided similarly to women in 
television news. The numbers of male/female users of social media is approximately even; in 
particular sites such as Facebook, MySpace, Flicker, and Linkedin indicate that women are using 
these sites just as often as men (Graham, 2005). Thus the use of female podcasters is also 
appropriate for this study. 
 Scholars have criticized experiments for having low external validity, such as having a 
created artificial viewing environment. However, experiments are considered superior to other 
methods when investigating the effects of key independent variables (Kinder and Palfrey, 1993). 
In the case of framing studies done on television news, there are several shortcomings to the 
potential design and external validity to these experiments in general (de Vreese, 2004). First, 
researchers are not able to fully manipulate the independent variable. Second, there is a potential 
for low external validity because the experiment may not be generalizable to a larger population 
or different population. To avoid that potential pitfall, it is imperative to create stimuli that keep 
in mind journalistic practices (2004).   
Measurement 
 The study has three independent variables, race of anchor (Anglo-European descent vs. 
‘the other’ South Asian-looking), story frame type (securitized and not securitized), and modality 
of the information source (traditional media versus social media). In addition the study has four 
dependent variables: trust (in presenter/information/modality), credibility (in presenter/ 
information/modality), and authenticity (in presenter/information/modality) and story type 
(securitized and nonsecuritized). 
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Although trust is generally measured using credibility scales, this study argues that trust and 
credibility are distinct from one another (Kohring and Matthes, 2007). A credible source may not 
necessarily be a trusted source while a trusted source may not be perceived as being credible. 
Relying on previous research, trust and credibility were measured using different scales. 
Authenticity, on the other hand, is not widely discussed in the literature; thus ad hoc scales were 
developed that address dependent variables using scales that address issues of believability and 
truthfulness.  
Trust scales 
 Tsfati and Cappella (2003) define trust as relationship over time between two sides: a 
trustor and a trustee. In other words one side must place the trust, while the other side is being 
trusted. Trust allows people to deal with the risk of a complex open future, in that it enables them 
to give up control to another. The trustor, whether through action or information, now becomes 
the link to the trustee’s future, helping to reduce the complexity of not knowing (Luhmann, 1979). 
This is how trust replaces knowledge. But it must be noted that the actual act of trusting is “a state 
midway between knowing and not knowing” (Simmel, 1964 in Kohring and Matthes, 2007). Thus 
the trustee does not know if his/her trust is warranted (2007).  
 Fukuyama (1995) defines trust, in the general sense, as honest and cooperative behavior 
that is based on commonly shared norms of professional standards. Thus, the media trust scales 
must also take into consideration audience assessments of media fairness and objectivity, as well 
as accuracy and credibility. Tsfati and Cappella (2003) found that trust was also gained through 
consumption patterns. Essentially, individuals who trust the mainstream media tend to get their 
information and news from these traditional sources; however, those who have higher levels of 
mistrust of mainstream media focus their attention to alternative sources, such as the Internet. Their 
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study also found that even though skeptics and non-skeptics do not differ significantly in the 
amount of news exposure, skeptics tended to view higher amounts of non-mainstream news. 
 Bennett, Staci & Flickinger (2001) also found that trust was tied with how “fair” the 
viewing audience thinks the press is being when covering public affairs. Their data suggest that 
audiences that are more conservative with a tendency to be misanthropic tended to not trust the 
press to cover politics fairly. In addition, those who disapproved of Congress and the president 
were likely not to trust in media fairness (2001). This project also asked participants to indicate 
their trust in the government, their voting tendencies, as well as how closely they see their politics 
aligned with the media’s politics (Vultee, 2007). 
Although there are multiple definitions of trust, this study uses Kohring’s (2004).Kohring 
(2004) defines a trust situation as: “Social Actor A selectively connects his or her own action with 
a certain action of Social Actor B under the condition of a perceived risk. The risk refers to the 
fact that A’s action becomes impossible when B does not fulfill the trust expectation toward him 
or her. For the Trustee A, this risk has not become legitimately tolerable because of factual criteria” 
(p. 130). For this study Social Actor A is the media presenter (social or traditional media), while 
Social Actor B is the audience. 
In a modern society, information is widely disseminated through media channels, 
traditional or new. In particular, the protests in the Middle East have shown that social media is a 
major tool for youth activists who used sites like Facebook and YouTube to show the international 
audience the corruption of their governments. However, consumers, because of lack of time and 
resources (Huang, 2009), are also taking on the risk of giving media (traditional or new) the 
responsibility of selecting what news and information viewers will see (Kohring and Matthes, 
2007). By selecting information that is to be disseminated to their audiences, the media create a 
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social reality, especially in regards to the way American’s see people in non-Western nations. 
 In addition, story (Entman, 1991; 1993; 2004; Scheufele, 1999) and image selection 
(Messaris & Abraham, 2001) are also framing techniques. By selecting certain stories, the media 
creates a very specific social reality of the world, which the viewer trusts is a true representation. 
Thus, when developing scales, selectivity of the information is also crucial to understanding how 
audiences perceive news about certain topics (e.g. terrorism, Ground Zero Mosque, etc).  
 Trust also extends into the online forums when audiences are selecting what information 
to consume. Georg and Jackob (2010) found that people with access to online information sources 
may feel less dependent on the media. In fact, many may also be less confident in mainstream 
media and thereby less susceptible to media effects. In the world of computer mediated 
communication, Caruso (2008) says that trust is a difficult concept to approach because of the lack 
of certainty regarding the identity of the communicator. However, the addition of visuals works 
do catalyze trust (2008).  
 This study also uses visuals, but those visuals are not necessarily devised to create trust. 
Rather the focus is on how audiences perceive information coming from a source that is Caucasian 
or South Asian/Middle Eastern. The use of visuals allows the researcher to determine how 
audiences will interpret trust from these particular anchors or podcasters. Thus Kohring’s (2004) 
definition of trust is a key element in this study as it focuses the relationship the audience has with 
the information provider (i.e. anchor or podcaster). In determining trust in media three items were 
measured: trust in the information (i.e. newsworthiness of topic, factual accuracy, accuracy of 
depiction), trust in the presenter (journalistic assessment), and trust in the medium after each video. 
The first two items used a version of Kohring and Matthes’s (2007) multidimensional scale; for 
the trust in medium, a simplified version of Nah and Chung’s (2012) scales were used as they 
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answer questions related to how audiences trust information from non-traditional sources such as 
social media versus a professional journalist. 
 Nah and Chung’s (2012) scales look at the use and trust of both professional and citizen 
journalism as associated with social capital, such as social trust and media credibility. Their scales 
were based on perceived journalistic roles of both traditional and citizen journalists and were 
measured with 15 items regarding five different roles: disseminator, interpreter, adversary, 
mobilize (calling audiences to action), and civic roles (based on scales developed by Weaver et al, 
2007, also see Cassidy, 2007, see appendix for questions). Some of the 15 items were not used in 
this study as not all items answer the questions being examined. Participants answered questions 
based on a series of 5-point Likert scales (1-very important, 2-important, 3-neutral/don’t know, 4-
not important, 5-not important at all). In addition to questions like: “People shouldn't believe 
everything they see on the Internet”; “I wouldn't believe this until I hear it on TV;” were asked 
because they directly pertained to whether audiences trust the medium (Vultee, Ali, Stover, 
&Vultee, in press; Vultee, 2011). 
 Kohring and Matthes (2007) have differentiated the term trust from credibility. Mass 
communication research in media trust derives its theoretical lineage from sociology, in that these 
theories specifically refer to the selectivity of social actors, namely the mass media (Tsfati and 
Cappella, 2003). Thus these theories offer a relevant multidimensional scale for trust in media. In 
addition, like Kohring and Matthes (2007), this study is focused on trust in journalism, which is 
referred to as “trust in media.” It does not refer to other forms of media such as advertisement and 
entertainment. 
Credibility scales 
 Credibility is a trait attributed to communicators by the audience (Infante, Rancer, & 
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Womack, 1993). In credibility research multiple reference objects were used, such as in the Yale 
experiments that Hovland and Weiss (1951) conducted. In some studies the reference object being 
studied for credibility was sometimes the media sources as channels and in others, authors of the 
message. Like the present study, Kiousis (2001) also divided credibility into two categories: source 
and medium credibility. 
 Source credibility involves examining how different communicator characteristics (i.e. 
race of anchor/podcaster) can influence how audiences process the messages (Addington, 1971; 
Markham, 1968; Mulac & Sherman, 1975; O’Keefe, 1990). The way audiences interpret messages 
based on the ‘presenter’ is particularly important when the message is in regards to risk and crisis 
communication. Although this study does not deal with an immediate crisis such as a food recall 
or the spread of a highly infectious disease, it does deal with threats to the American way of life. 
Newhagen and Nass’s (1987) media analysis found that television credibility was based on 
individual on-air personalities (i.e. news anchors, station brand). Thus the credibility of the 
information presenter is very important. As in previous studies, the presenter/communicator is 
defined as the individual presenting the information.  
 Medium credibility is focused on the modality that the information is disseminated from, 
rather than the presenter (Abel & Wirth, 1977; Gantz, 1981; Newhagen, 1997). In this study the 
two modalities compared were a traditional news broadcast and a podcast (for example: YouTube 
or a blog). Medium credibility has been studied far more extensively, especially during the age of 
information overload. Schweiger (2000) suggests that credibility can also influence the journalistic 
and commercial success of a given medium. Thus credibility is an important heuristic for viewers 
at the time of content selection (2000). Johnson and Kaye (1998) also focused on credibility in 
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online news media and online candidate literature and found that online news was perceived to be 
more credible than traditional print and broadcast news media. 
The openness of the Internet makes it different from other technologies such as television 
when it comes to information retrieval, especially in key ways like credibility. The open 
accessibility of the medium is designed specifically to not be controlled by any one person or 
entity. This feature allows anyone to be an author at any time (Flanagin & Metzger, 2000). Coupled 
with traditional media reports following the use of social media during the uprisings in the Middle 
East, the Internet has also become a haven for activists in the United States and abroad. 
 Flanagin and Metzger (2000) found that audiences perceived information from online 
sources and more traditional sources like radio and television to be of equal credibility. Their study 
found that overall respondents reported Internet information to be as credible as information 
obtained from television, radio, and magazines, but not as credible as newspaper information. This 
study suggests that certain types of information sources (i.e. newspapers) are still considered more 
credible than newer (broadcast and Internet) information sources. 
One of the most widely used credibility scales in media studies is Gaziano and McGrath’s 
(1986) 12-item scale (Sundar, 1998; Johnson and Kaye, 1998). Gaziano also noted that their 
credibility scales were derived by their predecessors Hovland and Weiss (1951) and have been 
successfully used by Meyer (1988), as well as many others.  
 Gaziano and McGrath’s (1986) factor analysis found that media credibility comprised 12 
items: the news is fair, unbiased, tells the whole story, is accurate, respectful of people's privacy, 
watches out after people's interests, is concerned about the community's well-being, there is a 
separation of fact and opinion, can be trusted, is concerned about the public interest, factual, and 
has well-trained reporters. However, since trust is addressed in the previous scale, it will not be 
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addressed to determine credibility. Thus, the current study will use 11 of Gaziano and McGrath’s 
scales. Further, most literature on trust in media deals with mainstream sources (Gaziano and 
McGrath are about credibility in newspaper and television); however, the current research also 
delves into alternative spaces for information like social media. 
Georg and Jackob (2010) also found that those skeptical of the media actively search for 
alternative sources for their news, as well as those who felt that they were not dependent on the 
media for information. Therefore the Gaziano and McGrath (1986) News Credibility Scale can be 
used for news coming from alternative sources like social media and podcasts. Abdulla, Garrison, 
Salwen, Driscoll, and Casey (2002) also used the Gaziano and McGrath (1986) credibility scales 
for newspapers, television, and Internet news. Thus, credibility will be measured using 11 of 
Gaziano and McGrath’s (1986) 12-item Likert-type news credibility scale. Participants will answer 
questions based on a series of 5-point Likert scales (e.g. 1-very important, 2-important, 3-
neutral/don’t know, 4-not important, 5-not important at all). 
Authenticity scales 
Defining authenticity is more complex because it is largely thought of as being an 
emotional and political issue for native populations, especially those seeking sovereignty and their 
“own voice” (Linnekin, 1991). A contemporary example is the current and ongoing revolutions 
throughout the Middle East. Many of these activists have credited social media for providing a 
free forum to express their opinions, as well as allowing many in the Western world to hear the 
uncut, authentic voices of these people.  
 However, traditional media producers have voiced their concerns over believability, ethical 
lapses, newsgathering techniques, and news presentation of Internet sources of news and 
information (Lasica, 2001; Arant & Anderson, 2000; Williams, Wardle and Wahl-Jorgensen, 
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2011). Similarly, Flanagin and Metzger (2000) also argue that while traditional news sources go 
through a check and balance system, many Internet sites do not. The Internet is an open, free space 
where anyone with access to a computer can post information regardless of whether it is credible. 
It is up to the viewing public to discern its trustworthiness. However, despite the misgiving from 
traditional media producers, many people use the Internet as a source of news and information, 
especially those who have higher levels of mistrust of mainstream news media (Flanagin and 
Metzger, 2000). Although the concept of authenticity is deeply tied with the credibility, there is a 
difference. Authenticity speaks to the “realness” of the information. According to Dylko and 
McCluskey (2012) because much of the UGC created is in an unfinished form, this “projects 
authenticity and invites future participation by the users, which often guarantees refinement” (p. 
257). 
 Information coming from wikis, blogs, Facebook, and other social media sites is generally 
written or posted by everyday people or those who are not tied to government or professional 
organizations such as traditional media agencies. Lasica (2003) says that the typical blogger is an 
amateur with no editorial oversight and no professional training as a journalist, and generally 
works outside the mainstream news media’s rules and standards. However, many bloggers see this 
as an asset and say that mainstream media is an elitist club that forces information to fit within its 
organizations routines and narratives, putting economic survival over its societal responsibility as 
a free press (2003). 
 Case in point, during the recent uprisings in the Middle East, social media took on a new 
role as being the authentic voice of the people (Ali &Fahmy, 2011). Many news organizations in 
the Middle East are government owned and therefore are seen as an extension of that government, 
including being corrupt. Supporters of citizen journalism argue that because citizen journalists are 
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living their stories, they are better equipped to give first-hand accounts (Liu et al, 2009). Essentially 
the source becomes the storyteller, thereby lending a more authentic voice to the report and giving 
first-hand accounts as they happen. Further, Hall (2009) suggests that authenticity perceptions 
would be associated with the sense that one has gained valid insights about the world. When the 
citizens of these countries sensed they were no longer able to get the information they needed, they 
turned to social media sources like Facebook and YouTube. 
 Domingo et al. (2008) argue that blogs are challenging the very definition of journalism 
because bloggers are pushing against the norm of the journalist as the “trained observer.” bloggers 
are generally involved in the stories they are reporting on (2008) thus giving first-hand accounts 
as they happen. In addition, these first-hand accounts may lend themselves to giving audiences an 
authentic voice. Previous research (Jacobson, 1969) suggests that authenticity is often synonymous 
with believability and trustworthiness. 
 Authenticity matters for many reasons. It has direct ties to the concepts of credibility and 
trust in that sources of information that are considered “inauthentic” generally are also considered 
sources that are not credible and untrustworthy. Authenticity is also a key concept in research 
about social media networks. When discussing social media networks such as Facebook and 
MySpace; Marwick and boyd (2010) presume that “authenticity” is tied in with truthfulness. This 
truth is generally seen as being accurate information about oneself such as age, sexuality, 
hometown, and likes and dislikes. It then stands to reason that information that is coming from a 
source, whether it is informal like a blog or podcast or a traditional forum like a local news affiliate, 
needs to have elements of truthfulness. But for something to be interpreted as truthful it also needs 
to be seen as believable. The addition of truth is how authenticity is different than trust and 
credibility. 
94 
 
 
 Jacobson’s (1969) study looked at the believability of the media. Although the study does 
not ask questions pertaining to new media, the scales derived from it answer questions about 
authenticity in regards to both traditional and social media. Jacobson’s analysis compared both the 
source of the message (television, radio, and newspapers), as well as the person from whom the 
information was originating (Weiss, 1959; Sargent, 1965). He found that television news was 
perceived to be the most believable of the three mediums. Jacobson (1969) equated authenticity to 
believability and thus created authenticity scales comprised of: trustworthy-untrustworthy, 
accurate-inaccurate, expert-ignorant, and open minded-close minded. 
 A more contemporary look at Jacobson’s (1969) study was Austin and Dong(1994), who 
examined the extent to which message content contributed independently and in combination with 
institutional level source reputation to predict what was believable and truthful about specific news 
stories. Their factor analysis found that a reality emerged comprised of judgments about source 
truthfulness and message accuracy, source expertise and message representativeness, and finally 
source bias and personal perspective. These concepts were developed by Austin (1990) who 
referred to them as “apparent reality assessments” (ARA) and defined as the degree to which an 
individual believes media portrayals of issues or people reflect reality, which provides a way to 
test believability judgments based on message content and context. 
 Austin and Dong’s (1994) scales dealt with information from newspaper; however, the 
questions that they ask are also relevant to information from television and online sources and can 
easily be used. Thus this study uses Austin and Dong’s (1994) media believability scales with a 
few variations. Austin et. al (1994) also considered whether believability was influenced by the 
sources the reporters used. Because this study does not include sources and is just focused on the 
anchor and/or podcaster, that particular factor will not be considered. 
95 
 
 
As mentioned previously, the literature on authenticity suggests that for something to be perceived 
as authentic it must have elements of truthfulness and believability. This study purports that 
audiences will perceive authenticity in anchors and the modality of the information if these sources 
are truthful and believable. Thus, authenticity will be measured using two sub-scales: authenticity 
of modality and authenticity of the anchor. Participants will answer questions based on a series of 
5-point Likert scales (1-very important, 2-important, 3-neutral/don’t know, 4-not important, 5-not 
important at all). 
Statistical analyses 
 SPSS was used to run statistical analyses for this study. The statistical measure was a 
repeated Anova. The repeated Anova allows the researcher to use a smaller number of subjects in 
a shorter amount of time. One question this study asks is:  Does the race of the presenter (anchor 
or podcaster) affect audience perception of trust, credibility, and authenticity after controlling for 
story type (high securitized or low securitized)? Because multiple measures were used, a repeated 
Anova was the appropriate statistical test. A Cronbach’s Alpha was used to measure the reliability 
of the trust, credibility, authenticity and securitization scales. Cronbach’s Alpha is used to measure 
reliability when multiple Likert questions are used to create a scale (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). 
For trust, Cronbah’s Alpha measured at .8, credibility measured at .89, authenticity measured at 
.85 and securitization scales measured at .89. Acceptable values of alpha range from .70 to .95 
(Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
Demographics 
 The main part of the study enrolled 171 participants. That number was reduced to 165 due 
to technical issues with one of the work stations. Of the 165 enrollees, about 42.4% were male 
(n=70) and 57.6% were female (n=95). Participants’ ages ranged from 16 to 63 (M= 22.47, SD= 
7.68). About 37% (n=61) participants identified themselves as White or Caucasian, 23.6% (n=39) 
as Black or African American, 14.5% (n=24) as Middle Eastern or Middle Eastern American, and 
11.5% (n=19) as South Asian or South Asian American. Other ethnicities included Hispanic or 
Latino, 3% (n=5), American Indian or Alaska Native, 1.2% (n=2), Native Hawaiian or other 
Pacific Islander, .6% (n=1), and multi or biracial, 3% (n=5).  
 Most participants reported using the Internet almost every day (68.5%, n=113), 20.6% 
(n=34) used the Internet/social media sites three to five days a week, 6.7% (n=11) one to two days 
a week, 1.8% (n=3) less than once a week, and 2.4% (n=4) reported having never used the 
Internet/social media sites. Participants’ radio use is broken down as follows: 20.6 % (n=34) used 
radio almost every day, 20% (n=33) used it three to five days a week, 24.8% (n=41) used it one to 
two days a week, 22.4% (n=37) used it less than once a week, and 12.1% (n=20) reported never 
using radio/radio websites. Television use is as follows: 18.8% (n=31) reported using almost every 
day, 25.5% (n=42) three to five days a week, 30.3% (n=50) use television one to two days a week, 
20.6% (n=34) used it less than once a week, and 4.8% (n=8) never use television. 
 Turning to print media use (and their accompanying websites), 12.7% (n=21) participants 
use newspapers or their websites almost every day, 15.2% (n=25) use it three to five days a week, 
26.7% (n=44) use newspapers one to two days a week, and 37.6% (n=62) are less than once a 
week, and 7.9% (n=13) never read newspapers. Finally magazines (and their websites) use was 
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reported as follows, 5.5% (n= 9) almost daily, 9.7% (n=16) use it three to five days a week, 23.6% 
(n=39) use it one to two days a week, 32.7% (n=54) use magazines and their websites less than 
once a week, and 28.5% (n=47) never use magazines. 
 The following table shows participants’ new media usage: 
New Media 
Usage 
Almost every 
day 
3 to 5 days a 
week 
1 to 2 days a 
week 
Less than once 
a week 
Never 
Social 
Networking 
Site (i.e. 
Facebook and 
Twitter 
66.7% (n=110) 12.1% (n=20) 11.5% (n=19) 3.6% (n=6) 6.1% (n=10) 
Instant 
Messaging or 
IM-ing 
18.8% (n=31) 7.3% (n=12) 12.1% (n=20) 15.8% (n=26) 46.1% (n=76) 
Video Chat 
Sites (i.e. 
Skype and 
Facetime) 
7.9% (n=13) 4.2% (n=7) 26.1% (n=43) 30.9% (n=51) 30.9% (n=51) 
Blogging 1.8% (n=3) 6.1% (n=10) 4.2% (n=7) 15.8% (n=26) 72.1% (n=119) 
Table 3 
A majority of participants were heavy social media site users and non-bloggers. 
 Participants were asked about their political affiliation and how they view the media’s 
political leanings. Liberal participants were the majority with 47.3% (n= 78), while those who saw 
themselves as neutral or conservation were 26.7% (n= 44) and 26.1% (n=43), respectively. 
Participants who saw themselves as left of the media were the largest group with 44.2% (n= 73). 
Those who saw themselves as being right of the media were 33.3% (n= 55). Finally, participants 
who viewed themselves as having the same political leanings as the media were 22.4% (n= 37). 
 Scale items were developed using multiple theories as mentioned in the methodology. The 
98 
 
 
Likert scales followed a basic 1 to 5 scale, with lower numbers indicating more trust, credibility 
and authenticity, while higher numbers indicate less of each. For example, trust 1 questions asks: 
“I trust what the presenter is telling me” and is measured on a Likert scale as, 5-strongly agree, 4-
agree, 3-agree, 4-don’t know neutral and 1- disagree. 
Perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity of presenter race 
Hypothesis 1a and 1b look at how the race of the news presenter (TV and podcaster) affects 
how audiences perceive trust. Hypothesis 1a and 1b predict the White news presenter presenting 
the securitized and nonsecuritized stories will be perceived as more trustworthy than the Brown 
news presenter presenting the same set of stories (securitized and nonsecuritized). There was not 
a significant interaction effect between ethnicity and story type, (p= .3). There was not a significant 
main effect of ethnicity, (p = .62). Thus, hypothesis 1a and 1b did not find support.  
  Hypothesis 2a and 2b look at how race of the news presenter (TV and podcaster) affects 
how audiences perceive credibility. Hypothesis 2a and 2b predict the White news presenter 
presenting the securitized and nonsecuritized stories will be perceived as more credible than the 
Brown news presenter presenting the same set of stories. There was not a significant interaction 
effect between ethnicity and story type, (p= .57). There was not a significant main effect for 
ethnicity (p = .215). Thus, hypothesis 2a and 2b did not find support. 
  Research Question 1 asks if audiences perceive a difference in authenticity based on 
ethnicity of the news presenter. There was not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity 
and story type, (p= .27). There was not a significant main effect of ethnicity (p= .25). Thus, there 
was no statistically significant difference between races of the presenters and perceptions of 
authenticity. 
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Perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity of Modality (traditional and social media) 
  Hypothesis 3 focuses on modality and predicts that stories from traditional media (anchors) 
will be perceived as more trustworthy compared to stories from social media sources (podcasters) 
by looking at the interaction between modality (traditional versus social media) and story type 
(securitized versus nonsecuritized). There was a significant interaction effect between story type 
and modality, such that securitized television stories (2.62) were trusted more than securitized 
podcast stories (3.04). Nonsecuritized television stories (2.58) were trusted more than 
nonsecuritized podcast stories (2.84), (F (1,163) 4.311, p = .039, η2p  = .026). Thus, hypothesis 3 
found support. 
 Hypothesis 4 focuses on modality and predicts that stories from traditional media (anchors) 
will be perceived as more credible than stories from social media (podcasters). There was a 
significant interaction between story type and modality, (F (1, 163) 10.580, p < .001, η2p= .061). 
Securitized television stories (3.1) were perceived as more credible than securitized podcast stories 
(3.4). Nonsecuritized television stories (3.04) were perceived as more credible than nonsecuritized 
podcast stories (3.2). Thus, hypothesis 4 found support. 
  Research question 2 asks if audiences will perceive authenticity in news information from 
social media differently than from traditional media. There was a significant interaction between 
story type and modality, (F (1, 163) 19.069, p < .001, η2p= .105). Like trust and credibility, 
securitized television stories (2.6) were perceived as more authentic than securitized podcast 
stories (3.02). Nonsecuritized television stories (2.54) were perceived as more authentic than 
nonsercuritized podcast stories (2.8). Specifically, White (2.621) securitized anchors were 
perceived as more authentic than White (3.037) securitized podcasters. Similarly, Brown (2.534) 
securitized anchors were perceived as more authentic than Brown (3.002) securitized podcasters.  
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MEDIA USAGE (traditional and social) on trust, credibility and authenticity on 
PRESENTERS’ RACE 
  Research question 3 asks how participant use of traditional and social media affects trust 
of presenter. Overall, there was not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity of traditional 
anchor and media usage of participant, (p = .56). There was not a significant interaction effect 
between story type, ethnicity of anchor and media usage, (p = .98). There was not a main effect of 
ethnicity (anchor) for traditional media usage, (p= .67). For social media usage, there was not a 
significant interaction effect between ethnicity of podcaster and media usage of participant, (p 
=.93). There was not a significant interaction effect between story type, ethnicity of anchor and 
media usage, (p = .4). There was not a main effect of ethnicity (podcaster) for new media usage 
(p= .57). Thus, the media usage of the participant did not influence trust of the traditional media 
anchor or social media podcaster (White and Brown).  
  Research question 4 asks how participants’ traditional media use affects their perception 
of anchor credibility. There was a not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity of anchor 
and amount of traditional media usage, (p = .3). There was not a significant interaction effect 
between story type, ethnicity of anchor and media usage, (p = .75). Main effects for ethnicity were 
statistically insignificant (p = .3). For social media usage, there was not a significant interaction 
effect between ethnicity of podcaster and media usage of participant, (p = .93). There was not a 
significant interaction effect between story type, ethnicity of anchor and media usage, (p = .4). 
Main effects for ethnicity were also statistically insignificant, (p = .57). Thus, the media usage of 
the participant did not influence credibility of the traditional media anchor or social media 
podcaster (White and Brown).  
  Research question 5 asks what effect media usage has on participants regarding 
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authenticity of anchor. For traditional media usage, there was not a significant interaction effect 
with traditional media usage and the ethnicity of anchor/podcaster, (p = .91). There was not a 
significant interaction effect between traditional media usage, ethnicity of the anchor and story 
type, (p = .98). There was not a statistically significant main effect for ethnicity, (p = .24). For 
social media usage there was not a significant interaction effect with social media usage and 
podcaster ethnicity, (p = .69). There was not a significant interaction effect between podcaster 
ethnicity, social media usage and story type, (p = 69). There was not a significant main effect with 
ethnicity of anchor, (p = .21). Thus, media usage did not have a statistical effect on participants’ 
perception of presenter authenticity. 
Participants’ POLITICAL LEANINGS and PERCIEVED POLITICS OF THE MEDIA 
  Question 6a asks what effect the political leanings and perceived politics of the media of 
participant have on trust of presenter. There was not a significant interaction effect between 
participant politics and presenter ethnicity, (p = .91). There was not a significant interaction 
between participants’ politics, presenter ethnicity and story type (p = .52). There also was not a 
significant main effect ethnicity, (p = .7). Participants’ political leanings did not make a statistically 
significant difference in trust of either the White of Brown anchor/podcaster.  
 Research question 6b looks at media distance or how participants’ perception of where the 
media’s politics are in comparison to their own (left of the media, same as the media, right of the 
media) affects trust in the presenter. There was not a significant interaction effect between ethnicity 
and media politics, (p = .831). There was not a significant main effect for audience perceived 
media’s politics and trust, (p = .608). Participants’ perceived media politics did not have an effect 
on trust of the presenter. Thus, participants’ politics and perception of the media’s politics had no 
statistically significant effect on trust of the presenter. 
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  Research question 7a asks how political leanings of the participant, as well as perceived 
politics of the media, affect the credibility of the presenter. There was not a significant interaction 
effect between presenter ethnicity and participant political leanings, (p = .85). There also was not 
significant interaction effect between presenter’s ethnicity, story type and participants’ politics (p 
= .33). There was not a main effect of presenter ethnicity, (p = .3). 
  For research question 7b, (the perceived politics of the media), there was not a significant 
interaction effect between media politics and ethnicity of presenter, (p = .1). There was not a 
statistically significant main effect of media’s perceived politics and credibility of the presenter 
ethnicity, (p = .49). Thus, participants’ politics and perception of the media’s politics did not affect 
credibility of the presenter. 
  Research question 8a asks what effect participants’ political leanings and perceived politics 
of the media have on authenticity of anchor. There was not a significant interaction effect with 
presenter ethnicity and participants’ political leanings, (p = .59). There was not a significant main 
effect of ethnicity of the presenter, (p = .34).           
  For research question 8b, there was not a significant interaction effect between the news 
presenters’ ethnicities and media’s politics, (p = .33). There was not a significant main effect with 
presenter ethnicity, (p = .22). Thus, participants’ politics and perception of the media’s politics did 
not affect perceptions of authenticity of the presenter. 
Participants’ POLITICAL LEANINGS and PERCIEVED POLITICS OF THE MEDIA and 
STORY TYPE 
  Research question 9a asks how participant trust is affected by their own political leanings 
and their perception of the media’s political leanings. There was a significant interaction effect for 
story type and participants’ political leanings, (F (1, 162) 3.192, p =.044, η2p = .038) and a 
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significant main effect for story type, (F (1, 162) 5.665, p = .018, η2p = .034). Liberal leaning 
participants perceived the nonsecuritized stories (2.63) as more trustworthy than securitized (2.84) 
stories. Politically neutral participants perceived the nonsecuritized stories (2.77) more trustworthy 
than the securitized (2.85) stories. But conservative participants perceived the nonsecuritized 
(2.79) stories as more trustworthy than their securitized (2.78) counterparts; however, this last 
difference was not statistically significant.  
  Research question 9b looks at how participants’ perception of the media’s politics (that is 
are the media liberal-leaning, neutral or conservative–leaning) affects participants’ trust of story 
type. There was not a significant interaction effect with media’s perceived politics and story type, 
(p = .44).  
  Research question 10a asks how participants’ perception of credibility is affected by their 
own political leanings and their perception of the media’s political leanings. For participants 
personal politics, there was not a significant interaction effect between story type and participant 
political leanings, (p = .3). For research question 10b, perception of media politics, there was not 
a significant interaction effect between media’s politics and story type, (p = .81). 
  Research question 11a asks how participants’ perception of authenticity is affected by their 
own political leanings. There was not a significant interaction effect between story type and 
participant political leanings, (p = .12). For research question 11b, there was not a significant 
interaction effect between media politics and story type, (p = .27). 
AGE of PARTICIPANT on Trust, Credibility and Authenticity on presenter, story type and 
modality 
  Research question 12 deals with how age of the participant affects trust of the news 
presenter and finds there was not a significant interaction effect between age of participant and 
104 
 
 
ethnicity of news presenter, (p = .28). There was not a significant interaction effect between story 
type and age of participant, (p = .3) and ethnicity of news presenter, story type and age of 
participant, (p = .39). There was not a main effect of age, (p > .05). Thus participant age was not 
a statistically significant factor for news presenter and story type trustworthiness. 
  Research 13 asks what effect age of participant has on credibility of presenter and story 
type. There was not a significant interaction effect between age of participant and ethnicity of 
presenter, (p = .33). There was not a significant interaction effect between age and story type, (p 
= .97). Thus, age of the participant did not have a statistically significant effect on perceptions of 
credibility for the presenter and story type. 
  Research question 14 asks what effect age of participant has on authenticity of presenter 
and story type. There was not a significant interaction effect between age of participant and 
presenter ethnicity, (p = .08). There was not a significant interaction between age of participant 
and story type, (p = .83). There was not a significant interaction between age of participant, 
presenter ethnicity and story type, (p = .7). There was not a main effect for presenter ethnicity, (p 
= .88).  
  Research question 15 asks what effect age of participant has on perceptions of trust for 
modality (traditional and social) and finds that there was not a significant interaction between 
presenter ethnicity, story type and modality, (p= .41). As for credibility, there was not a significant 
interaction effect between news presenter ethnicity, story type, and modality, (p = .23). Finally for 
authenticity, there was not a significant interaction effect between news presenter ethnicity, story 
type, and modality, (p = .72). Thus, age was not a factor for determining trust, credibility and 
authenticity for modality.  
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GENDER and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity of presenter, story type and 
modality 
  The next set of hypotheses and research questions look at how participant gender affects 
trust, credibility and authenticity of news presenter, story type and modality. Hypothesis 5 predicts 
women will perceive both news presenters (White and Brown) as more trustworthy compared to 
men. There was not a significant interaction of ethnicity of presenter and participant gender, (p = 
.87). There was not a significant interaction effect with story type and participant gender, (p = 
.69).There was not a significant main effect for ethnicity of presenter, (p = .6). The results find that 
gender was not a factor in trust of the anchor/podcaster (White and Brown). Thus, hypothesis 5 
was not supported. 
  Hypothesis 6 predicted that women will perceive both news presenters (White and Brown) 
as more credible than men. There was not a significant interaction effect with presenter ethnicity 
and participant gender, (p = .45). There was not a significant interaction effect with story type and 
participant gender, (p = .7). There was not a significant main effect for ethnicity of presenter, (p = 
.27). Thus gender was not a statistically significant factor in perceived credibility of 
anchor/podcaster. Hypothesis 6 was not supported.  
  Research question 16 asks if male or female participants will find the Brown presenter 
more or less authentic than the White presenter. Like trust and credibility, there was not a 
significant interaction with anchor/podcaster ethnicity and gender of participant, (p = .61). There 
was not a significant interaction effect with story type and participant gender, (p = .6). There was 
not a significant main effect for anchor/podcaster ethnicity, (p = .23). Thus gender was not a factor 
in perceived authenticity of the presenter.  
  The final set of hypotheses and research questions look at how participant ethnicity plays 
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a role in anchor/podcaster trust, credibility and authenticity. Participant ethnic categories were 
collapsed into three main categories, White (n= 61), South Asian/Middle Eastern (n= 43) and Other 
(n= 61). Hypothesis 7 predicts that participants who identify as South Asian and Middle Eastern 
will perceive the Brown anchor more trustworthy than participants who self-identify as Caucasian. 
There was a significant interaction effect with story type and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 162) 
4.393, p = .014, η2p = .014). 
  There was a significant interaction effect with ethnicity of presenter, story type and 
participant ethnicity, (F (1, 162) 4.016, p = .020, η2p = .020). Middle Eastern/ South Asian 
participants trusted the White news presenter (3.081) less than the Brown news presenter (2.857) 
presenting the same stories. But Middle Eastern/ South Asian participants trusted the Brown news 
presenter (2.721) presenting the nonsecuritized stories less than the White news presenter (2.612) 
presenting the same stories. There was not a significant interaction with presenter ethnicity and 
participant ethnicity, (p = .24). There was not a significant main effect with presenter ethnicity, (p 
= .52). Thus, hypothesis 7 was partially supported. Middle Eastern/South Asian participants trusted 
the White securitized news presenter, but also trusted the Brown not securitized news presenter.  
  Hypothesis 8 predicts participants who identify as South Asian and Middle Eastern will 
perceive the Brown anchor more credible than participants who identify as Caucasian. There was 
a significant interaction effect with presenter ethnicity, story type and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 
162) 4.884, p = .009, η2p = .057). Middle Eastern/South Asian participants perceived the White 
securitized news presenter (3.449) as less credible than the White nonsecuritized news presenter 
(3.112). Middle Eastern/South Asian participants also perceived the Brown securitized news 
presenter (3.256) as less credible than the Brown nonsecuritized news presenter (3.128). 
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Figure 1: Interaction between participant ethnicity, securitized story type and ethnicity of 
presenter for credibility 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Interaction between participant ethnicity, nonsecuritized story type and ethnicity 
of presenter for credibility 
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such that White securitized news presenter (3.269) was perceived as less credible than the White 
nonsecuritized news presenter (3.128). Also the Brown nonsecuritized news presenter (3.226) was 
2.45
2.5
2.55
2.6
2.65
2.7
2.75
2.8
White nonsecuritized Brown nonsecuritized
White Brown Other
2.45
2.5
2.55
2.6
2.65
2.7
2.75
2.8
White nonsecuritized Brown nonsecuritized
White Brown Other
108 
 
 
perceived as less credible than the Brown nonsecuritized news presenter (3.112). There was not a 
significant main effect with anchor/podcaster ethnicity, (F (1, 162) = 2.201, p > .05). There was 
also not a significant interaction effect with anchor/podcaster ethnicity and participant ethnicity, 
(F (1, 162) = 1.562, p > .05). Interaction effect with story type and participant ethnicity approached 
statistical significance, (F (1, 162) 2.969, p = .054, η2p = .035).  
  Research question 17 asks which ethnic group of participants perceived the Brown anchor 
as more authentic than the White anchor. There was a significant interaction effect with 
anchor/podcaster ethnicity and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 162) 3.104, p = .048, η2p = .037). Middle 
Eastern/South Asian participants perceived the Brown securitized news presenter (2.826) as less 
authentic than White (2.765) and other participants (2.727). Middle Eastern/South Asian 
participants also perceived the Brown nonsecuritized news presenter (2.713) as less authentic than 
White (2.699) and other participants (2.593). 
  There was a significant interaction effect with story type and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 
162) 3.216, p = .043, η2p = .038), such that the Middle Eastern/ South Asian participants perceived 
the White securitized news presenter (3.078) as the least authentic. There was a significant 
interaction effect with anchor/podcaster ethnicity, story type and participant ethnicity, (F (1, 162) 
3.908, p = .022, η2p = .046).  
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Figure 3: Interaction between participant ethnicity, securitized story type and ethnicity of 
presenter for authenticity 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Interaction between participant ethnicity, nonsecuritized story type and ethnicity 
of presenter for authenticity 
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who identify as White (2.773) found the White nonsecuritized news presenters less authentic than 
participants who identify as a South Asian/Middle Eastern (2.678). Participants who identify as 
White (2.765) found the Brown securitized news presenters more authentic than participants who 
identify as a South Asian/Middle Eastern (2.826). And finally, participants who identify as White 
(2.699) found the Brown nonsecuritized news presenters more authentic than participants who 
identify as a South Asian/Middle Eastern (2.713). 
 Further, there was a significant main effect for story type, (F (1, 162) 21.501, p <.001, η2p 
= .117). The White securitized news presenter (2.827) was perceived as less authentic than the 
White news presenter (2.671) presenting the nonsecuritized stories. The Brown securitized news 
presenter (2.767) was perceived as less authentic than the Brown news presenter (2.664) presenting 
the nonsecuritized stories. There was not a significant main effect of presenter ethnicity, (F (1, 
162) 1.966, p = .163, η2p = .012). 
 This study compares story type (securitized versus nonsecuritized), ethnicity of the 
presenter (White versus Brown) and modality (traditional versus social media). Overall, 
participants trusted traditional media, but news from social media was perceived as more authentic. 
Credibility was a mixed bag, in that some social media conditions elicited more credibility than 
traditional media. Manipulating broadcast news stories (traditional and podcast) with securitizing 
elements in conjunction with the race of the presenter, shows some interesting results. Securitized 
stories elicited more trust and credibility when the presenter was White, while nonsecuritized 
stories tended show similar results for Brown presenters. The next chapter will discuss what these 
findings mean in the context of securitizing frames, race, traditional and alternative news sources. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS 
 
  According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2014) there have been 
four cases of Ebola in the United States, resulting in one fatality. Yet, during the 2014 Midterm 
election campaign, several prominent candidates for House and Senate “ran 734 ads citing the 
threat of Ebola” from October 21 to the 25th (Judis, 2014). Politicians like North Carolina 
Republican Thom Tillis, who successfully won a seat in the Senate, included the fear of Ebola as 
a major campaign strategy. Other politicians, like Republican Senator Mitch McConnell, used the 
threat of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) as part of his ad campaigns. What do Ebola and 
ISIS have in common? Both were used as convenient pretexts for immigration policies. Linking 
Ebola and ISIS to border immigration allowed political actors to manufacture a threat fostering 
fear in the American public, which arguably allowed these candidates to win the elections.   
  Despite the fact that there have been no incidences involving Ebola infected Mexican 
immigrants and ISIS is mainly contained in Iraq and Syria, Republican politicians continue to 
insist that these issues are threats that the American public needs to be protected from (Talbot, 
2014). And they are successful in maintaining the implausibility of those fears. The media as an 
intermediary relays those fears through news coverage to a largely misinformed public in spite of 
the increased interest in both Ebola and ISIS. 
  The Pew Research Center (Motel, 2014) finds that Ebola remains among the top followed 
stories since 2010, only to be surpassed by the Boston Marathon Bombing, the elementary school 
shooting in Newtown, Hurricane Sandy and the 2012 Presidential election (2014). According to a 
Pew Research Center (2014) poll, a majority of Americans support the U.S. military campaign 
against ISIS. Highest support comes from Republicans (68%) who also believe that the U.S. needs 
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to do more to stop the threat of ISIS (2014).  
  Concerns surrounding Ebola, ISIS and immigration have opened the door to questions 
about security and existential threats from those deemed “others.” Conversations about security 
took a pointed turn following 9/11 when American exceptionalism and Orientalism joined to create 
a newer version of America and a perceived American culture. This dissertation examines how 
already prevalent frames about race can be amplified by effects of securitization which will be 
presented with some tentative conclusions about those findings.  
 Watson (2011) suggests that securitization is a subfield of framing because “security” itself 
is a “master frame” (p. 2) that operates by creating a social reality through the use of language and 
images. Political actors and the media play on racial stereotypes and create problems and threats 
through discursive practices (Gamson, Croteau, Hoyne and Sasson, 1992). Images, especially 
broadcast images, have the ability to direct audiences to think about topics in certain ways (de 
Vreese, 2004). Coupled with the ubiquitous nature of the online news sources, audiences today are 
inundated with a variety of ways to get the news. This dissertation adds to the body of research 
regarding framing, securitization and race with the hopes of illuminating how different audiences 
perceive news information from multiple sources and presenters. 
 This dissertation focuses on how securitization has a framing function with the news media 
as an important intermediary between political actors and the public. In particular, broadcast news 
can provide a multi-layered look at how audiences perceive information from on-air personalities. 
In recent years, the growth of social media has provided consumers an alternative place to get their 
news in the form of blogs, podcasts and tweets (Allan and Thorsen, 2009). This research also looks 
at the function of race in audience perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity on news content, 
as well as the presenter. This dissertation examines perceptions of race, particular kinds of news 
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and where people get that news. Audience perception, for this study, was measured using scales 
for trust (Kohring and Matthes, 2007; Nah and Chung, 2012), scales for credibility (Gaziano and 
McGrath, 1986) and scales for authenticity (Austin and Dong, 1994). And Vultee’s (2007) 
securitization scales were used to measure perceptions regarding story type (securitized and 
nonsecuritized).  
 Essentially the chapter asks: When security is “switched” on, do audiences trust the 
information? Is the information credible? And when that same information is presented in a social 
media context, is the information perceived as authentic? In addition, how do audiences perceive 
the individuals that give them the news? What kind of difference does is make to audiences if the 
presenter is White or Brown? And how does modality (traditional versus social media) affect the 
way news information is perceived by audiences? This chapter hopes to answer these questions 
while examining the role of security within the context of media framing. 
Race and trust, credibility and authenticity: Audience perceptions of presenters’ race  
  Although race of the presenter did not play a part in how audiences perceive trust, 
credibility and authenticity, previously studies have found that race matters. But the results suggest 
otherwise. Part of this could be due to the growing multiculturalism within audiences, as well as 
diversity within the field of journalism. Gunther (1992) found that audiences’ attributes play a 
larger role in trust in media, rather than media attributes themselves. Involvement in social groups 
plays a larger role in how audiences trust news, especially if the group membership is based on a 
common ethnicity (1992). Although audiences are open to a large variety of content for the 
purposes of information seeking and observation, much of what is consumed is highly scrutinized 
due to “personal predilections” (1992, p. 163).  
  This is somewhat contradictory to past research which suggests that individual and groups 
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deemed as “others” will generally be viewed as less credible (Melican and Dixon, 2008; Entman 
and Rojecki; 2000); however, much of the prior research is focused on the stereotypes of Blacks 
and rarely includes discussion of “Browned” people. Vidal-Ortiz (2008) suggests that political-
economic issues have allowed certain ethnic groups like Blacks and Latinos to be visualized in 
mainstream media as acceptable “others.” But Middle Easterners and South Asians (once viewed 
as model minorities prior to 9/11), “are continuously reracialized as terrorists and deficient citizens 
regardless of their political or religious belief systems” (2008; p. 1039). But in the context of crisis 
information, prior research in credibility and race has found that the presenters’ race does not 
necessarily affect their audiences’ perception of credibility in terms of the type of news presented 
(Andsager & Mastin, 2003; Mohammed, 2012). Race of the presenter may only be a minor factor 
when it comes to trusting and finding information credible as audiences may perceive the 
information itself to be more cognitively valuable.  
  Further, the introduction of brown faces in high profile journalism positions, as well as 
entertainment may also suggest why certain races do not elicit changes in audience perceptions of 
trust and credibility. Major news contributors like Sanjay Gupta (CNN senior medical 
correspondent), Ali Velshi (CNN host of Your Money) and Fareed Zakaria (CNN host of Fareed 
Zakaria GPS/Global Public Square) may show audiences that Brown news presenters are at the 
same level as their White counterparts in the newsrooms in terms of expertise and training. Further, 
growing multiculturalism has also permeated entertainment, such as Aziz Ansari (comedian, Parks 
and Recreation), Mindy Kaling (The Office and The Mindy Kaling Project), Kal Penn (Harold and 
Kumar) and Kunal Nayyar (The Big Bang Theory). It is important to note that while television 
news is growing more diverse, it is not necessarily at the same rate of audience diversity. However, 
the growing popularity of these figures may suggest why race did not make a significant difference 
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in trust and credibility of the presenter. 
  In a growing multimedia environment, examining the perception of authenticity is 
valuable. Marwick and boyd (2010) say that there in not an “absolute sense of authenticity” (p. 
119), but rather how consumers of media perceive authenticity in the presenter. Authenticity could 
be viewed as a person tweeting without any expectations from the viewer or the concept of the 
“real person.” Grazian (2003) says that authenticity is socially constructed by society and as a 
result does not have a clear cut definition.  
  Kiousis (2001) and others (Addington, 1971; Markham, 1968; Mulac & Sherman, 1975; 
O’Keefe, 1990) have found that the presenters’ characteristics can influence news audiences’ 
perception of information. However, this study found that race of the presenter was not a 
significant factor for audience perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity. 
Story type and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity 
  The current results suggest when securitized information is presented by an “other” 
audiences align the information with the source. Thus, if the information is about Islamic militants, 
a presenter who looks like that “other” might elicit more trust, credibility and authenticity. Again, 
“turning on” the security switch suggests that audiences may equate importance to certain topics 
dealing with security. Aligning ISIS and Ebola with immigration suggests to the viewing public 
that terrorism and disease come from immigrants and this continues to reinforce negative 
stereotypes about “othered” people. This creates larger issues surrounding inequality and access 
to social institutions and policy formation. 
 Like trust and credibility, race did not affect audience perception of authenticity, but story 
type did. Securitized stories in both Brown and White conditions, as well as, traditional and podcast 
conditions were viewed as more authentic. Like in trust and credibility, when security was “turned 
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on” audiences perceived those stories as more authentic. Breten (2011) suggests that regardless of 
genre, television bombards its audiences with stories about dangers and risks especially in regards 
to terrorism and the “war on terror.” As a result viewers are hypersensitive to the potential threat 
and regardless of the lack of focus and direction, these audiences may perceive this information as 
more authentic than nonsecuritized information. 
Audience perceptions of modality (television and social media) 
  Audience attitudes towards trusting a particular modality was measured and the results 
showed that television was trusted more than social media overall. In spite of the growth of 
alternative news, Tsfati and Cappella (2003) found that even when alternative news sources were 
available, television was still trusted more. Part of this might stem from the fact that despite 
growing audience skepticism of traditional media, most of these people are exposed to television 
news on a regular basis (2003).  Papathanassopoulos, Coen, Curran, Aalberg, Rowe, Jones, Rojas 
and Tiffen (2013) also found that despite the growing acceptance and use of online news sources, 
television news viewing was still at the top of the news consumption hierarchy with print and 
Internet tied at second place. Ahlers (2005) also found that the growth of online news consumption 
has not necessarily impacted traditional media negatively. Many users multitask media by 
continuing to use traditional media in conjunction with online sources (2005). 
  Similarly, traditional media stories were also perceived to be more credible than their social 
media counterparts. This is consistent with previous research which suggests that traditional media 
is generally perceived as the more credible source when compared to online (Kiousis, 2001). 
Johnson and Kaye (2004) suggest that the more a particular medium is used the more credible it is 
perceived by the users. Despite the fact that a majority (66.7 %) of the participants for this study 
identified as heavy social media users, many of these participants also were regular users of 
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television. Despite the growth if Internet news audiences, television remains the most widely used 
medium in the United States (Pew Research Center, 2011).  
  Finally, authenticity of modality found that traditional media was perceived as more 
authentic. Previous research suggests that authenticity is tied to “truthfulness” and as a result when 
a presenter is “truthful” about their appearance and likes and dislikes audiences may perceive that 
as being authentic (Marwick and boyd, 2010). In addition, the growth of alternative news sources 
has resulted in a growing distrust of traditional media (Kiousis, 2001). Part of this growing distrust 
may be due to how closely related to reality media portrayals of issues and peoples are (Austin, 
1990). The stylized nature of traditional media through high quality camera use and production 
routines may make the information coming from that channel appear more authentic then an 
everyday person presenting the same information in context of a podcast. 
  Further, audiences tend to seek the most convenient ways to get information despite having 
alternative information sources, like the Internet (Georg & Jackob, 2010). Television does not 
require the same level of literacy that the Internet requires. By its very nature, television is a more 
passive and prolific source of information. Younger generations may prefer the mobility of the 
Internet via mobile technology, but by and large television currently remains the most used 
medium in the United States. Those numbers will change in the future as younger people continue 
to turn to the Internet as a primary source of news information.  
Participants’ political leanings, perceived politics of the media and story type 
  There was a significant interaction effect between story type and participant’s personal 
politics. Liberal, politically neutral and conservative leaning participants trusted securitized stories 
more than nonsecuritized stories within traditional media conditions. The podcast conditions had 
a different result with liberal and politically neutral participants trusting the nonsecuritized stories 
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more than the securitized stories. However, conservative participants trusted the information in the 
securitized stories more than the nonsecuritized. Overall, stories from traditional media were 
trusted more than their podcast counterparts.  
  Media texts may be interpreted differently by audiences based on their political views 
(Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Vollone, Ross & Lepper, 1985); however, the results of this study 
show that when security is “turned on,” higher levels of trust were perceived. Similarly in the 
podcast conditions, conservative audiences trusted the securitized stories more than the 
nonsecuritized stories, which is interesting because podcasts, in general, were trusted less than 
traditional media. Morris (2007) suggests that the introduction of online news sources has led to 
“fragmented media,” where audiences seek alternative sources to augment their own political 
views. Even though many conservatives criticize the media for being too liberal (Morris, 2007), 
the results of this study find that perceived politics of the media only made a difference with the 
stories were securitized.    
  According to Feldman (2007), while younger people are focusing on social media as a 
legitimate source of news, many of these audiences are also turning to The Daily Show with John 
Stewart for news about politics. This suggests that total abandonment of traditional media is not 
necessarily occurring, rather these audiences are not getting all of their political information from 
traditional news services and relying (in some cases) on alternative television political programs.  
Age of participant on trust, credibility and authenticity on presenter and story type 
  Participants’ age was not a significant factor in audience perception of trust, credibility and 
authenticity of the presenter in the traditional and podcast conditions. That finding is consistent 
with prior research which suggests that demographic variable, like age, may not play a significant 
role in trust of the presenter (Yang, 2007; Georg and Edmund, 2010). These studies found that 
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media usage (amount used and type of media) played a much larger role in how audiences trusted 
the presenters. 
  These findings were not unexpected as the current questions regarding age were not 
focused on the age of the presenter, but rather on the age of the participant. The average age of the 
participants was nearly 23, with almost 70 percent as heavy social media users. The presenters 
used for this study were also in their early to mid- 20s. Since participants were not given a wide 
variety in presenter age and all presenters were female, this suggest that audiences did not focus 
on the presenters’ attributes, but rather at the information being presented. Similarly, Weibel, 
Wissmath and Groner (2008) found that age of the presenters did not necessarily affect the 
newscasters’ perceived credibility. 
  Age of the participant did not affect trust, credibility and authenticity of the modality. 
Although the results were not significant, future research in the area might include more detail in 
media preferences for younger and older media consumers. In addition, the average age in the 
participant pool was nearly 23 years old and largely social media users. According to Pew Research 
Internet Project (2014) 74 percent of people online use social media (numbers from January 2014), 
thus trust in modality may be an ever changing space for the average user. In addition, certain 
types of information in may evoke different reactions in audiences regardless of age and modality. 
Younger audiences tend to be more heavily represented in studies comparing television and 
Internet usage, and this study had an overall young population.  
  Previous research` that suggests that audience demographics variables do affect their 
perception of medium credibility (Westley & Severin, 1964; Abel & Wirth, 1977; Gunther, 1992; 
Mulder, 1981); however, these studies were focused on traditional media. The addition of social 
media has provided audiences more options for seeking information, and despite the majority of 
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heavy social media users, age did not show a significant effect for modality and credibility. 
  Conventional wisdom suggests that as the Internet continues to become ubiquitous, more 
and more people will turn to it for information, including news. But as in the case of trust and 
credibility, authenticity did not produce significant results in regards to age and media usage 
despite the fact that the majority of users claimed to be heavy social media users and the average 
age of the participants was just under 23. This suggests that authenticity may be perceived in 
different ways than trust and credibility. Story type produced a significant main effect in that 
nonsecuritized stories were perceived as more authentic than securitized stories. Thus, when 
security was turned on audiences found nonsecuritized stories more authentic. One explanation for 
this result might be that participants did not judge the securitized stories as believable while 
nonsecuritized stories may have been perceived closer to reality. Austin and Dong (1994) found 
that stories judged believable were because they were more closely perceived as reality while 
information deemed sensational is deemed unbelievable. The participants for this study may have 
perceived the securitize stories as sensational and nonsecuritized stories as more aligned with 
reality. 
Gender and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity of presenter, story type and modality 
  Gender did not produce any significant results for trust, credibility and perceived 
authenticity for audience perception of presenters, regardless of the presenter’s ethnicity. Several 
audience demographic characteristics like age, gender and education have been identified as 
correlates of trust and credibility (Choi, Watt & Lynch, 2006; Gunther, 1992; Becker, Cobbey & 
Sobowale, 1978; Westley & Severin, 1964). In contrast, Grabe and Kamhawi (2006) found that 
when presented with negative, positive and ambiguous news information, men tended to focus and 
recall the negative news, while women leaned more towards the positive news. News information 
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that has securitizing elements could certainly be viewed as negative news, yet the current results 
did not show a difference in gender.   
  This suggests that securitization may not necessarily connote “negative” for audiences. For 
some viewers (perhaps regardless of gender), certain racial markers, like religion, skin color and 
even the immigration status of a group of individuals might symbolize a threat. Thus, all 
immigrants will take American jobs, Muslims are terrorists, the spread of Ebola and ISIS poses a 
threat to the U.S. Racial markers allow viewers to make decisions about news information 
efficiently, which does not always translate to negative. This area requires future exploration 
looking at how gender works within the context of securitized news from both traditional and 
social media. 
Participant race and perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity  
  The current study divided the participant pool into three categories: White (n=61), South 
Asian/Middle Eastern (n=43) and Other (n=61). The reason was to identify those groups that have 
been deemed “Brown” and “White” and see if they perceived trust, credibility and authenticity 
with presenters that looked like them. The study hypothesized that participants who self-identify 
as South Asian and Middle Eastern will perceive the Brown anchor as more trustworthy than 
participants who self-identify as Caucasian. The results found that there was a significant 
interaction effect between ethnicity of presenter, story type and participant ethnicity.  
 White securitized presenters were trusted most by the Other category, followed by White 
and South Asian/Middle Eastern participants. White nonsecuritized presenters were trusted most 
by South Asian/Middle Eastern, followed by Other and White participants. South Asian/Middle 
Eastern participants essentially trusted White presenters presenting nonsecuritized news more than 
securitized news. Research in audience attributes suggests that trust in media is based on 
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individuals’ relationship with the content (Gunther, 1992). Trust may decrease for certain 
audiences if the news information is perceived as controversial (Roberts and Leifer, 1975). In 
terms of race, Johnson (1984) found that Black audiences assessed Black reporters positively in 
appearance and believability, overall these audiences felt White reporters were just “better 
performers,” (p. 367). When security was turned on Brown securitized presenters were trusted by 
Other, White and South Asian/Middle Eastern participants. And finally Brown nonsecuritized 
presenters were trusted by Other, South Asian/Middle Eastern and White. Despite the growing 
numbers of South Asian and Middle Eastern on-air personalities, non-White audiences may 
continue to perceive White presenters as more trustworthy than Brown because Whites are more 
commonly seen on-air.  
 The combination effect of the White presenter with security turned on resulted in less 
perceived trust from South Asian/Middle Eastern audiences than Other and White audiences. This 
suggests that this ethnic group of participants may trust the White presenter to be professional, 
they may not trust the information being presented by this presenter. Little research extends into 
how the ethnicity of the participant plays a role in trust of the news presenter. Giles (2002) suggests 
that viewing audiences generally align themselves with television personalities they have 
developed a parasocial relationship with. Horton & Wohl (1956) defined parasocial relationships 
as the perception of an actual social relationship with a media personality. In the case of this study, 
the results were inconsistent with prior research and require more exploration.  
 Further the study hypothesized that participants who self-identified as South Asian and 
Middle Eastern would perceive the Brown anchor as more credible than participants who self-
identify as Caucasian. Overall, participants who were categorized as Other found the presenters in 
all the conditions more credible than their South Asian/Middle Eastern and White counterparts. 
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White securitized presenters were perceived as more credible by White participants compared to 
South Asian/Middle Eastern. White presenters presenting nonsecuritized stories were perceived as 
more credible by South Asian/Middle Eastern than White participants. Brown securitized and 
nonsecuritized presenters were perceived as more credible by South Asian/Middle Eastern than 
White participants. Johnson’s (1984) exploratory study on black audiences’ perception of Black 
newscasters versus White newscasters found Black participants’ perceived the White newscaster 
more credible. Like the Johnson (1984) study, the participants for the current research many not 
be an accurate representative sample. Further, the audiences are exposed to White news presenters 
more often (Johnson, 1984; Poindexter, Smith & Heider, 2003) and as a results may perceive them 
as more credible.  
 The final research question asks which ethnic group of participants perceived authenticity 
in the presenters. To date this is the only research on authenticity, race of presenter and 
securitization and as such it is exploratory. Like credibility, Other participants found the presenters 
in all conditions to be the authentic. Broken down between the other two categories, White 
participants perceived the White securitized presenter as more authentic than South Asian/Middle 
Eastern participants. White nonsecuritized presenter was perceived as more authentic by the South 
Asian/Middle Eastern participants than the White presenter. Thus, securitizing a story appears to 
make a difference in authenticity if the presenter is White, but not if the presenter is Brown. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, when security is turned people pay more attention. Certainly 
media, entertainment and news, manage the ways race and identity are constructed on television 
and even online (Gandy, 2001). But identifying markers in audience can illuminate the types of 
viewing choices. Gandy (2001) suggests that people who are “favorably oriented toward people of 
their own race would tend to prefer content that enables such as interaction, even if it is indirect,” 
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(p. 601). These results show the White audiences perceive White presenters presenting securitized 
news more authentic than Brown presenters. However, the same does not translate to Brown 
audiences and Brown presenters. 
 As with trust and credibility, these audience members perceived the White presenter 
presenting nonsecuritized stories as more authentic than the Brown presenter. Further, the Brown 
securitized presenter was perceived as more authentic by the White participants as compared to 
the South Asian/Middle Eastern participants. And finally the Brown nonsecuritized presenter was 
perceived as more authentic by the White participant as compared to the South Asian/Middle 
Eastern participants. Meaning that in both cases, White participants were more likely than South 
Asian/Middle Eastern participants to see the Brown presenter as more authentic than the white 
presenter. Again, because this area is exploratory, further research is required to determine how 
story type, modality and presenters’ race correlate with the race of the participants. 
Implications for the field of journalism 
  During the mid-October 2014 elections, Americans regarded Ebola and ISIS has major 
threats to the United States despite there being little evidence to support these claims. ISIS is a 
terrorist organization, but its attacks are generally isolated in Iraq and Syria. As for Ebola, there 
have only been four cases in the United States with only one fatality. Yet Republican candidates 
were able to successfully weave these unfounded assertions into their campaigns and win political 
seats, specifically using ISIS and Ebola to create restrictive immigration policies. One reason for 
their success may lie with the origins of where these so-called threats come from. 
  Post-9/11, Americans feared new terrorists’ attacks. Not only were the attackers of Middle 
Eastern decent, they also came through regular immigration channels (international student visas). 
This resulted in renewed U.S. policies that restricted immigration, while increasing surveillance 
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of immigrant populations (Rodriguez, 2008). These measures, rather than alleviating tensions 
about security, exacerbated racial divides and re-racialized American society. These policies 
redefined groups as “good guys” and “bad guys” and as a result certain minority populations were 
targeted as potential threats to American society. Because ISIS is defined as a threat from the 
Middle East, politicians were able to successfully equate it with national security post-9/11. 
  Similarly, Ebola stories stoked public fear and an increase in news coverage that was akin 
to the early days of immigration when epidemics were blamed on immigrants such as tuberculosis 
from Jews and cholera from the Irish (Judis, 2014). Fears surrounding Ebola may be linked to its 
origins from Africa. Like similar “othered” geographic spaces, Africa and the ensuing Ebola 
coverage, evoked unfounded fears of the “Other” by the American public. As Judis (2014) says, 
“These fears are grounded in Americans’ own peculiar nativism, which contrasts the purity of the 
New World with the evil of the Old” (n.p.). The renewed sense of American exceptionalism 
coupled with media stories and political actors focusing on “threats” created a successful 
securitizing atmosphere. 
 These results of this dissertation brought to light some important aspects of the construction 
of news information, in particular looking at perceived threats to American culture and audience 
perceptions of trust, credibility and authenticity. Further, news from social media adds another 
layer to the different kinds of news and where people get it. Past studies have found that trust and 
credibility in traditional media sources is eroding due to alternative media sources, while 
authenticity in social media is an underdeveloped area of research. Audiences, with more choices 
in the new media environment, are turning to online sources for news; however, most people 
continue to use the Internet a supplement to traditional media (Gaskins and Jerit, 2012). When 
audiences use social media, authenticity is a principal element when it comes to presenters 
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(Marwick & boyd, 2010). Social media has made an impact in the ways audiences consumes news. 
 The “Arab Spring” is a prime example of how social media, especially in countries with 
government-owned media, appealed to people during times of political strife (Hamdy & Gomaa, 
2012). Traditional media in Egypt was a mouthpiece for the government, while social media sites 
like YouTube and Twitter allowed the Egyptian public to post videos and news information about 
the injustices being committed by their own government (2012). Unlike network news broadcasts, 
which are packaged and distributed, social media allows audiences to engage with the information 
(Hermida, Fletcher, Korrell & Logan, 2012). Journalists, as well as academics, are debating the 
relationship between traditional and social media sources, while acknowledging the diversity 
within American journalism and audiences.  
 Growing multiculturalism in America has led to what scholars call the “browning of 
America,” (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo 2009). In some ways this “browning” has resulted 
in a perceived “existential threat” to America and the American way of life in terms of dominating 
cultures, religions and even languages. Examples like Sharia Law and even the “Ground Zero 
Mosque” represent more than a potential physical menace, they can also be perceived as a more 
nuanced cultural threat. Sharia law is perceived as the law of the “enemy” and could potentially 
dismantle the U.S. Constitution, and the “Ground Zero Mosque” is being built on hallowed ground 
and is perceived as an affront to the victims of the 9/11 attacks. Part of this fear is due to American 
exceptionalism or that idea that American values and perceived culture is the standard. For 
example, immigration can be securitized because it opens the door to “othered” groups that bring 
other languages, religions and cultures to America which are not necessarily negative so long as 
they do not usurp the “American way of life.” Essentially, the immigrating populations would 
fundamentally change what makes America American. But how does securitization fit within the 
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context of media framing? 
 Frames rely on stereotypes that are already prevalent within all cultures (Entman, 1993). 
Audiences are inundated with images of people and faraway places that become representations 
of the way the world looks. Frames allow editors, managers and journalists to take complex issues 
and simplify them for their audiences (Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 2003; Scheufele, 1999). Frames are 
created through the repetitive use of words, phrases, metaphors and images (Entman, 1991, 1993). 
Securitization provides an amplifying effect that exaggerate the social and cultural importance of 
these frames (Vultee, 2009). This dissertation adds to the body of literature regarding framing and 
securitization. The results suggest that when security is “turned on” audiences perceived higher 
rates of trust, credibility and authenticity. As a result it is imperative to recognize that the media 
has an important role when talking about topics like terrorism, immigration and even health. 
Specifically, race and culture can be framed and securitized and this can be significant in 
newsrooms for consumers and news producers. 
  Journalism is a public service ideally based on the concept of democracy and inclusion; 
however, American journalism has been criticized for its depictions of race, trivializing culture 
and essentially maintaining the status quo (Glasser, Awad and Kim, 2009). The Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s created more opportunities for minorities in the newsrooms, but not in 
direct proportion to minority population growth. As a result, mainstream news media has been 
criticized for not covering issues that reflect minority populations and for biased news coverage 
regarding issues about race and culture. Shaw (1990) noted that lack of diversity in the news media 
has played a significant role in perpetuating stereotypes about ethnic minorities.   
 The results of this study may illuminate the hiring decisions made by news owners and 
managers. Making stronger efforts to hire people of color as reporters and anchors may aid in 
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negating racial and ethnic stereotypes prevalent in the media. What is particularly of interest for 
news producers is being aware of the types and ways they write news stories, especially 
understanding the ways in which audiences trust, find credible and authentic, news information 
when the security switch is turned on. And finally it is important to address how audiences, who 
are becoming more diverse and media literate, consume news in multiple formats. As online news 
becomes more prolific and ubiquitous, it is important to understand how traditional media outlets 
are changing and evolving in this new media environment. Journalists and other news producers 
need to explore the ways in which stereotypes are formed and used within their news coverage to 
better understand the ways to dispel them.  
 In addition, as the field of journalism becomes more diverse, there is a growing need to 
address how audiences perceive information from ethnic news presenters in traditional media. This 
dissertation research also hopes to add to the body of literature that examines race post 9/11 in 
terms of trust, credibility and authenticity. This could have implications for news producers and 
writers as they package news. Also social media is becoming a larger part of traditional media 
newscasts (Hermida, Fletcher, Korell & Logan, 2012), as such newsmakers need to pay attention 
to what citizens are bringing to the newsroom and the impact it has on diverse audiences. 
Limitations and future research 
 This dissertation study had several limitations. The questions about trust and credibility 
were limited in scope and for future research should be made more elaborate to test for differences 
between the two. Much of the research surrounding trust and credibility tends to these terms 
interchangeably, thus further explanation of these terms should be used in future research. While 
authenticity is an exploratory area, the scales should also be broadened to gain a better 
understanding of its role in news from traditional and new media. The large amount of insignificant 
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results, also suggests that a more through definition of trust, credibility and authenticity is require 
to understand how audiences perceive these elements in news.  
 The stories created for the study were also limited in subjects. This dissertation was mainly 
focused on terrorism and immigration, but future studies could add other topics like economics, 
health issues and climate change. In addition, the presenters hired for the study were students and 
while that is more commonplace in social media settings to see more casual presentations, in 
traditional media their lack of television news training may have been more apparent to 
participants. 
 Grabe and Kamhawi (2006) suggest that participant demographics play an important role 
in news perception. This dissertation used participant demographics as correlates, but the findings 
were inconclusive. Women interpret news differently than men, but the results of this dissertation 
did not find those differences to be significant. This suggests that perhaps the ways men and 
women interpret securitized news is different than news that is perceived as negative. When the 
security switch is turned on, men and women may interpret that information in more similar ways 
than previously thought. Further, the lack of significant results for participant age and 
securitization may reflect that younger and older audiences also see securitized information 
similarly. Despite what society thinks about younger people media use and perceptions of security, 
the current results say that there are no major differences.  
 But securitization made a difference in the way certain audiences viewed the information 
in terms of trust, credibility and authenticity. This dissertation was interested in looking at the ways 
“othered” participants like South Asians and Middle Easterners perceived news information 
differently than other ethnic groups like White and Black. Conventional wisdom has always 
suggested that ethnic groups will most often align themselves with people who physically resemble 
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them, but the results proved that it is not always the case. In many ways this result reflects current 
newsroom demographics which showcase growing multiculturalism in the newsrooms, but not 
necessarily at the same rate as represented in current US populations. Because White anchors and 
reporters dominate American newsroom, many viewers may interpret this as the norm and may 
not perceive a person of color in the same regard for trust, credibility and authenticity merely due 
to the lack of visibility on-air.  
 Issues of race are important factors to consider when considering news information in the 
new media environment. Trust, credibility and even authenticity are interpreted by different 
audiences in different ways, especially when the information presented may be perceived as a 
threat to the “American way of life.” Culture is an ever evolving and highly interpretive space, but 
during times of conflict it becomes coveted and cherished. Thus, it is important to recognize that 
threating a dominant culture may be perceived as a threat to national identity. 
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APPENDIX A 
BROADCAST SCRIPTS 
(Manipulated portions are highlighted) 
NATO ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN TRADITIONAL MEDIA SCRIPTS  
 
[SECURITIZED] ANCHOR: Pakistan's military insists that the NATO strike last month that killed 
more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers near the Afghan border was deliberate. 
Pakistani military officials at the briefing contended that NATO forces knew they were firing 
at Pakistani troops throughout the attack and even apologized as they kept firing…evidence 
they say supports their assertions the attack was deliberate. 
The Pakistani officials at the briefing argued that well-established operating procedures and an 
intricate system for operational information sharing were deliberately ignored, which led to the 
tragic incident. 
[NONSECURITIZED]ANCHOR: Pakistan's military insists that the NATO strike last month that 
killed more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers near the Afghan border was deliberate. 
U.S. officials have said it was a regrettable case of mistaken identity and miscommunication 
when NATO attacked the area in support of a nearby U.S.-Afghan joint patrol that believed 
it was under fire from the Taliban. 
The Pakistani officials at the briefing argued that well-established operating procedures and an 
intricate system for operational information sharing were deliberately ignored, which led to the 
tragic incident. 
NATO ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Last month a NATO airstrike in Pakistan killed 24 Pakistani 
soldiers…and Pakistani officials are saying it was deliberate. Not only are we killing innocent 
civilians with drone bombs, but now were killing their soldiers who are trying to help us 
combat terrorism. There’s even evidence that suggests that NATO forces were apologizing 
to the Pakistani soldiers as they were firing on them.  
Within hours of the attack Pakistan had closed the border crossing for supplies bound for NATO 
forces in Afghanistan… it’s a move that’s been used in the past as a protest. 
[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Last month a NATO airstrike in Pakistan killed 24 
Pakistani soldiers…and Pakistani officials are saying it was deliberate. According to U.S. 
officials…it was a major case of mistaken identity and miscommunication from both parties. 
NATO soldiers truly believed they were under attack by the Taliban and fought back. 
Although the deaths are a tragedy…I think we all need to keep in mind that these Pakistani 
men were soldiers. It’s a hazard of the job.  
Within hours of the attack Pakistan had closed the border crossing for supplies bound for NATO 
forces in Afghanistan… it’s a move that’s been used in the past as a protest. 
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DRONE ATTACKS SCRIPTS TRADITIONAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED]ANCHOR: 
Several missiles fired from an American drone aircraft on Thursday struck a meeting of local 
people in northwest Pakistan who had gathered with Taliban mediators to settle a dispute over a 
mine. Pakistani intelligence says the attack killed 26 of 32 people present, some of them Taliban 
fighters, but the majority were elders and local people, including several children. The locals were 
not attached to the militants. 
Waziristan is one of the hardest hit areas in Pakistan and is also a major hub for extremism. 
But according to one local: quote “Muslim blood has become a business. If they really were 
killing extremists, the deaths from drone strikes would be lessening the insurgency, which it 
isn't."  End quote. The United States has been using drones attacks in Pakistan since 2004. 
About four missiles fired from one or more drones hit the meeting of two tribes and Taliban 
mediators who had gathered on open ground at a market in Datta Khel, in North Waziristan.  
[NONSECURITIZED]ANCHOR:  Several missiles fired from an American drone aircraft on 
Thursday struck a meeting of local people in northwest Pakistan who had gathered with Taliban 
mediators to settle a dispute over a mine. Pakistani intelligence says the attack killed 26 of 32 
people present, some of them Taliban fighters, but the majority were elders and local people, 
including several children. The locals were not attached to the militants. 
But American officials on Thursday sharply disputed Pakistan’s account of the strikes and 
the civilian deaths, contending that all the people killed were insurgents. According to one 
American official…quote: “These people weren’t gathering for a bake sale. They were 
terrorists.”  End quote. 
About four missiles fired from one or more drones hit the meeting of two tribes and Taliban 
mediators who had gathered on open ground at a market in Datta Khel, in North Waziristan.  
DRONE ATTACKS SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: America has been using drones as a weapon of choice since 
2004 especially in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border areas. Despite the fact that Pakistani officials 
are saying we are killing innocent civilians…we are in fact targeting and killing key members 
of Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Take for instance the latest bombing in Waziristan….a major 
hub for extremism. As one American official put it…quote “These people weren’t gathering 
for a bake sale. They were terrorists.” End quote. The two tribes were gathering to discuss local 
business matters with members of the Taliban. 
[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: America has been using drones as a weapon of choice 
since 2004 especially in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border areas. Waziristan is one of the hardest 
hit areas in Pakistan and is also a major hub for extremism. But according to one local: quote 
“Muslim blood has become a business. If they really were killing extremists, the deaths from 
drone strikes would be lessening the insurgency, which it isn't."  End quote. The two tribes 
were gathering to discuss local business matters with members of the Taliban. 
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RAYMOND DAVIS SHOOTING SCRIPTS TRADITIONAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED]ANCHOR: More trouble for U.S./Pakistan relations…this time resulting in the 
deaths of two Pakistani citizens by an American. 
The U.S. says the American, 36-year-old Raymond Allen Davis, shot the Pakistanis on 
January 27th because they were trying to rob him in the eastern city of Lahore. Pakistani 
police officials say one of the men was carrying a gun. Washington insists his detention is 
illegal under international agreements covering diplomats because he is a U.S. Embassy 
staffer.  
The disclosure compounds an already combustible standoff between the United States and 
Pakistan at a time of growing distrust between the two countries and complicates the U.S. efforts 
on the war on terror. 
[NONSECURITIZED]ANCHOR:  More trouble for U.S./Pakistan relations…this time resulting 
in the deaths of two Pakistani citizens by an American. 
Investigators have determined that CIA contractor Raymond Davis who killed two Pakistani 
youths… was not acting in self-defense. Lahore City police Chief Aslam Tareen told a news 
conference that one of the boys was killed while running away. On Friday, Pakistani police 
officials recommended Davis face a murder charge in a case that has further strained 
relations between the counterterrorism allies.  
The disclosure compounds an already combustible standoff between the United States and 
Pakistan at a time of growing distrust between the two countries and complicates the U.S. efforts 
on the war on terror. 
RAYMOND DAVIS SHOOTING SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Two Pakistanis were killed by Raymond Davis…he’s a CIA 
contractor who was stationed in the city of Lahore. So Davis shot the men when they were trying 
to rob him according to U.S. officials. Later on…Pakistani police found out that one of the 
men Davis shot actually had a gun. Pakistan has no right to detain Davis…it was self-defense 
and he had the right to defend himself. 
Of course this only makes the situation between Pakistan and the U.S. more difficult because there 
is major distrust between both countries. On one hand both countries are trying to combat terrorism 
and on the other they have to rely on each other and that requires trust. 
[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Two Pakistanis were killed by Raymond Davis…he’s a 
CIA contractor who was stationed in the city of Lahore.  
Crime scene investigators from both sides…U.S. and Pakistan agree that Davis was in 
fact…NOT acting in self-defense. I mean he shot of one of the innocent men in the back. 
Pakistani police officials are recommending that Davis face a murder charge…which makes 
perfect sense. He killed two innocent people…well technically three if you count the wife that 
committed suicide after she found out her husband had been shot dead. 
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Of course this only makes the situation between Pakistan and the U.S. more difficult because there 
is major distrust between both countries. On one hand both countries are trying to combat terrorism 
and on the other they have to rely on each other and that requires trust. 
IRAQI REFUGEES TRADIONAL MEDIA SCRIPTS 
[SECURITIZED]ANCHOR: Iraqi refugees across the United States — some of whom, have risked 
violence, kidnapping and death threats for assisting U.S. forces — now face a dire economy and 
joblessness in their adopted land. 
Tens of thousands have fled Michigan's troubled economy in recent years, yet Iraqi refugees 
continue to move to the state. Family ties and cultural support from the region's large Middle 
Eastern community is appealing to many of the refugees. 
But what Detroit boasts in Middle Eastern culture, it lacks in economic opportunities. According 
to the Department of Treasury…Michigan’s unemployment is at 10.6 this year, while the national 
average is at 8.6. 
Critics say that the Obama Administration lifting restrictions on Iraqi refugee settlement 
has put an undue amount of stress on the most economically depressed state in America. 
Southeast Michigan currently has 15,000 Iraqi refugees, many of whom are still unemployed. 
[NONSECURITIZED]ANCHOR: Iraqi refugees across the United States — some of whom, have 
risked violence, kidnapping and death threats for assisting U.S. forces — now face a dire economy 
and joblessness in their adopted land. 
Tens of thousands have fled Michigan's troubled economy in recent years, yet Iraqi refugees 
continue to move to the state. Family ties and cultural support from the region's large Middle 
Eastern community is appealing to many of the refugees. 
But what Detroit boasts in Middle Eastern culture, it lacks in economic opportunities. According 
to the Department of Treasury…Michigan’s unemployment is at 10.6 this year, while the national 
average is at 8.6. 
Though Dearborn retains its Lebanese flavor, the area’s Muslim community includes many 
immigrants from India, Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere, along with a growing Eastern 
European contingent and many African-Americans. 
IRAQI REFUGEES SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: We won the war in Iraq and have opened the doors to nearly 
15,000 Iraqi refugees…many of whom helped us during the Iraq war. Some risked death and 
violence to help bring down one of the worst regimes in human history. But these same people are 
now facing the harsh realities of joblessness here in Michigan. 
The fundamental problem is that employment is the backbone of the U.S. resettlement program. 
Refugees are expected to find work when they arrive in the U.S. and to move as quickly as possible 
toward self-sufficiency…except that was a system tailored to an economy with plentiful jobs. But 
jobs have dried up and the system is now collapsing. 
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But the bigger question is…if we really “Won” the war in Iraq, why do we continue to let 
thousands of Iraqi refugees–many of them MUSLIM–into the United States, especially in 
economically depressed areas like Michigan, where there aren’t enough jobs and 
unemployment is nearly 11%? 
 [NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: We won the war in Iraq and have opened the doors to 
nearly 15,000 Iraqi refugees…many of whom helped us during the Iraq war. Some risked death 
and violence to help bring down one of the worst regimes in human history. But these same people 
are now facing the harsh realities of joblessness here in Michigan. 
The fundamental problem is that employment is the backbone of the U.S. resettlement program. 
Refugees are expected to find work when they arrive in the U.S. and to move as quickly as possible 
toward self-sufficiency…except that was a system tailored to an economy with plentiful jobs. But 
jobs have dried up and the system is now collapsing. 
But we have to remember that we live in one of the greatest countries in the world and despite 
the economic situation…refugees are willing to accept what we consider low pay. One of the 
things I love about living in Detroit is the fact that we have large, thriving ethnic and religious 
groups from all around the world. Keep them coming. The Big Three will pull through as 
our regional economy continues to diversify. 
 
LOWE’S ADS SCRIPTS TRADITIONAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED]ANCHOR: Lowe's is planning to stick by its decision to pull its ads from a reality 
TV show about American Muslims... despite the growing opposition the home improvement chain 
is facing over the move.  
Lowe's stopped running commercials during "All-American Muslim" after a conservative group 
known as the Florida Family Association e-mailed advertisers to ask them to stop advertising on 
the show. 
The group said the program, which follows the lives of Muslim families living in the Metro 
Detroit area, was "propaganda that riskily hides the Islamic agenda's clear and present 
danger to American liberties and traditional values." 
"All-American Muslim" premiered last month and chronicles the lives of five families who live in 
and near Dearborn, Michigan, a Detroit suburb with a large Muslim and Arab-American 
population. The show airs on Mondays on TLC and portrays Muslim families living in the United 
States. 
[NONSECURITIZED]ANCHOR: Lowe's is planning to stick by its decision to pull its ads from a 
reality TV show about American Muslims... despite the growing opposition the home 
improvement chain is facing over the move.  
Lowe's stopped running commercials during "All-American Muslim" after a conservative group 
known as the Florida Family Association e-mailed advertisers to ask them to stop advertising on 
the show. 
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Calling the retail giant's decision "un-American" and "naked religious bigotry”…Senator 
Ted Lieu says quote: "The show is about what it's like to be a Muslim in America, and it 
touches on the discrimination they sometimes face. And that kind of discrimination is exactly 
what's happening here with Lowe's.” 
 
"All-American Muslim" premiered last month and chronicles the lives of five families who live in 
and near Dearborn, Michigan, a Detroit suburb with a large Muslim and Arab-American 
population. The show airs on Mondays on TLC and portrays Muslim families living in the United 
States. 
LOWES’S ADS SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Lowe’s has made the big decision to pull its ads from this new 
TLC show called “American Muslim”. 
Lowe's stopped running commercials during the show after a conservative group known as the 
Florida Family Association e-mailed advertisers to ask them to stop advertising on the show. 
In think it’s safe to say that this show is just a ploy to trick God-fearing Americans into 
falling for propaganda that’s hiding the obvious Muslim agenda to disrupt our American 
civil liberties and traditional values.  
[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: Lowe’s has made the big decision to pull its ads from this 
new TLC show called “American Muslim”. 
 
Lowe's stopped running commercials during the show after a conservative group known as the 
Florida Family Association e-mailed advertisers to ask them to stop advertising on the show. 
As far as I’m concerned…Lowe’s pulling their ads from the show is absolutely un-American 
and clear bigoted move to squelch the voices of a minority population. The show is about 
what it's like to be a Muslim in America, including the discrimination they sometimes face. 
And that kind of discrimination is exactly what's happening here with Lowe's. 
GUNMAN SCRIPTS TRADITIONAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED]ANCHOR: A lone gunman, shooting randomly at cars in Hollywood with no 
apparent motive, was killed on Vine Street by Los Angeles police officers Friday morning. 
 
The young man was spotted in a white tank top…walking up the street yelling “Allah- u-
Akbar” and firing a handgun in the air. He then turned to firing at passing motorists who 
seemed to be picked at random, including a man in a Mercedes who was shot in the jaw. That 
man is currently in critical condition. 
The gunman was eventually shot by a detective and an off-duty officer who may have been 
working on a movie set nearby. 
Police so far…have found no motive in the shooting. 
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[NONSECURITIZED]ANCHOR: A lone gunman, shooting randomly at cars in Hollywood with 
no apparent motive, was killed on Vine Street by Los Angeles police officers Friday morning. 
 
The young man was spotted in a white tank top…walking up the street yelling “I’m going to 
die and I want to die” and firing a handgun in the air. He then turned to firing at passing 
motorists who seemed to be picked at random, including a man in the Mercedes who was 
shot in the jaw. That man is currently in critical condition. 
The gunman was eventually shot by a detective and an off-duty officer who may have been 
working on a movie set nearby. 
Police so far…have found no motive in the shooting. 
GUNMAN SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: This crazy guy…who apparently didn’t have a motive…was 
shooting randomly at cars in Hollywood. He was killed by LA Police Friday morning. 
Witnesses spotted the guy walking up the street yelling “Allah-u-Akbar” and firing a 
handgun in the air. He then turned to firing at passing cars…even shooting a guy driving a 
Mercedes in the jaw. The driver is still in critical condition. 
The gunman was eventually shot by a detective and an off-duty officer who may have been 
working on a movie set nearby. 
[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: This crazy guy…who apparently didn’t have a 
motive…was shooting randomly at cars in Hollywood. He was killed by LA Police Friday 
morning. 
Witnesses spotted the guy walking up the street yelling “I’m going to die and I want to die” 
and firing a handgun in the air. He then turned to firing at passing cars…even shooting a 
guy driving a Mercedes in the jaw. The driver is still in critical condition. 
The gunman was eventually shot by a detective and an off-duty officer who may have been 
working on a movie set nearby. 
SHARIA LAW SCRIPTS TRADITIONAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED]ANCHOR: Murfreesboro, Tennessee is the epicenter of a legal battle dealing 
with Sharia Law.  State lawmakers have introduced legislation that would make it a felony to 
practice the religious law of Islam. And a Senate candidate in Nevada warns that cities like 
Dearborn are already under Sharia law – quote – “We're talking about a militant terrorist 
situation, which I believe isn't a widespread thing, but it is enough that we need to address” 
end quote. 
If passed…individuals or groups practicing Sharia law could be punished with 15 years behind 
bars. Tennessee isn't the first state to consider anti-Sharia legislation. Oklahoma passed a similar 
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bill last year. In March…Missouri House Speaker Steve Tilley said he would support a bill that 
"maintains that U.S. law will take precedence in U.S. courts. 
[NONSECURITIZED]ANCHOR: Murfreesboro, Tennessee is the epicenter of a legal battle 
dealing with Sharia Law.  State lawmakers have introduced legislation that would make it a felony 
to practice the religious law of Islam. If passed…individuals or groups practicing Sharia law could 
be punished with 15 years behind bars. Many Muslims consider Sharia law to outline basic 
tenets of living a moral life...including how to give to the poor, repay debt, and ensuring the 
rights of women and children. Some US courts already settle arguments in religious 
communities by referring to religious rules. 
 
 Tennessee isn't the first state to consider anti-Sharia law legislation. Oklahoma passed a 
similar bill last year. In March…Missouri House Speaker Steve Tilley said he would support a bill 
that "maintains that U.S. law will take precedence in U.S. courts. 
SHARIA LAW SCRIPTS PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA 
[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: So there’s this town in Tennessee…Murfreesboro…which has 
become like the major epicenter of the Sharia Law debate. I’m gonna to have to say…we live in 
America…so why are we wasting taxpayer dollars debating a law that has no business being 
here in the U.S. in the first place.  
 Tennessee lawmakers have introduced legislation that would make it a felony to practice 
the religious law of Islam…even saying that if passed…individuals or groups practicing Sharia 
law could be punished with 15 years behind bars.  
 This isn’t something that’s unique to Tennessee. Oklahoma passed a similar bill last year 
and in March Missouri House Speaker Steve Tilley said he would support a bill that "maintains 
that U.S. law will take precedence in U.S. courts”. 
 
[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: So there’s this town in Tennessee… Murfreesboro… 
which has become like the major epicenter of the Sharia Law debate. I’m gonna to have to 
say…we live in America…which is not a country of just white Christians.  It’s a country that 
has embraced people from all religions and from every country in the world. 
 Tennessee lawmakers have introduced legislation that would make it a felony to practice 
the religious law of Islam…even saying that if passed…individuals or groups practicing Sharia 
law could be punished with 15 years behind bars.  
 This isn’t something that’s unique to Tennessee. Oklahoma passed a similar bill last year 
and in March Missouri House Speaker Steve Tilley said he would support a bill that "maintains 
that U.S. law will take precedence in U.S. courts”. 
GROUND ZERO MOSQUE TRADITIONAL MEDIA SCRIPTS 
[SECURITIZED] ANCHOR: America's Republicans are up-in-arms about a proposed building 
that is barely even a blueprint yet, because it will put a new mosque within walking distance of 
New York's Ground Zero. Former mayor Rudy Giuliani, who led the city through the 9/11 
attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center in 2001…has referred to the plans to build 
the mosque as a “desecration of hallowed ground”. Critics charge that having a mosque so 
close to where nearly 3,000 innocent people lost their lives is insensitive and an insult to the 
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victims' families. The mosque would be part of a 13-story Islamic center originally named 
Cordoba House, after the Spanish city conquered by Muslim invaders. 
[NONSECURITIZED] ANCHOR: America's Republicans are up-in-arms about a proposed 
building that is barely even a blueprint yet, because it will put a new mosque within walking 
distance of New York's Ground Zero. Mayor Michael Bloomberg says if people want to build 
a house of worship they have a right to do it. He further goes on to say "This country is not 
built around state religion or only religions or clergy people we agree with. It's built around 
freedom.” The mosque would be just one part of an Islamic community center originally named 
Cordoba House, after the Spanish city conquered by Muslim invaders and enriched by their 
heritage. 
GROUND ZERO MOSQUE PODCAST/SOCIAL MEDIA SCRIPTS 
[SECURITIZED] PODCASTER: It hasn’t even been built yet and Republicans are already up in 
arms over a proposed mosque being built near ground zero. Muslim community members have 
purchased an abandoned and private building a few blocks away that used to be the Burlington 
Coat Factory. Frankly…it’s a disgrace that President Obama supports the idea of this 
mosque. I mean…how can you build a mosque where 3,000 people died because of Islamic 
terrorists? Sure Muslims have the freedom and the right to build a mosque near Ground 
Zero. But we also as Americans have the right to free speech and to picket in front of the 
mosque for as long as it stands.  
[NONSECURITIZED] PODCASTER: It hasn’t even been built yet and Republicans are already 
up in arms over a proposed mosque being built near ground zero. Muslim community members 
have purchased an abandoned and private building a few blocks away that used to be the 
Burlington Coat Factory. Despite the fact that it’s being called a mosque…it’s actually a large 
proposed community center, open to the public and set to house, among other things, a 
basketball court. Yes there will be a prayer space inside it as well, but you don't call a hospital 
a church because it happens to have a chapel inside it, do you? Naysayers may have the right 
to picket in front of the proposed community center…but peaceful Muslims have the right 
to build a place for a multi-faith dialogue. 
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APPENDIX B  
 
SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Trust 
1.) I trust what the presenter is telling me. (trust 1) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
 
2.) The story is providing me an adequate interpretation of complex issue. (trust 2) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
 
3.) I trust this information. (trust 3) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
Credibility 
1.) The presenter is a credible source of information. (cred 1) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
 
2.) The information is fair. (cred 2) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
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3.) Only news from radio, newspaper, and television is credible. (cred 3) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
Authenticity 
1.) I believe what the presenter is saying. (auth 1) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
 
2.) I believe this information. (auth 2) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
 
3.) Television news is believable. (auth 3-Conditions 1-4) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
 
4.) News from social media is believable. (auth 3- Conditions 5-8) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
Securitization 
1.) The story represents a threat to our way of life. (sec 1) 
-strongly agree 
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-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
 
2.) The government needs to tale extraordinary measures to deal with this situation. (sec 2) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
 
3.) The information from this story makes me feel worried. (sec 3) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
 
4.) Americans need more information about this story. (sec 4) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
 
5.) This story makes me feel personally threatened. (sec 5) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-diasgree 
-strongly disagree 
 
6.) The development in this story is a threat to our country. (sec 6) 
-strongly agree 
-agree 
-don’t know/neutral 
-disagree 
-strongly disagree 
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Political leanings questions 
1.) How would you describe your own politics? (pol 1) 
 - Very liberal 
 -Liberal 
 -Neither liberal nor conservative 
 -Conservative 
 -Very conservative 
 
2.) How closely do you follow international news (for example: The Middle East)? (pol 2) 
 - Very closely 
 - Closely 
 -Somewhat closely 
 -Not closely 
 -Never 
3.) How much do you trust the news media to look after your interests? (pol 3) 
 -All of the time 
 -Most of the time 
 -Occasionally 
 -Hardly ever 
 -Never 
4.) How would you describe the politics of the news media? (pol 4) 
 -Very liberal 
 -Liberal 
 -Neither liberal nor conservative 
 -Conservative 
 -Very conservative 
5.) Do you think the country is better or worse off than it was before the terrorist acts of 
September 11, 2001? (pol 5) 
- Much better 
- Better 
-Neutral/don’t know 
- Worse 
-Much worse 
 
6.) Do you think the country is safer or less safe than it was after the terrorist acts of 
September 11, 2001? (pol 6) 
- Safer 
-Somewhat safer 
-Somewhat less safer 
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-Less safe 
- Not safe at all 
7.) How good a job would you say the President is doing? (pol 7) 
- Good job 
- Somewhat good job 
-Neutral/ don’t know 
-Somewhat bad job 
-Bad job 
 
8.) The good a job would you say Congress is doing? (pol 8) 
- Good job 
- Somewhat good job 
-Neutral/ don’t know 
-Somewhat bad job 
-Bad job 
 
9.) How much do you trust the government to look out for you interests? (pol 9) 
- All of the time 
- Most of the time 
- Occasionally 
-Hardly 
- Never 
 
Media Usage Questions 
1.) Newspapers and/or newspaper websites (media 1) 
- Never 
-Less than once a week 
- 1-2 days a week 
-3-5 days a week 
-Almost everyday 
 
2.) Television and/or television websites (media 2) 
- Never 
-Less than once a week 
- 1-2 days a week 
-3-5 days a week 
-Almost everyday 
 
3.) Radio and/or radio websites (media 3) 
- Never 
-Less than once a week 
- 1-2 days a week 
-3-5 days a week 
145 
 
 
-Almost everyday 
 
4.) Magazines and/or magazine websites (media 4) 
- Never 
-Less than once a week 
- 1-2 days a week 
-3-5 days a week 
-Almost everyday 
 
5.) Internet and/or social media websites (for example: Yahoo, MSN, Facebook, Twitter) 
(media 5) 
- Never 
-Less than once a week 
- 1-2 days a week 
-3-5 days a week 
-Almost everyday 
Social Media Engagement Questions 
1.) Blogging (social 1) 
- Never 
-Less than once a week 
- 1-2 days a week 
-3-5 days a week 
-Almost everyday 
 
2.) Social Networking Sites (for example: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, MySpace, 
Google+) (social 2) 
- Never 
-Less than once a week 
- 1-2 days a week 
-3-5 days a week 
-Almost everyday 
 
3.) Instant Messaging (or IM-ing) (social 3) 
- Never 
-Less than once a week 
- 1-2 days a week 
-3-5 days a week 
-Almost everyday 
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4.) Video Chat (for example: Skype, Facetime) (social 4) 
- Never 
-Less than once a week 
- 1-2 days a week 
-3-5 days a week 
-Almost everyday 
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 The purpose of this study is to investigate audience perceptions of trust, credibility and 
authenticity in news information coming from traditional and social media sources, especially 
focused on how securitization amplifies the effects of news frames regarding race and culture. 
Research in race and media suggests that citizens of nations who look like the “other” will be 
framed differently than those of nations that look like “us.” The study examines the effects of 
securitization and how exceptionalism coupled with framing can create an atmosphere where 
American culture has become securitized, in particular the ways in which multiculturalism due to 
increased immigration, especially from South Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American 
countries, has led to a racially charged space post-9/11. The study employed an experiment 
comparing traditional and social media to determine the ways in which audiences perceive news 
information and found that story type (securitized and nonsecuritized) played an important role in 
how audiences perceived trust, credibility and authenticity in the information, the presenter and 
the modality. Overall, securitized stories were trusted and perceived more credible than 
nonsecuritzed stories. Race played a larger role in the way audiences perceived the presenter, with 
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the Brown presenters generally being perceived as more authentic than their White counterparts. 
Audiences also perceived traditional media more trustworthy and credible compared to social 
media. But news from social media was perceived as more authentic than traditional media. 
Further, this dissertation focused on how securitization has a framing function with the news media 
as an important intermediary between political actors and the public. Broadcast news can provide 
a multilayered look at how audiences perceive information from on-air personalities. But in recent 
years, the growth of social media has provided consumers an alternative place to get their news, 
such as video blogs and/or podcasts. Thus, this study examines perceptions of news information 
from multiple channels, presenters of different ethnicities and modality due to the drastically 
changed ways in which the American public, politicians and the media talk about “security.” 
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